[Cryptography] Vulnerabilities (in theory and in practice) in P25 two-way radios

2011-08-10 Thread Matt Blaze
Our (Sandy Clark, Travis Goodspeed, Perry Metzger, Zachary Wasserman, Kevin Xu and me) Usenix Security paper on vulnerabilities in the P25 two-way radio system (used by public safety agencies in the US and elsewhere) is out today. See http://www.crypto.com/papers/p25sec.pdf for the paper

Czech intel agency allegedly offered tax free cash to local crypto vendor to incorporate defects

2010-09-27 Thread Matt Blaze
I don't know anything beyond this this news story, but interesting... http://www.praguemonitor.com/2010/09/14/mfd-bis-offers-tax-free-money-encryption-system - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

Re: SHA-1 collisions now at 2^{52}?

2009-05-02 Thread Matt Blaze
On May 2, 2009, at 5:53, Peter Gutmann wrote: Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com writes: Greg Rose g...@qualcomm.com writes: It already wasn't theoretical... if you know what I mean. The writing has been on the wall since Wang's attacks four years ago. Sure, but this should light a fire

Domestic surveillance and warrantless wiretaps

2008-12-28 Thread Matt Blaze
Like many people, I found last week's Newsweek cover piece, revealing Thomas M. Tamm as the principal source for James Risen and Eric Lichtblau's 2005 NY Times story that broke the warrantless wiretap story, to be a riveting read. But I actually found a sidebar to the story even more

Re: road toll transponder hacked

2008-08-26 Thread Matt Blaze
On Aug 26, 2008, at 10:15, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:24 AM, Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://www.technologyreview.com/Infotech/21301/?a=f From the article: other toll systems, like E-Z Pass and I-Pass, need to be looked at too A couple years ago I

Security by restraining order

2008-08-13 Thread Matt Blaze
The EFF yesterday filed a letter from a number of academic security researchers urging the judge in the MIT Charlie Card case to reverse the restraining order. It can be found on the EFF's case page, at http://www.eff.org/cases/mbta-v-anderson/ As a security researcher (and one of the

Surveillance, secrecy, and ebay

2008-07-26 Thread Matt Blaze
One of the less-discussed risks of widespread surveillance is not just the abuse or misuse of intercepted content and meta- data by the government, but its accidental disclosure. As more and more private data gets collected, and as it sits around for longer and longer, it becomes inevitable that

Security and Human Behavior workshop

2008-07-02 Thread Matt Blaze
There was a terrific interdisciplinary workshop this week at MIT on security and human behavior. Organized by Ross Anderson and Bruce Schneier, the idea was to bring together security researchers from diverse fields who don't normally talk with each other: computing, psychology, economics,

Re: How far is the NSA ahead of the public crypto community?

2008-05-09 Thread Matt Blaze
On May 8, 2008, at 19:08, Leichter, Jerry wrote: An interesting datapoint I've always had on this question: Back in 1975 or so, a mathematician I knew (actually, he was a friend's PhD advisor) left academia to go work for the NSA. Obviously, he couldn't say anything at all about what he

How far is the NSA ahead of the public crypto community?

2008-05-08 Thread Matt Blaze
During the 1980's and 1990's crypto wars, an occasional topic of speculation was just how much the NSA was ahead of the open/public/academic cryptography research community in cryptanalysis and cipher design. We wondered (and still wonder) whether the NSA was merely a strong center of

Re: OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts)

2008-05-05 Thread Matt Blaze
Nonsense. Total nonsense. A half-decent reverse engineer does not need the source code and can easily determine the exact operation of all the security-related components from the compiled executables, extracted ROM/EPROM code or reversed FPGA/ASIC layout I'm glad to know that you have managed

Rewriting the cryptography debate

2008-03-15 Thread Matt Blaze
So I recently re-read Lawrence Wright's controversial piece in the New Yorker profiling Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell. (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/080121fa_fact_wright) While the piece's glimpse into the administration's attitudes toward torture and

Re: Failure of PKI in messaging

2007-02-12 Thread Matt Blaze
I'm all for email encryption and signatures, but I don't see how this would help against today's phishing attacks very much, at least not without a much better trust management interface on email clients (of a kind much better than currently exists in web browsers). Otherwise the phishers could

Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.

2007-01-26 Thread Matt Blaze
I was surprised to discover that one of James Randi's million dollar paranormal challenges is protected by a surprisingly weak (dictionary- based) commitment scheme that is easily reversed and that suffers from collisions. For details, see my blog entry about it:

Re: Creativity and security

2006-03-28 Thread Matt Blaze
On Mar 26, 2006, at 22:07, Joseph Ashwood wrote: - Original Message - From: J. Bruce Fields [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Creativity and security On Fri, Mar 24, 2006 at 06:47:07PM -, Dave Korn wrote: IOW, unless we're talking about a corrupt employee with a photographic

Re: serious threat models

2006-02-04 Thread Matt Blaze
Yes, it's not at all clear from these stories just what was going on or how high tech the attack would have to be. What does diverting to a prepaid mobile mean? Here's a possibility: they social engineered or otherwise compromised the target account to assigned it a new telephone number and

Re: Webcast of crypto rump session this year!

2005-08-17 Thread Matt Blaze
And for those who didn't catch this bit on the webcast (or in person): The Bletchley park trust wants to sell off the building that houses the Colossus rebuild and turn it in to housing. Another group, the Bletchley Park Heritage (run by, among others, the amazingly interesting Tony Sale) hopes

Weaknesses in RFID-based transponders

2005-01-29 Thread Matt Blaze
A group of computer scientists at Johns Hopkins and RSA Labs is reporting practical attacks against the TI Digital Signature Transponder RFID chip, which is used, among other things, to secure many automotive transponder ignition keys and the SpeedPass payment system. Their paper is available at

Safecracking for the computer scientist

2005-01-09 Thread Matt Blaze
I've been thinking for a while about the relationship between the human-scale security systems used to protect the physical world the cryptologic and software systems that protect the electronic world. I'm increasingly convinced that these areas have far more in common that we might initially

Re: Question on the state of the security industry (second half not necessarily on topic)

2004-07-09 Thread Matt Blaze
On Jul 3, 2004, at 14:22, Dave Howe wrote: Well if nothing else, it is impossible for my bank to send me anything I would believe via email now To take this even slightly more on-topic - does anyone here have a bank capable of authenticating themselves to you when they ring you? I have had

Re: Monoculture

2003-10-02 Thread Matt Blaze
I must admit I'm baffled, and rather appalled, to be seeing supposed advocates of cryptography suggesting, in effect, that cryptologic education somehow perpetuates a guild system or that deployed security protocols need not be measured against the current state of the art. It might be debatable

Re: New authentication protocol, was Re: Tinc's response to Linux's answer to MS-PPTP

2003-09-30 Thread Matt Blaze
I wrote: For some recent relevant papers, see the ACM-CCS '02 paper my colleagues and I wrote on our JFK protocol (http://www.crypto.com/papers/jfk-ccs.ppt), ... But of course I meant the url to be http://www.crypto.com/papers/jfk-ccs.pdf I don't know what I could have been thinking; I

Re: Monoculture

2003-09-30 Thread Matt Blaze
I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed newcomers. No longer acceptable indeed. Too much competition boys? Rich, Oh come on. Are you willfully misinterpreting what I wrote, or did you

Re: Monoculture

2003-09-30 Thread Matt Blaze
Perry writes: Richard Schroeppel [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: (Responding to the chorus of protocol professionals saying please do not roll your own) I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed

Re: New authentication protocol, was Re: Tinc's response to Linux's answer to MS-PPTP

2003-09-29 Thread Matt Blaze
EKR writes: I'm trying to figure out why you want to invent a new authentication protocol rather than just going back to the literature and ripping off one of the many skeletons that already exist (STS, JFK, IKE, SKEME, SIGMA, etc.). That would save people from the trouble of having to

USENIX Security '04 Call for Papers

2003-09-06 Thread Matt Blaze
: 31 March 2004 Camera-Ready Papers Due: 18 May 2004 ORGANIZERS Program Chair: Matt Blaze, ATT / University of Pennsylvania Program Committee: Bill Aiello, ATT Labs - Research Tina Bird, Stanford University Drew Dean, SRI International Carl Ellison, Microsoft Eu-Jin Goh, Stanford University Sotiris