* John Denker [2013-10-10 17:13 -0700]:
> *) Each server should publish a public key for "/dev/null" so that
> users can send cover traffic upstream to the server, without
> worrying that it might waste downstream bandwidth.
>
> This is crucial for deniabililty: If the rubber-hose guy accuses
* Hadmut Danisch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2007-02-26 21:20 +0100]:
> has this been mentioned here before?
I don't know if it was mentioned here. Bruce Schneier wrote about it
some time ago.
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0404.html#2
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0405.html#10
Nicolas
---
* Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2006-02-25 13:11 -0800]:
> Finally, the properties of MY public-key will directly affect the
> confidentiality
> properties of YOUR envelope. For example, if (on purpose or by force) my
> public-key
> enables a covert channel (eg, weak key, key escrow, shared priva
* Joseph Ashwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2005-11-22 02:50 -0800]:
> - Original Message -
> From: "Anton Stiglic" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: RE: Fermat's primality test vs. Miller-Rabin
>
>
> >-Original Message-
> >From: [Joseph Ashwood]
> >Subject: Re: Fermat's primality test vs
* Karl Chen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2005-08-02 09:24 -0700]:
> As an authentication protocol, it looks vulnerable to a time
> synchronization attack: an attacker that can desynchronize the server
> and client's clocks predictably can block the client's authentication
> and use it as his own. (Assumin
