Actually, patenting the method isn't nearly as silly as it sounds.
Produced in quantity, a device to break GSM using this attack is not going
to cost much more than a cellphone (without subsidies). Patenting the
attack prevents the production of the radio shack (tm) gsm scanner, so
that it at
On Mon, 8 Sep 2003, Dave Emery wrote:
Just to amplify this a bit, does anyone seriously think the
NSA's satellite and embassy based cellphone interception capability is
primarily targeted against - US - GSM calls ? Or that they can
routinely get warrants to listen in using the wired
See their paper at CRYPTO 2003 for more details. I am disappointed that
you seem to be criticizing their work before even reading their paper.
I encourage you to read the paper -- it really is interesting.
OK, then, where is it? I looked on:
www.iacr.org under Crypto 2003 -- no papers
Vin McLellan wrote:
A5/2 was the equivalent of 40-bit DES, presumed to be relatively weak and
developed as an export standard.
Yeah. Except it would be more accurate to place A5/2's strength as
roughly equivalent to 17-bit DES. A5/1's strength is roughly equivalent
to that of 40-bit DES.
Of
One point your analysis misses is that there are public policy
implications to deploying a phone system that enemy countries can
routinely intercept. Not all attacks are financially motivated.
Is it a good thing for our infrastructure to be so insecure?
Do we want other countries listening to
At 05:18 PM 9/7/2003 -0700, David Honig wrote:
A copy of the research was sent to GSM authorities in order to correct the
problem, and the method is being patented so that in future it can be used
by the law enforcement agencies.
Laughing my ass off. Since when do governments care about patents?
At 11:43 AM 9/8/2003 -0400, Anton Stiglic wrote:
I think this is different however. The recent attack focused on the A5/3
encryption algorithm, while the work of Lucky, Briceno, Goldberg, Wagner,
Biryukov, Shamir (and others?) was on A5/1 and A5/2 (and other crypto
algorithms of GSM, such as
At 02:37 AM 9/9/2003 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
At 05:18 PM 9/7/2003 -0700, David Honig wrote:
A copy of the research was sent to GSM authorities in order to correct the
problem, and the method is being patented so that in future it can be used
by the law enforcement agencies.
Laughing my ass off.
David Honig[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 02:37 AM 9/9/03 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
At 05:18 PM 9/7/2003 -0700, David Honig wrote:
Laughing my ass off. Since when do governments care about patents?
How would this help/harm them from exploiting it? Not that
high-end LEOs haven't already
Trei, Peter wrote:
Why the heck would a government agency have to break the GSM encryption
at all?
Once upon a time, it used to be the favourite
sport of spy agencies to listen in on the
activities of other countries. In that case,
access to the radio waves was much more juicy
than access to
Trei, Peter wrote:
Why the heck would a government agency have to break the GSM encryption
at all? The encryption is only on the airlink,
and all GSM calls travel through the POTS land line system in the clear,
where they are subject to warranted wiretaps.
Breaking GSM is only of useful if you
John Doe Number Two wrote:
It's nice to see someone 'discovering' what Lucky Green already figured-out
years ago. I wonder if they'll cut him a check.
No, no, no! This is new work, novel and different from what was
previously known. In my opinion, it is an outstanding piece of research.
At 05:04 PM 9/8/2003 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
David Honig[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 02:37 AM 9/9/03 +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
much more than a cellphone (without subsidies). Patenting the attack
prevents the production of the radio shack (tm) gsm scanner, so that it
at least requires
At 05:04 PM 9/8/03 , Trei, Peter wrote:
Why the heck would a government agency have to break the GSM encryption at
all? The encryption is only on the airlink, and all GSM calls travel
through the POTS land line system in the clear, where they are subject to
warranted wiretaps.
A government
At 05:04 PM 9/8/03 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
Why the heck would a government agency have to break the GSM encryption
at all? The encryption is only on the airlink, and all GSM calls travel
through
the POTS land line system in the clear, where they are subject to
warranted wiretaps.
Breaking GSM
On Mon, Sep 08, 2003 at 09:55:41PM +, David Wagner wrote:
Trei, Peter wrote:
Why the heck would a government agency have to break the GSM encryption
at all?
Well, one reason might be if that government agency didn't have lawful
authorization from the country where the call takes place.
http://www.israel21c.org/bin/en.jsp?enPage=BlankPageenDisplay=viewenDispWhat=objectenDispWho=Articles%5El496enZone=TechnologyenVersion=0;
Israel21c
Code breakers crack GSM cellphone encryption
By ISRAEL21c staffSeptember 07, 2003
The faults discovered in the 850 million cellphones could
At 03:32 PM 9/7/03 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
If the cellphone companies in 197 countries want to correct the code errors
that expose them to trickery and abuse, they will have to call in each
customer to make a change in the cellphone's programming, or replace all of
the cellular phones used by
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