Marc Branchaud wrote:
>
> Ian Grigg wrote:
> >
> > Tying the certificate into the core crypto protocol seems to be a
> > poor design choice; outsourcing any certification to a higher layer
> > seems to work much better out in the field.
>
> I'll reserve judgement about the significance of SSLBar
Ian Grigg wrote:
Tying the certificate into the core crypto protocol seems to be a
poor design choice; outsourcing any certification to a higher layer
seems to work much better out in the field.
I'll reserve judgement about the significance of SSLBar, but I couldn't
agree more with the above poin
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> How many users can remember MD5 checksums??? If they were rendered into
> something pronounceable via S/Key like dictionaries it might be more
> useful...
Apologies, last night's answer was too brief to
be useful! Here's the more detailed and coffee
charged explanation
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> How many users can remember MD5 checksums??? If they were rendered into
> something pronounceable via S/Key like dictionaries it might be more
> useful...
You forgot this bit:
> It's a small step for the user, but a giant leap
> for userland security. It means that so
On Tue, 24 Jun 2003, Ian Grigg wrote:
> http://sslbar.metropipe.net/
>
> Fantastic news: coders are starting to work
> on the failed security model of secure browsing
> and improve it where it matters, in the browser.
>
> This plugin for Mozilla shows the SSL certificate's
> fingerprint on the we
http://sslbar.metropipe.net/
Fantastic news: coders are starting to work
on the failed security model of secure browsing
and improve it where it matters, in the browser.
This plugin for Mozilla shows the SSL certificate's
fingerprint on the web browser's toolbar.
It's a small step for the user,
