* John Denker j...@av8n.com [2013-10-10 17:13 -0700]:
*) Each server should publish a public key for /dev/null so that
users can send cover traffic upstream to the server, without
worrying that it might waste downstream bandwidth.
This is crucial for deniabililty: If the rubber-hose guy
* Hadmut Danisch [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2007-02-26 21:20 +0100]:
has this been mentioned here before?
I don't know if it was mentioned here. Bruce Schneier wrote about it
some time ago.
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0404.html#2
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0405.html#10
Nicolas
* Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2006-02-25 13:11 -0800]:
Finally, the properties of MY public-key will directly affect the
confidentiality
properties of YOUR envelope. For example, if (on purpose or by force) my
public-key
enables a covert channel (eg, weak key, key escrow, shared private
* Joseph Ashwood [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2005-11-22 02:50 -0800]:
- Original Message -
From: Anton Stiglic [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin
-Original Message-
From: [Joseph Ashwood]
Subject: Re: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin
* Karl Chen [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2005-08-02 09:24 -0700]:
As an authentication protocol, it looks vulnerable to a time
synchronization attack: an attacker that can desynchronize the server
and client's clocks predictably can block the client's authentication
and use it as his own. (Assuming the
