Re: [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing

2013-09-17 Thread Sandy Harris
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 12:44 PM, Bill Frantz fra...@pwpconsult.com wrote: Symmetric encryption: Two algorithms give security equal to the best of them. Three protect against meet-in-the-middle attacks. Performing the multiple encryption at the block level allows block cyphers to be

Re: [Cryptography] real random numbers

2013-09-14 Thread Sandy Harris
Let me a try a different way of stating (what I think is) Denker's point. From docs for my RNG, at: ftp://ftp.cs.sjtu.edu.cn:990/sandy/maxwell/ Discussing Denker's Turbid, found at: http://www.av8n.com/turbid/paper/turbid.htm (Quoting) The unique advantage of Turbid is that it provably delivers

Re: [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources

2013-09-10 Thread Sandy Harris
On Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 10:59 AM, Marcus D. Leech mle...@ripnet.com wrote: I wonder what people's opinions are on things like the randomsound daemon that is available for Linux. I have not looked at that. A well thought out well documented RNG based on a sound card is:

Re: [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis

2013-08-26 Thread Sandy Harris
On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 4:12 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote: I really like RPis as a cryptographic tool. The only thing that would make them better is a second Ethernet interface so they could be used as a firewall type device. Two things to look at. Onion Pi turns one into a

Re: Intel to also add RNG

2010-07-25 Thread Sandy Harris
On 7/13/10, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com wrote: It is disturbing to me that people oppose this so much. Yes. A hardware RNG seems an obvious Good Thing. Not a complete solution, but a very useful component. For a lot of applications -- servers run in isolation, networking equipment,

What is required for trust?

2010-07-09 Thread Sandy Harris
India recently forbade some Chinese companies from bidding on some cell phone infrastructure projects, citing national security concerns: http://www.chinatechnews.com/2010/05/25/12102-indias-bsnl-excludes-chinas-huawei-zte-from-gsm-bidding Of course, the Chinese gov't and companies are by no

Re: hedging our bets -- in case SHA-256 turns out to be insecure

2009-11-17 Thread Sandy Harris
On 11/12/09, David-Sarah Hopwood david-sa...@jacaranda.org wrote: Sandy Harris wrote: On 11/8/09, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn zo...@zooko.com wrote: Therefore I've been thinking about how to make Tahoe-LAFS robust against the possibility that SHA-256 will turn out to be insecure

Re: hedging our bets -- in case SHA-256 turns out to be insecure

2009-11-11 Thread Sandy Harris
On 11/8/09, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn zo...@zooko.com wrote: Therefore I've been thinking about how to make Tahoe-LAFS robust against the possibility that SHA-256 will turn out to be insecure. NIST are dealing with that via the AHS process. Shouldn't you just use their results? We could use a

Re: TLS man in the middle

2009-11-08 Thread Sandy Harris
On 11/6/09, mhey...@gmail.com mhey...@gmail.com wrote: From http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg03928.html and http://extendedsubset.com/?p=8 From what I gather, when TLS client certificates are used, an attacker can post a command to a victim server and have it

Re: Factoring attack against RSA based on Pollard's Rho

2009-06-07 Thread Sandy Harris
9, mod 16, or by combining those mod 144. Mod 25, mod 49 et cetera gave constraints but not unique solutions. After playing with this a while, I concluded that it was not actually useful, -- Sandy Harris, Quanzhou, Fujian, China

Fwd: 80-bit security? (Was: Re: SHA-1 collisions now at 2^{52}?)

2009-05-10 Thread Sandy Harris
espionage situation, say Boeing and Airbus competing for big orders. -- Sandy Harris, Quanzhou, Fujian, China - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com

Re: [tahoe-dev] SHA-1 broken!

2009-05-03 Thread Sandy Harris
, but it looks feasible. -- Sandy Harris, Quanzhou, Fujian, China - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to majord...@metzdowd.com

Re: Destroying confidential information from database

2009-04-30 Thread Sandy Harris
file systems have become much more common and, for all I know the attack technology may have changed too. Is there a more recent analysis or is Guttman still the best reference? -- Sandy Harris, Quanzhou, Fujian, China

Re: CSPRNG algorithms

2009-04-30 Thread Sandy Harris
/wiki/Random_number#Random_sequences_from_physical_phenomena It is a wiki so if you can improve it, please do. No doubt Wikipedia has a list as well. All the usual crypto texts have chapters on it, too. -- Sandy Harris, Quanzhou, Fujian, China

Re: CPRNGs are still an issue.

2008-12-16 Thread Sandy Harris
not be encrypting unless some enemy might get the text and using things an an enemy can get is exactly what you do not want here. However, it is cheap and random-looking, and the volume is proportional to the amount of crypto done, so it might help in some cases. -- Sandy Harris, Quanzhou, Fujian

Hybrid cipher paper

2008-11-19 Thread Sandy Harris
and RC4-128 to get a cipher that takes a 256-bit key and is significantly faster than AES-256, and arguably more secure. One is immune to algebraic attacks. -- Sandy Harris, Quanzhou, Fujian, China - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: combining entropy

2008-10-27 Thread Sandy Harris
and use a standard hash. -- Sandy Harris, Quanzhou, Fujian, China - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff

2008-04-24 Thread Sandy Harris
to construct it -- then for any symmetric cipher key size less than the public key size, your overheads are the same. -- Sandy Harris, Nanjing, China - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography

Re: Cruising the stacks and finding stuff

2008-04-22 Thread Sandy Harris
thousand times faster). Brute force against a 96-bit key should take 2^32 times as long. Since pi seconds is a nano-century, that's somewhat over a century. For a 128-bit key, over 2^32 centuries. If brute force is the best attack, this is obviously secure. -- Sandy Harris, Nanjing, China

Re: Gutmann Soundwave Therapy

2008-02-01 Thread Sandy Harris
. Does tinc do something that IPsec cannot? -- Sandy Harris, Nanjing, China - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Death of antivirus software imminent

2008-01-14 Thread Sandy Harris
relevant. Among the more obvious problems are the fact that complexity is bad for security, that the US government has some history of abusing wiretaps, and that other governments who would have access to any such technology are even less trustworthy. -- Sandy Harris, Nanjing, China

Re: Password vs data entropy

2007-10-27 Thread Sandy Harris
is sound,128 bits should theorectically be enough for any data and any human time scale. Practice and theory can differ, though, and you cannot be utterly certain there's not some unpublished attack that does awful things to the crypto. I'd use 256 bits and a well-analyzed algorithm. -- Sandy Harris

Re: ad hoc IPsec or similiar

2007-06-26 Thread Sandy Harris
IPsec; it does not handle incoming connections. However, that may be enough for many client machines that live in dynamic address space. -- Sandy Harris Quanzhou, Fujian, China - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending

Re: ad hoc IPsec or similiar

2007-06-22 Thread Sandy Harris
There is an RFC based on that work: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4322.txt The FreeS/WAN project has ended. I do no know if the follow-on projects, openswan.org and strongswan.org, support OE. -- Sandy Harris Quanzhou, Fujian, China

Re: Entropy of other languages

2007-02-26 Thread Sandy Harris
Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Wed, Feb 07, 2007 at 05:42:49AM -0800, Sandy Harris wrote: He starts from information theory and an assumption that there needs to be some constant upper bound on the receiver's per-symbol processing time. From there, with nothing else, he gets

Re: Entropy of other languages

2007-02-07 Thread Sandy Harris
-known rule about word, letter or sound frequencies in linguistics. I'm not sure if you can also get Pareto's Law which covers income wealth distributions in economics. -- Sandy Harris Quanzhou, Fujian, China - The Cryptography

Re: Entropy Definition (was Re: passphrases with more than 160 bits of entropy)

2006-03-23 Thread Sandy Harris
can increase it. * Can you add or increase entropy? You can add more entropy, either from another source or more from the same source. That is the only way to increase it. -- Sandy Harris Zhuhai, Guangdong, China

Re: 3DES performance

2004-12-09 Thread Sandy Harris
Lee Parkes wrote: Hi, I'm working on a project for a company that involves the use of 3DES. They have asked me to find out what the overheads are ... Some info at: http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/freeswan-2.06/doc/performance.html

Re: potential new IETF WG on anonymous IPSec

2004-09-11 Thread Sandy Harris
Zooko O'Whielcronx wrote: On 2004, Sep 09, , at 16:57, Hal Finney wrote: ... an extension to IPsec to allow for unauthenticated connections. Presently IPsec relies on either pre-shared secrets or a trusted third party CA to authenticate the connection. No. It can also use RSA public keys without

Re: cryptograph(y|er) jokes?

2004-06-24 Thread Sandy Harris
bear wrote: Bob and Alice routinely discuss bombs, terrorism, tax cheating, sexual infidelity, and deviant sex over the internet. They conspire to commit crimes, share banned texts and suppressed news, or topple tyrannical governments whose agents eavesdrop on their every communication. They do

Re: cryptograph(y|er) jokes?

2004-06-23 Thread Sandy Harris
Hadmut Danisch wrote: does anyone know good jokes about cryptography, cryptographers, or security? There's always the sys admin's mantra: I know I'm paranoid, but I worry about whether I'm paranoid enough. FreeS/WAN docs have links to several collections of crypto quotes, many funny:

Re: efficiency?? vs security with symmetric crypto? (Re: Tinc's response to Linux's answer to MS-PPTP)

2003-09-27 Thread Sandy Harris
Adam Back wrote: What conceivable trade-offs could you have to make to get acceptable performance out of symmetric crypto encrypted+authenticated tunnel? All ciphers you should be using are like 50MB/sec on a 1Ghz machine!! There's fairly detailed performance data for Linux FreeS/WAN IPsec

Re: authentication and ESP

2003-06-22 Thread Sandy Harris
John S. Denker wrote: On 06/19/2003 01:49 PM, martin f krafft wrote: As far as I can tell, IPsec's ESP has the functionality of authentication and integrity built in: It depends on what you mean by built in. 1) The RFC provides for ESP+authentication but does not require ESP to use