level..
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Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - de...@iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front
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; caveat emptor.
I would imagine it'd be the result of fitting some reasonable
exponential to both keylengths and extrapolating, which then of course
blows up...for once *literally* exponentially. ;)
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Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - de...@iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front
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break. That should be fair enough, and should help us optimize
against future security breaks at the margin, no?
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Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - de...@iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front
+358-50-5756111, 025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2
then have any quantitative research on how bad this
sort of sharing really is, in excess of the basic cryptographic
vulnerability? Does the social network research of recent years yield
any numbers, for instance?
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Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - de...@iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front
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. And why such drives will be forthwith banned. Et cetera,
ad nauseam.
So it goes.
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Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - de...@iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front
+358-50-5756111, 025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2
in
this department most likely fall in the advanced category even today,
especially if computationally thrifty. I've certainly never seen
anything of the sort in what DSP literature I'm aware of.
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Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111
student/math+cs/helsinki university, http
and then use them as computationally heavy black boxes
in algorithms. (The latter part is analogous to efforts at creating
physical one-time tokens for watermarking purposes.)
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Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], tel:+358-50-5756111
student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi