DIMACS Workshop on Bounded Rationality

2005-01-26 Thread Linda Casals


Registration Deadline: January 24, 2005**
*
 
DIMACS Workshop on Bounded Rationality
  
 January 31 - February 1, 2005
 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ

Organizers: 
   
 Lance Fortnow, University of Chicago, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 Richard McLean, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 Daijiro Okada, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 
Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and
the Socio-Economic Sciences.

 

Traditionally, economists and game theorists have assumed that
strategic agents are fully rational but in the last few decades a
number of game theorists have argued that human players do not behave
in a way consistent with theoretical predictions. Questions have been
raised regarding the postulate of full rationality and some have
proposed formalizations of partially or boundedly rational players and
games played by such players. If one takes the view that a process of
decision-making in economic or other social situations constitutes
computation in a formal sense of theoretical computer science, then
one is naturally led to some notion of bounded computational power as
a formal expression of bounded rationality. Two important and
complementary questions in this line of inquiry are (1) What is the
computational power required in order to play a game in a way
consistent with full rationality? (2) If players are limited in their
computational power, how different will equilibrium outcomes be from
the fully rational case? This workshop will bring together economists
and game theorists interested in bounded rationality, as well as
theoretical computer scientists with experience in limited
computational models.

Topics of interest include:

* Bounded recall and bounded complexity in repeated games
* Strategic aspects of machine learning
* Game theoretic applications of cryptography 

**
Program:

This is a preliminary program.

Monday, January 31, 2005

 8:15 -  8:50 Breakfast and Registration

 8:50 -  9:00 Welcome and Opening Remarks
  Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director

 9:00 - 10:00 Correlation, Communication, Complexity and Competition
  Abraham Neyman, Hebrew University

10:00 - 10:30 Break

10:30 - 11:30 Olivier Gossner, TBA

11:30 - 12:30 Players as Serial or Parallel Random Access Machines
  Timothy Van Zandt, INSEAD

12:30 -  2:00 Lunch

 2:00 -  3:00 Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania, TBA

 3:00 -  3:30 Break

 3:30 -  4:30 Deterministic Calibration and Nash Equilibrium
  Sham Kakade, University of Pennsylvania

 4:30 -  5:30 For Bayesian Wannabees, Are Disagreements not About Information?
  Robin Hanson, George Mason University 

 6:00 Dinner - DIMACS Lounge

Tuesday, February 1, 2005

 8:30 -  9:00 Breakfast and Registration

 9:00 - 10:00 Algorithms for Graphical Games
  Luis Ortiz, MIT

10:00 - 10:30 Break

10:30 - 11:30 Deterministic Calibration with Simpler Checking Rules
  Dean Foster, University of Pennsylvania

11:30 -  1:00 Lunch

 1:00 -  2:00 Mechanism Design and Deliberative Agents
  Kate Larsen, University of Waterloo

 2:00 -  2:30 Break

 2:30 -  3:30 Vahab Mirrokni, MIT, Convergence Issues in Competitive Games

 3:30  - 4:30 Efficient Equilibrium Algorithms for Compact Repeated Games
  Michael Littman, Rutgers University 


**
Registration Fees:

(Pre-registration deadline: January 24, 2005)

Please see website for additional registration information.

*
Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel 
can be found at:

http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Bounded/

   **PLEASE BE SURE TO PRE-REGISTER EARLY**

***


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DIMACS Workshop on Bounded Rationality

2004-07-28 Thread Linda Casals

*
 
DIMACS Workshop on Bounded Rationality
  
 January 31 - February 1, 2005
 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ

Organizers: 
   
 Lance Fortnow, University of Chicago, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 Richard McLean, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 Daijiro Okada, Rutgers University, [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 
Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and
the Socio-Economic Sciences.

 

Traditionally, economists and game theorists have assumed that
strategic agents are fully rational in the sense that all players can
completely reason about the consequences of their actions. In the last
few decades, a number of game theorists have argued, in part motivated
by experimental results, that human players do not behave in a way
consistent with theoretical predictions. Questions have been raised
regarding the postulate of full rationality and some have attempted
formalization of partially or boundedly rational players and games
played by such players. This research falls under the rubric of
bounded rationality.

If one takes the view that a process of decision making in economic or
other social situations constitutes a computation in a formal sense of
theoretical computer science, then one is naturally led to some notion
of bounded computational power as a formal expression of bounded
rationality. Two important and complementary questions in this line of
inquiry are: (1) What is the computational power required in order to
play a game in a way consistent with full rationality? (2) If players
are limited in their computational power, how different will
equilibrium outcomes be from the fully rational case? With regard to
the first question, some researchers have examined the computational
complexity of finding best responses in games. As to the second
question, a number of researchers have focused on repeated games
played by various types of computing machines with an emphasis on
their role in facilitating cooperative behavior. In one branch of this
work, bounded rationality is interpreted as bounded recall where a
player's strategic options are limited by constraints that are placed
on memories of past actions. A larger literature models bounded
rationality in terms of finite automata. In particular, the strategies
of players are limited to those that are implementable by finite state
automata. Further work that studies strategies implementable by Turing
machines may be found. Most of the aforementioned work has been
carried out by game theorists and, with the exception of a short burst
of activity in the mid-1990's, there has not been a significant amount
of activity in bounded rationality from the computer science point of
view. This workshop will bring together economists and game theorists
interested in bounded rationality, as well as theoretical computer
scientists with experience in limited computational models. It will
explore previous interactions between computer scientists and
economists concerning this topic. It will then address such issues as:
What are the desiderata of a model of bounded rationality? How do
models of bounded rationality affect conclusions of standard models?
What aspects of human behavior have no compelling model of bounded
rationality to explain them? Are there computational models that
properly estimate the computational power of bounded players while
allowing for an analysis that yields useful results?


**
Registration Fees:

(Pre-registration deadline: January 24, 2005)

Please see website for additional registration information.

*
Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel 
can be found at:

http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Bounded/

   **PLEASE BE SURE TO PRE-REGISTER EARLY**

***

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