[Read the paper here:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/%7Erja14/Papers/nonbanks.pdf Very interesting
stuff, but not likely new to most here.]
The Federal Reserve commissioned me to research and write a
paper on fraud, risk and nonbank payment systems. I found that
phishing is facilitated by payment
[Some interesting thinking going on. Wasn't there some similar ideas
presented/published at a past FC conference?]
Subject: [gsc] Digital cache with extended features
Date: Sun, 06 May 2007 12:57:08 +0300
From: George Hara [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
It
At 07:50 AM 5/4/2007, Nicolas Williams wrote:
On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 10:25:34AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
This seems to assume that when a crack is announced, all revenue
stops. This would appear to be false. When cracks are announced in such
systems
At 11:32 AM 5/2/2007, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Anyone very familiar with AACS have ideas on what optimal attack and
defense strategies are? This seems like a fertile new ground for
technical discussion.
Ed Felton wrote and excellent piece on AACS from the technical and
economic/tactical
At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue
At 12:15 PM 3/30/2007, Hal Finney wrote:
If the backing is distributed among a multitude of holders (e.g., in a
fashion similar to how Lloyds backs their insurance empire), who's
identities are kept secret until audit time and then only a few, randomly
selected, names and claimed deposit
At 08:23 PM 3/29/2007, Allen wrote:
Steve,
I assume that you mean the owner of the on-line financial service when you
say operator, correct? In which case what exactly are the auditors going
to be looking at when comes time to audit but the operator's identity,
whereabouts, the servers and a
At 04:40 PM 2/20/2007, Adam Back wrote:
There is quite some underinformed speculation as critique on the
thread... Its interesting to see people who probably understand SSL,
SMIME and stuff at least at a power user if not programmer level, try
to make logical leaps about what must be wrong or
With the expiration of Chaum's key patents it was assumed that someone
would step up an try their hand at launching a DBC-based financial
service. Some time has passed and I'm happy to announce that this has
finally happened. Taking a cue from the lively Digital Gold Currencies,
eCache's
At 03:57 PM 1/18/2007, Saqib Ali wrote:
When is the last time you checked the code for the open source app
that you use, to make sure that it is written properly?
When is the last time you carefully checked the code for a closed source
app that you use? (Besides the one you mentioned to
http://dilbert.com/comics/dilbert/archive/dilbert-20070117.html
http://dilbert.com/comics/dilbert/archive/dilbert-20070118.html
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At 06:32 AM 1/16/2007, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Disk encryption, in general, is useful when the enemy has physical
access to the disk. Laptops -- the case you describe on your page --
do fit that category; I have no quarrel with disk encryption for them.
It's more dubious for desktops and
I haven't been following the smartcard scene for a while. I'm looking to
create a low-cost and portable link encryptor, with D-H or similar key
exchange, for lower 100kbps data speeds. Is this possible?
Steve
-
The
At 07:21 AM 12/2/2006, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Quoting:
The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
conversations.
The technique is
At 07:21 AM 12/2/2006, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Quoting:
The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
conversations.
BTW, its easy to
At 02:45 PM 9/20/2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Via Bruce Schneier's blog, flexible displays that can sit on smartcards.
So we finally have an output mechanism that means you don't have to
trust smartcard terminal displays:
At 08:05 AM 5/11/2006, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Let me again remind people that if you do not inform your elected
representatives of your displeasure with this sort of thing,
eventually you will not be in a position to inform them of your
displeasure with this sort of thing.
I think begging
What happens to the quantum information ingested by a black hole? In 1997,
Thorne and Hawking argued that information swallowed by a black hole is
forever hidden, despite the fact that these dense objects do emit a
peculiar kind of radiation and eventually evaporate. Preskill countered
that
At 10:40 AM 4/20/2004, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
While it's unfortunate that security on the current DVD format is broken
and can't be reprogrammed, HD is what really matters. Once studios release
high-definition content, there will be little or no distinction between
studio-quality and
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3324883.stm
Adam Back is part of this team, I think.
Similar approach to Camram/hahscash. Memory-based approaches have been
discussed. Why hasn't Camram explored them?
steve
BTW, Penny Black stamp was only used briefly. It was the Penny Red which
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
1. Invisiblog http://invisiblog.com/ lets you publish a weblog using GPG
and the Mixmaster anonymous remailer network. You don't ever have to
reveal your identity - not even to us. You don't have to trust us, because
we'll never know who you are.
The postal notice itself says this is the first step to identify all
senders, so this is not a matter of paranoia, this is reality. The post
office is moving towards identification requirements for everyone, said
Chris Hoofnagle, associate director of the Electronic Privacy Information
Companies are using a new software protection system, called Fade, to
protect their intellectual property from software thieves. Fade is being
introduced by Macrovision, which specializes in digital rights management,
and the British games developer Codemasters. What the program does is make
On Sat, Oct 04, 2003 at 11:31:36PM -0700, Ian Clarke spake thusly:
I have never ever characterized Freenet as being anything other than in
development. If you don't like the fact that Freenet is taking so-long
to perfect, then either help, or use Earth Station 5 - I hear its great.
You never
.
Not if they can type GNURadio into Google.
steve
A foolish Constitutional inconsistency is the hobgoblin of freedom, adored
by judges and demagogue statesmen.
- Steve Schear
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subscriber instruments can
be captured by mobile rouge cell sites for fun stuff (I seem to recall
Harris Communications made these).
steve
A foolish Constitutional inconsistency is the hobgoblin of freedom, adored
by judges and demagogue statesmen.
- Steve Schear
In the .NET Framework, it's possible to access a private member of any
class -- your own, another developer's, or even the classes in the .NET
Framework itself! Appleman demonstrates this with a great example that uses
private members to get the list of groups that the current user is a
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jk-02.09.03-005/
German police have searched and seized the rooms (dorm?) of one of the JAP
developers. They were on the look for data that was logged throughout the
period when JAP had to log specific traffic. The JAP-people say that the
seizure was not
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
It will often be possible to also trace the communication channel back
through the crowd, by inserting delays onto chosen links and observing
which ones correlate with delays in the data observed at the endpoint.
This way it is not necessary to monitor
An excellent site for those interested in tunneling, covert channels,
network related steganographic methods developments.
http://gray-world.net/
There is no protection or safety in anticipatory servility.
Craig Spencer
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The
://sslbar.metropipe.net
Enjoy.
A Jobless Recovery is like a Breadless Sandwich.
-- Steve Schear
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http://www.acros.si/papers/session_fixation.pdf
A Jobless Recovery is like a Breadless Sandwich.
-- Steve Schear
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