Re: [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening

2013-09-19 Thread Max Kington
On 19 Sep 2013 19:11, Bill Frantz fra...@pwpconsult.com wrote: On 9/19/13 at 5:26 AM, rs...@akamai.com (Salz, Rich) wrote: I know I would be a lot more comfortable with a way to check the mail against a piece of paper I received directly from my bank. I would say this puts you in the sub

Re: [Cryptography] End to end

2013-09-18 Thread Max Kington
On 18 Sep 2013 07:44, Christoph Gruber gr...@guru.at wrote: On 2013-09-17 Max Kington mking...@webhanger.com wrote: [snip] Hence, store in the clear, keep safe at rest using today's archival mechanism and when that starts to get dated move onto the next one en-masse, for all your media

Re: [Cryptography] End to end

2013-09-17 Thread Max Kington
On 17 Sep 2013 15:47, Christoph Gruber gr...@guru.at wrote: On 2013-09-16 Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote: [snip] If people are sending email through the corporate email system then in many cases the corporation has a need/right to see what they are sending/receiving. [snip]

Re: [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far

2013-09-14 Thread Max Kington
. They only enable cooperation to the extent that local law allows and have different rules about support that allows evidence that can be admissible in court and other kinds of support. So it comes back to what you're worried about, it doesn't have to be about absolutes Max I'd love to be disabused

Re: [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity

2013-09-14 Thread Max Kington
and the salt I can probably brute force the password. I've exchanged mails with the mailpile.is guys and I think they're still looking at the options. Max ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo

Re: [Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis

2013-09-11 Thread Max Kington
cryptosystems? How modern is modern? :-) I have modern cryptanalysys by Christopher Swenson (or at least did have before it was loaned and I moved) and it was an excellent book and crucially was very accessible. Also available in kindle format now. It is 5 years old now though. Regards Max Thanks

Re: [Cryptography] In the face of cooperative end-points, PFS doesn't help

2013-09-08 Thread Max Kington
all I had done was shift the target from the protocol to the device. If I really wanted to get the data I'd attack the onscreen software keyboard and leave everything else alone. Max On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 7:50 PM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On Sep 7, 2013, at 11:16 PM, Marcus D

Discrete logarithms modulo 530-bit prime

2007-02-07 Thread Max Alekseyev
Thorsten Kleinjung reports recent success on computing discrete logarithms modulo 530-bit (160 decimal digits) prime: http://listserv.nodak.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0702L=nmbrthryT=0P=194 Max - The Cryptography Mailing List

A security bug in PGP products?

2006-08-21 Thread Max A.
, Max - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: NIST recommendations for PRNGs

2006-07-25 Thread Max A.
On 6/14/06, Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: via Bruce Schneier's blog: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90_DRBG_June2006.pdf It was updated June 30 to the final version: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90_DRBG-June2006-final.pdf Max

Re: Factorization polynomially reducible to discrete log - known fact or not?

2006-07-12 Thread Max A.
: solving the discrete logarithm problem for a composite modulus is exactly as hard as factoring and solving it modulo primes. Max - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: classical crypto programmatic aids

2006-06-29 Thread Max A.
Travis, Take a look at http://www.cryptool.com/ Regards, Max On 6/27/06, Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi folks, Does anyone here know of any computer-based aids for breaking classical cryptosystems? I'm thinking in particular of the ones in Body of Secrets, which are so short that I

Re: Status of attacks on AES?

2006-06-09 Thread Max
in distinguishing AES-encrypted data (say, for a fixed plaintext without repeating blocks on their choice) from random data. Max - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: U. Washington Crypto Course Available Online For Free

2006-06-06 Thread Max
Institute: http://www.msri.org/publications/video/index01.html Max P.S. If you know other good courses/lectures on the topic missing in the collection, please share. On 6/6/06, Udhay Shankar N [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/06/04/1311243 -- ((Udhay Shankar N

Re: Is AES better than RC4

2006-05-24 Thread Max
cipher (if you like something from the RC-family of ciphers) but that was already done by the AES standard committee. RC6 became one of the five finalists but then lost the race to Rijndael. Look at the details of AES selection process if interested. Max

Re: Status of attacks on AES?

2006-05-13 Thread Max
? It worths to look at Nicolas T. Courtois' page: http://www.cryptosystem.net/aes/ Max - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: RNG quality verification

2006-04-12 Thread Max
of flaws in cryptographic primitives, thus significantly reducing the amount of time required to determine security or insecurity of a given cryptographic primitive. Max - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

Re: is breaking RSA at least as hard as factoring or vice-versa?

2006-04-08 Thread Max
Yet another paper on the topic: Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalence of Computing the RSA Secret Key and Factoring by Jean-Sebastien Coron and Alexander May http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/208 Max - The Cryptography Mailing

Re: MD5 collisions in one minute

2006-03-18 Thread Max
, do you aware of another MD5 Collisions generating software (requiring ~45 minutes per collision) available at http://www.stachliu.com/collisions.html I did not find any references to it in Marc's website/paper. Max

Re: jointly create a random value for corrupted party

2005-07-19 Thread Max
. The party i then verifies that the value r_i was used to produce one of q_1, q_2, q_3. From A's use of r every party computes g^r mod p and verifies that g^r=q1*q2*q3. Max - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending