On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 04:22:50PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> On Oct 10, 2013, at 11:58 AM, "R. Hirschfeld" wrote:
> > Very silly but trivial to "implement" so I went ahead and did so:
> >
> > To send a prism-proof email, encrypt it for your recipient and send it
> > to irrefrangi...@mail.uni
On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 11:45:56AM -0400, Arnold Reinhold wrote:
> If we are going to always use a construction like AES(KDF(key)), as
> Nico suggests, why not go further and use a KDF with variable length
> output like Keccak to replace the AES key schedule? And instead of
Note, btw, that Keccak
On Sat, Oct 05, 2013 at 09:29:05PM -0400, John Kelsey wrote:
> One thing that seems clear to me: When you talk about algorithm
> flexibility in a protocol or product, most people think you are
> talking about the ability to add algorithms. Really, you are talking
> more about the ability to *remo
On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 11:20 AM, Ray Dillinger wrote:
> So, it seems that instead of AES256(key) the cipher in practice should be
> AES256(SHA256(key)).
More like: use a KDF and separate keys (obtained by applying a KDF to
a root key) for separate but related purposes.
For example, if you have a
On Sep 25, 2013 8:06 AM, "John Kelsey" wrote:
> On Sep 22, 2013, at 8:09 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > Either way, the question is how to stop this side channel attack.
> > One simple way would be to encrypt the nonces from the RNG under a
> > secret key generated in some other fashion.
> >
't care about active attacks,
then you can get BTNS with minimal effort. This is quite true.
At least some times we need to care about active attacks.
> On Thu, 12 Sep 2013, Nico Williams wrote:
> >Note: you don't just want BTNS, you also want RFC5660 -- "IPsec
> >ch
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 03:17:35PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Sep 2013 14:53:28 -0500 Nico Williams
> wrote:
> > Traffic analysis can't really be defeated, not in detail.
>
> What's wrong with mix networks?
First: you can probably be observed using t
On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 04:03:44PM -0700, Nemo wrote:
> Phillip Hallam-Baker writes:
>
> > I have attempted to produce a summary of the discussion so far for use
> > as a requirements document for the PRISM-PROOF email scheme. This is
> > now available as an Internet draft.
> >
> > http://www.iet
On Mon, Sep 09, 2013 at 02:48:56PM -0400, Jeffrey I. Schiller wrote:
> I don’t believe you can do this without using some form of public key
> system.
My $.02:
- protocols based entirely on symmetric keying are either PSK or a
flavor of Needham-Schroeder (e.g., Kerberos)
- neither PSK nor N
On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 06:51:16PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> It occurs to me that specifying IVs for CBC mode in protocols
> like IPsec, TLS, etc. be generated by using a block cipher in counter
> mode and that the IVs be implicit rather than transmitted kills two
> birds with one stone.
>
On Mon, Sep 09, 2013 at 10:25:03AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> Just got word from an Openswan developer:
>
> "
> To my knowledge, we never finished implementing the BTNS mode.
>
> It wouldn't be hard to do --- it's mostly just conditionally commenting out
> code.
> "
> There's obviously a large p
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