Merry Certmas! CN=*\x00thoughtcrime.noisebridge.net

2009-09-30 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
Hello *,

In the spirit of giving and sharing, I felt it would be nice to enable
other Noisebridgers (and friends of Noisebridge) to play around with
bugs in SSL/TLS.

Moxie was just over and we'd discussed releasing this certificate for
some time. He's already released a few certificates and I thought I'd
join him. In celebration of his visit to San Francisco, I wanted to
release fun-times-at-moxie-marlinspike-high. This is a text file that
contains a fully valid, signed certificate (with private key) that can
be used to exploit the NULL certificate prefix bug[0]. The certificate
is valid for * on the internet (when exploiting libnss software). The
certificate is good for two years. It won't work for exploiting the bug
for software written with the WIN32 api, they don't accept (for good
reason) *! I suggest the use of Moxie's sslsniff[1] if you're so
inclined to try network related testing. It may also be useful for
testing code signing software.

It's been long enough that everyone should be patched for this awesome
class of bugs. This certificate and corresponding private key should
help people test fairly obscure software or software they've written
themselves. I hope this release will help with confirmation of the bug
and with regression testing. Feel free to use this certificate for
anything relating to free software too. Consider it released into the
public domain of interesting integers.

Enjoy!

Best,
Jacob

[0] http://thoughtcrime.org/papers/null-prefix-attacks.pdf
[1] http://thoughtcrime.org/software/sslsniff/
Private-Key: (1024 bit)
modulus:
00:cf:4d:17:42:00:8d:0c:41:95:31:8c:40:30:bc:
5e:42:b6:28:09:75:2f:19:61:d9:ab:4d:ec:f3:44:
c4:1c:01:95:6f:27:eb:70:07:98:4f:1e:05:d0:f3:
6c:49:45:e6:de:48:7a:59:f0:c2:93:6a:37:9c:02:
72:4f:bd:14:36:26:a1:70:97:d4:fe:4b:24:e8:cd:
29:1e:61:1a:85:b0:6f:96:06:83:10:13:d6:89:9f:
bd:07:67:f1:42:de:9b:63:67:8b:96:f9:06:ef:7c:
93:4b:6a:f9:39:31:32:7f:98:59:ef:ce:91:be:05:
ce:f0:82:33:d8:76:06:4c:9f
publicExponent: 65537 (0x10001)
privateExponent:
00:8c:4f:3b:7c:ba:ee:bc:ea:ee:d6:58:7d:61:ff:
3d:35:9e:21:3f:35:87:a9:80:67:59:e1:26:8e:09:
6f:4b:1d:6f:4d:8b:11:7a:04:49:fc:d2:ef:50:dc:
51:e0:ce:65:52:f2:6f:8d:cc:bd:86:15:90:8a:11:
c5:d9:5e:ba:fc:2b:fc:e3:a0:cd:c8:f0:9a:05:76:
06:82:07:a9:bd:14:cc:c7:7e:54:b9:32:5b:40:7a:
35:0a:26:80:d7:30:98:d6:b7:71:d5:9d:f4:0d:f2:
28:b5:a9:0c:2e:6d:78:19:86:a9:31:b0:a1:43:1c:
57:2c:78:a9:42:b2:49:d8:71
prime1:
00:ec:07:79:1d:e2:50:14:77:af:99:18:1b:14:d4:
0c:25:0c:20:26:0d:dd:c7:75:0e:08:d3:77:72:ce:
2d:57:80:9d:18:bb:60:7b:b2:62:4e:21:a1:e6:84:
96:91:31:15:cc:5b:89:5b:5a:83:07:96:51:e4:d4:
e6:3a:40:99:03
prime2:
00:e0:d7:5a:07:0e:cc:a6:17:22:f8:ec:51:b1:7b:
17:af:3a:87:7b:f1:e4:6d:40:48:28:d2:c0:9c:93:
e0:f1:8f:79:07:8f:00:e0:49:1d:0e:8c:65:41:ba:
c8:20:e2:ae:78:54:75:6b:f0:41:e5:d1:9c:2e:23:
49:79:53:35:35
exponent1:
15:17:15:db:75:bd:72:16:bf:ba:0e:4d:5d:2f:15:
66:ba:0e:a5:57:d7:d9:5a:bc:46:4d:9e:fe:c3:2d:
8a:04:14:05:81:b8:bd:54:d3:33:e8:0d:6f:6b:a9:
88:8f:ba:42:e8:6a:fd:9e:b8:d6:94:b7:fc:9a:89:
77:eb:0d:c1
exponent2:
5c:5a:38:61:63:c3:cd:88:fd:55:6f:84:12:b9:73:
be:06:f5:75:84:a3:05:f8:fc:6a:c0:3e:5b:52:26:
78:32:2d:4d:5c:80:c8:9f:5f:6f:05:5d:e6:04:b9:
85:40:76:d7:78:21:8f:07:6d:99:df:62:1e:55:62:
2d:92:6e:ed
coefficient:
00:c5:62:ea:ee:85:5c:eb:e6:07:12:58:a5:63:5a:
8f:e3:b3:df:c5:1e:cc:01:cd:87:d4:12:3f:45:8e:
a9:4c:83:51:31:5a:e5:8d:11:a1:e3:84:b8:b4:e1:
12:33:eb:2d:4c:4e:8c:49:e2:0d:50:aa:ca:38:e3:
e6:c2:29:86:17
Certificate Request:
Data:
Version: 0 (0x0)
Subject: C=US, CN=*\x00thoughtcrime.noisebridge.net, ST=California, 
L=San Francisco, O=Noisebridge, OU=Moxie Marlinspike Fan Club
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:cf:4d:17:42:00:8d:0c:41:95:31:8c:40:30:bc:
5e:42:b6:28:09:75:2f:19:61:d9:ab:4d:ec:f3:44:
c4:1c:01:95:6f:27:eb:70:07:98:4f:1e:05:d0:f3:
6c:49:45:e6:de:48:7a:59:f0:c2:93:6a:37:9c:02:
72:4f:bd:14:36:26:a1:70:97:d4:fe:4b:24:e8:cd:
29:1e:61:1a:85:b0:6f:96:06:83:10:13:d6:89:9f:
bd:07:67:f1:42:de:9b:63:67:8b:96:f9:06:ef:7c:
93:4b:6a:f9:39:31:32:7f:98:59:ef:ce:91:be:05:
ce:f0:82:33:d8:76:06:4c:9f
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
Attributes:
a0:00
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
64:e6:b2:77:45:74:c3:dc:f6:3d:e7:73:7f:0f:fb:dd:d7:30:
c3:0f:30:d5:52:2c:6b:41:ad:40:2b:4b:07:2a:de:80:69:d4:
a7:0b:6f:ed:cc:62:e7:4d:e1:fc:1e:81:0d:94:b9:c8:9b:14:
0a:10:d4:8e:f9:53:76:11:51:1d:c9:80:ca:15:e5:78:02:e1:
d1:89:95:b5:4a:3f:e0:f7:f3:35:ad:1f:7d:85:5b:8c:f5:de:
 

Re: Merry Certmas! CN=*\x00thoughtcrime.noisebridge.net

2009-09-30 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Tue, Sep 29, 2009 at 10:51:33PM -0700, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:

 It's been long enough that everyone should be patched for this awesome
 class of bugs. This certificate and corresponding private key should
 help people test fairly obscure software or software they've written
 themselves. I hope this release will help with confirmation of the bug
 and with regression testing. Feel free to use this certificate for
 anything relating to free software too. Consider it released into the
 public domain of interesting integers.

If anyone is curious about the impact of this on the Postfix TLS engine
(March 2006, version 2.3.0 and later releases):

1. Postfix checks subject domains obtained from either subjectAltName or CN
   to ensure that the ASN.1 string object length is equal to the C string
   length. Certificates that fail this test are considered anonymous. These
   checks were added in the Spring of 2005 when the contributed TLS patch
   adopted in the 2.2 release was significantly extended and revised.

2. Postfix only matches *.example.com certificates against single-label
   sub-domains of example.com. Thus for example, the Postini wild-card
   certificate for:

*.psmtp.com

   does not match (say Verisign's), MX records of the form:

verisign.com.  IN  MX  100 verisign.com.s6a1.psmtp.com.
verisign.com.  IN  MX  200 verisign.com.s6a2.psmtp.com.
verisign.com.  IN  MX  300 verisign.com.s6b1.psmtp.com.
verisign.com.  IN  MX  400 verisign.com.s6b2.psmtp.com.

   (Postfix also does not, for secure-channel destinations, trust DNS
enough to let MX records influence the name expected in a peer
certificate. So Postini's wildcard certificate is perhaps only useful
with other sending systems).

   So a * certificate will never match any peer domain.

Bottom line, this issue does not impact the Postfix secure-channel TLS
use case.

-- 
Viktor.

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