Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength

2013-09-30 Thread Taral
. Elligator 2 works fine on curve25519. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo

Re: [Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan

2013-09-13 Thread Taral
, Z makes me *less* secure than no BTNS at all. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-09-04 Thread Taral
applying it to IPv4 would break too many people. Not enough people use IPv6, so they are insisting on good hygiene there. Why do you not have PTR records for your IPv6 address? The problem is that, not Google's policy. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-09-04 Thread Taral
On Sep 4, 2013 12:14 AM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote: I *have* PTR records for my IPv6 addresses. What I don't know is which PTR records will make Gmail happy. SPF PTR records clearly do not do the trick. SPF uses TXT records, not PTR ones. Can you share your IPv6 address? I'll

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Taral
record. Otherwise, mail will be marked as spam or possibly rejected. Because under ipv6 your prefix is supposed to be stable (customer identifier) and the namespace delegated to you on request. Have you asked your provider for an ipv6 namespace delegation? -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Taral
: On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 1:59 PM, Taral tar...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:08 PM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote: Additional guidelines for IPv6 The sending IP must have a PTR record (i.e., a reverse DNS of the sending IP) and it should match the IP obtained

Re: Fw: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update

2010-07-17 Thread Taral
On Sat, Jul 17, 2010 at 7:41 AM, Paul Wouters p...@xelerance.com wrote: Several are using old SHA-1 hashes... old ? old in that they are explicitly not recommended by the latest specs I was looking at. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you

Re: Fw: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update

2010-07-16 Thread Taral
. 172800 IN DS 15191 8 2 A057C8553B1DC6CF158A87CD2D0BAA2CDC9C6A14FA03DE02B19AB0DA 62AF279E Several are using old SHA-1 hashes... -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you.     -- Unknown

Re: Security of Mac Keychain, Filevault

2009-11-03 Thread Taral
as non-password-based authentication (e.g. smart card) and multi-factor authentication. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Using Ideal Lattices

2009-05-01 Thread Taral
, but isn't local to me. Does anyone know of a paper? -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

Re: UCE - a simpler approach using just digital signing?

2009-01-30 Thread Taral
On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 1:47 PM, Ray Dillinger b...@sonic.net wrote: This is basic digital signatures; it would work. What's your transition plan? How do you deal with stolen trust tokens? (Think trojans/worms.) Also see: http://craphound.com/spamsolutions.txt -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please

Re: full-disk subversion standards released

2009-01-30 Thread Taral
other people say who've read the source code. Really? What about hardware backdoors? I'm thinking something like the old /bin/login backdoor that had compiler support, but in hardware. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown

Re: The perils of security tools

2008-05-27 Thread Taral
the kernel hands out entropy to multiple concurrent consumers. I don't think it's a semantic issue. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown - The Cryptography Mailing

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-09 Thread Taral
system or a system that has lost its cert. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography

Fwd: Fwd: Fwd: PunchScan voting protocol

2007-12-18 Thread Taral
I've attached below Rick's reply to this thread. Rick Carback is a member of the PunchScan team. - Taral -- Forwarded message -- From: Rick Carback Date: Dec 16, 2007 12:01 PM Subject: Re: Fwd: Fwd: PunchScan voting protocol I think there are some misconceptions/assumptions

Re: PunchScan voting protocol

2007-12-14 Thread Taral
provide an attack model. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Intercepting Microsoft wireless keyboard communications

2007-12-13 Thread Taral
On 12/10/07, Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Believe it or not, I thought of CFB... What about PCFB to get around the block issue? I remember freenet using it that way... -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown

Re: Scare tactic?

2007-09-20 Thread Taral
the legitimacy of networking infrastructure which is designed to provide high security. Funny how they didn't provide any details. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown

Re: improving ssh

2007-07-19 Thread Taral
for invalid or no username This makes some sense... 1. Client may request proof of host private key. 2. Client must authenticate. 3. Client may request a copy of the host public key. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown

Re: ad hoc IPsec or similiar

2007-06-26 Thread Taral
DNS is not significantly more trustworthy than simply querying the remote host on a known port if you don't have DNSSEC. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown

Re: padlocks with backdoors - TSA approved

2007-02-27 Thread Taral
that lock. I'm just waiting for someone with access to photograph said keys and post it all over the internet. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can't prove anything. -- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500

2007-01-14 Thread Taral
in auctions of adult materials. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can't prove anything. -- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-04 Thread Taral
anything in the GSM standard that would allow this either. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can't prove anything. -- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography

Re: A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem

2006-09-16 Thread Taral
there's anything inherently wrong with ASN.1 DER in crypto applications. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can't prove anything. -- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe

Re: Quantum RNG (was: Use of TPM chip for RNG)

2006-07-04 Thread Taral
On 7/4/06, Andrea Pasquinucci [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: About RNG, does someone in the list have any comment, ideas on this http://www.idquantique.com/products/quantis.htm Why? Noise-based RNGs are just as random and just as quantum. :) -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can't prove anything

Re: Status of attacks on AES?

2006-05-11 Thread Taral
On 5/10/06, John R. Black [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I skimmed this. The start of the article says that after 3 rounds AES achieves perfect diffusion?! No, it says their old ASD could not distinguish encrypted data from random after 3 rounds. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can't prove anything

Re: is breaking RSA at least as hard as factoring or vice-versa?

2006-04-02 Thread Taral
the two. This implication runs both ways. Given d and e (and pq), one can compute p and q. Proving this is an exercise left to the reader. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can't prove anything. -- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem

Re: passphrases with more than 160 bits of entropy

2006-03-22 Thread Taral
, theoretically. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can't prove anything. -- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Study shows how photonic decoys can foil hackers

2006-03-08 Thread Taral
://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/02/quantum_computi.html -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] Computer science is no more about computers than astronomy is about telescopes. -- Edsger Dijkstra - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe

Re: RSA signatures without padding

2005-06-20 Thread Taral
the signatures on the chosen messages). I think you're referring to the Desmedt-Odlyzko selective forgery attack. See http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/fy15/doc/1014_Menezes.sigs.pdf -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography

Re: Encryption plugins for gaim

2005-03-15 Thread Taral
some insights on this? Is it ready for prime time or just a proof-of-concept? Any known issues? If you want encryption with authentication, there's the gaim-encryption plugin. I get the feeling gaim-otr is for more specific circumstances. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] This message is digitally

Re: A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

2005-02-10 Thread Taral
install anything. Then again, the only extension I have installed (FlashGot), I manually checked myself. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] This message is digitally signed. Please PGP encrypt mail to me. A: Because it fouls the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-09 Thread Taral
think this last bit is untrue. You will find that the expected number of states of the PRNG after extracting one bit of randomness is half of the number of states you had before, thus resulting in one bit of entropy loss. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] This message is digitally signed. Please PGP

Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

2005-01-07 Thread Taral
that there is infinite compute capacity. From an information-theoretic point of view, there is NO SUCH THING as a perfect one-way function. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] This message is digitally signed. Please PGP encrypt mail to me. A: Because it fouls the order in which people normally read text. Q

Re: Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2004-12-22 Thread Taral
On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 10:58:11AM -0600, Matt Crawford wrote: On Dec 15, 2004, at 11:54, Taral wrote: What stops someone using 3 players and majority voting on frame data bits? As I understand it, they use such a huge number of bits for marking, that any reasonably-sized assembly

Re: Your source code, for sale

2004-11-06 Thread Taral
system had an implementation like this originally... -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] This message is digitally signed. Please PGP encrypt mail to me. A: Because it fouls the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? A: Top-posting. Q: What is the most annoying

Re: anonymous DH MITM

2003-10-06 Thread Taral
system can be constructed from a pseudonymous system by never reusing a pseudonym. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] This message is digitally signed. Please PGP encrypt mail to me. Be who you are and say what you feel, because those who mind don't matter and those who matter don't mind. -- Dr. Seuss

Re: anonymous DH MITM

2003-10-03 Thread Taral
as a security spec. Hardly. Just perform DH exchange over the interlock protocol. By your own admission, the MITM could not change the factors being exchanged, and by DH, the MITM cannot then know what the resulting key data is. -- Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED] This message is digitally signed. Please PGP encrypt