Re: Satellite eavesdropping of 802.11b traffic

2004-05-30 Thread Dirk-Willem van Gulik
On May 27, 2004, at 12:35 PM, John Kelsey wrote:
Does anyone know whether the low-power nature of wireless LANs 
protects them from eavesdropping by satellite?  Is there some simple 
reference that would easily let me figure out whether transmitters at 
a given power are in danger of eavesdropping by satellite?

If you assume a perfect vacuum (and note that the athmosphere is fairly 
opaque at 2.4 Ghz) and perfect antenna's etc - then the specific 
detectivity needed in space suggests a not unresonably sized (m2's) and 
cold antenna (below 180k) by very resonably NEP which is commercially 
available. Given the noise from the earth background (assuming a black 
body radiator) at 2.4, the Sun and the likelyhood that that largish 
antenna catches a fair chunk of exactly that  then you are at the edge 
of what would be realistic. However with some clever tricks and 
processing, like a phase array, you certainly should be able to at 
least detect that short (1-2mseconds) 100Khz wide 2.4Ghz transmisison 
at 0.1 watt is happening - assuming you know where to look. Listening 
in over a country-sized swath over a prologned periods of time is an 
entirely different story. Given that you then need to be at least 3-4 
order's of magnitude better - and that you only get at best square root 
when increase the easy things like  detector size etc, at best  - my 
guess would be that some flying or earthbound is a heck of a lot 
cheaper and more realistic.

There are some good papers on Lidar and Radar detections of clouds in 
the 3Ghz range at 12km which should give you more of an idea of the 
spatial resolution you could accomplish. When looking at these - bear 
in mind that the 2-3kWatt used is reflected by the ice particles - so 
what gets back is 30-40dBZ less - and that you can use a phased locked 
loop amplifier easily.

Dw
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Re: Satellite eavesdropping of 802.11b traffic

2004-05-28 Thread Ed Reed
Why worry about satellites when car/plane/neighbor unpiloted remote
controlled airplanes work so well?

You're free-radiating electronic emissions.  That's all a determined
adversary needs.  Or an opportunistic war-driving script-kiddie, for
that matter.

 John Kelsey [EMAIL PROTECTED] 5/27/2004 12:35:00 PM 
Guys,

Does anyone know whether the low-power nature of wireless LANs protects
them from eavesdropping by satellite?  Is there some simple reference
that would easily let me figure out whether transmitters at a given
power are in danger of eavesdropping by satellite?  

Thanks,

--John 

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RE: Satellite eavesdropping of 802.11b traffic

2004-05-28 Thread Trei, Peter
R. A. Hettinga

 At 12:35 PM -0400 5/27/04, John Kelsey wrote:
 Does anyone know whether the low-power nature of wireless 
 LANs protects
 them from eavesdropping by satellite?
 
 It seems to me that you'd need a pretty big dish in orbit to 
 get that kind
 of resolution.
 
 The Keyholes(?) are for microwaves, right?
 
 Cheers,
 RAH

I don't claim great expertise, but

802.11b/g operates in the microwave range - My home
net falls over every time my kid heats up a
burrito (It comes right back, though).

GSM phones run at a MAX of 0.25 watts (GSM900) or 
0.125 watts (GSM1800), but it is normal for the 
power used to be one hundredth of this maximum 
or less.

However, the base stations are much more powerful - 
50 watts. I suspect the spy-from-orbit stuff looks 
at this, not the phone transmitter. 802.11b/g 
typically runs around 0.1 watt, and there is no 
high-power base station.

If this is the case, then the power in an 802.11b/g
net is 1/500th of that for GSM phones - which seems
to fit in with the difference in range. Phones 
operate with kilometers to the base station, while
802.11b/g is lucky to cover a whole house.

A big antenna would obviously be a lot of help, but a
smaller one a lot closer would be better. If you insist
on listening from orbit, geosync is probably not the way
to go - you'd want something like the Iridium constellation
of low-orbit sats (600 miles up).

Clarke orbit (geosync) is about 35800 km up. You'd get
a 10,000 fold advantage by putting your spysats at only
358km. 

I suspect that eavesdropping on 802.11b/g from 
orbit is pretty hard. The power levels are very 
low, and there may be several nets running on the same 
channel within a satellites' antenna footprint. 
My summary: Very tough. Probably not impossible.

Peter

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Re: Satellite eavesdropping of 802.11b traffic

2004-05-28 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 9:19 PM -0400 5/27/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 At 12:35 PM -0400 5/27/04, John Kelsey wrote:
Does anyone know whether the low-power nature of wireless LANs protects
them from eavesdropping by satellite?
 It seems to me that you'd need a pretty big dish in orbit to get that kind
 of resolution.
 The Keyholes(?) are for microwaves, right?
Dunno if it would work in orbit,, but you can get surprising results
right here on earth using phased arrays.
Vivato is selling very long range phased array equipment as long
range/high quality 802.11 basestations, but you could do precisely the
same trick to eavesdrop instead of to communicate. With enough
computing power, one device could listen in on every 802.11
communication in a very large radius.
I don't know how practical it would be to set up some sort of large
scale phased array in orbit -- I suspect the answer is not practical
at all -- but the principle could apply there, too.
I would say quite practical. A huge advantage for the attacker is 
that 802.11b/g is in a fixed frequency band. A half-wave dipole is 
6.25 cm long. A large phased array could be assembled out of printed 
circuit board tiles, each with many antennas.

The outdoor range for 802.11 is up to 100 m.  Low earth orbit is 
about 150 km.  That is a factor of 1500. Power attenuation is the 
square of that, which works out to a 64 db loss.  Throw in another 10 
db for slant range, building attenuation, etc. The loss has to be 
made up by a combination of antenna gain, improved receiver 
performance and better signal processing. That doesn't sound undoable.

A single LEO satellite would only have a few minutes of visibility 
per day over any one location on Earth. That suggests an active 
attack, where the satellite looks for files or even changes data. The 
satellite's ability to transmit at much higher power levels is an 
advantage.

A third option is spot jamming. Here high power means one can get 
away with a smaller antenna, perhaps wrapped around a cheaper spin 
stabilized satellite.  Such a system could be used to briefly disable 
802.11-based security systems, perhaps allowing a spy to gain access 
to a building.

Other interesting possibilities include long endurance 
remotely-piloted aircraft, balloons and small receiving stations that 
could be planted by spies or even parachuted into position. I'm sure 
802.11 has given the SIGINT community much joy.

Arnold Reinhold
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Re: Satellite eavesdropping of 802.11b traffic

2004-05-28 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Fri, May 28, 2004 at 01:19:15PM -0500, Matt Crawford wrote:
 Don't dismiss possibilities for wireless data eavesdropping without 
 considering the possibilities of this new chip
 
 http://pr.caltech.edu/media/Press_Releases/PR12490.html
 
 and its friends
 
 http://www.chic.caltech.edu/

If you want to fly a LEO constellation of them, you need a very sparse structure (or
a huge density of pongsats, which doesn't agree with observations).

-- 
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net


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