********Registration Deadline: January 24, 2005********** ************************************************* DIMACS Workshop on Bounded Rationality January 31 - February 1, 2005 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers: Lance Fortnow, University of Chicago, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Richard McLean, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Daijiro Okada, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences. ************************************************ Traditionally, economists and game theorists have assumed that strategic agents are fully rational but in the last few decades a number of game theorists have argued that human players do not behave in a way consistent with theoretical predictions. Questions have been raised regarding the postulate of full rationality and some have proposed formalizations of partially or boundedly rational players and games played by such players. If one takes the view that a process of decision-making in economic or other social situations constitutes computation in a formal sense of theoretical computer science, then one is naturally led to some notion of bounded computational power as a formal expression of bounded rationality. Two important and complementary questions in this line of inquiry are (1) What is the computational power required in order to play a game in a way consistent with full rationality? (2) If players are limited in their computational power, how different will equilibrium outcomes be from the fully rational case? This workshop will bring together economists and game theorists interested in bounded rationality, as well as theoretical computer scientists with experience in limited computational models. Topics of interest include: * Bounded recall and bounded complexity in repeated games * Strategic aspects of machine learning * Game theoretic applications of cryptography ************************************************************** Program: This is a preliminary program. Monday, January 31, 2005 8:15 - 8:50 Breakfast and Registration 8:50 - 9:00 Welcome and Opening Remarks Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director 9:00 - 10:00 Correlation, Communication, Complexity and Competition Abraham Neyman, Hebrew University 10:00 - 10:30 Break 10:30 - 11:30 Olivier Gossner, TBA 11:30 - 12:30 Players as Serial or Parallel Random Access Machines Timothy Van Zandt, INSEAD 12:30 - 2:00 Lunch 2:00 - 3:00 Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania, TBA 3:00 - 3:30 Break 3:30 - 4:30 Deterministic Calibration and Nash Equilibrium Sham Kakade, University of Pennsylvania 4:30 - 5:30 For Bayesian Wannabees, Are Disagreements not About Information? Robin Hanson, George Mason University 6:00 Dinner - DIMACS Lounge Tuesday, February 1, 2005 8:30 - 9:00 Breakfast and Registration 9:00 - 10:00 Algorithms for Graphical Games Luis Ortiz, MIT 10:00 - 10:30 Break 10:30 - 11:30 Deterministic Calibration with Simpler Checking Rules Dean Foster, University of Pennsylvania 11:30 - 1:00 Lunch 1:00 - 2:00 Mechanism Design and Deliberative Agents Kate Larsen, University of Waterloo 2:00 - 2:30 Break 2:30 - 3:30 Vahab Mirrokni, MIT, Convergence Issues in Competitive Games 3:30 - 4:30 Efficient Equilibrium Algorithms for Compact Repeated Games Michael Littman, Rutgers University ************************************************************** Registration Fees: (Pre-registration deadline: January 24, 2005) Please see website for additional registration information. ********************************************************************* Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel can be found at: http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Bounded/ **PLEASE BE SURE TO PRE-REGISTER EARLY** ******************************************************************* --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]