Re: [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case

2013-10-14 Thread Nicolas Rachinsky
* John Denker j...@av8n.com [2013-10-10 17:13 -0700]: *) Each server should publish a public key for /dev/null so that users can send cover traffic upstream to the server, without worrying that it might waste downstream bandwidth. This is crucial for deniabililty: If the rubber-hose guy

Re: padlocks with backdoors - TSA approved

2007-02-27 Thread Nicolas Rachinsky
* Hadmut Danisch [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2007-02-26 21:20 +0100]: has this been mentioned here before? I don't know if it was mentioned here. Bruce Schneier wrote about it some time ago. http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0404.html#2 http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0405.html#10 Nicolas

Re: NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use

2006-02-28 Thread Nicolas Rachinsky
* Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2006-02-25 13:11 -0800]: Finally, the properties of MY public-key will directly affect the confidentiality properties of YOUR envelope. For example, if (on purpose or by force) my public-key enables a covert channel (eg, weak key, key escrow, shared private

Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin

2005-12-02 Thread Nicolas Rachinsky
* Joseph Ashwood [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2005-11-22 02:50 -0800]: - Original Message - From: Anton Stiglic [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin -Original Message- From: [Joseph Ashwood] Subject: Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin

Re: Ostiary

2005-08-02 Thread Nicolas Rachinsky
* Karl Chen [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2005-08-02 09:24 -0700]: As an authentication protocol, it looks vulnerable to a time synchronization attack: an attacker that can desynchronize the server and client's clocks predictably can block the client's authentication and use it as his own. (Assuming the