[A bit off topic but I thought I'd let it through anyway. Those
uninterested in OS design should skip the rest of this message. --Perry]
On 5/1/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Perry E. Metzger) wrote:
>Disk encryption systems like CGD work
>on the block level, and do not propagate CBC operations across bl
On 5/1/06, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Not if you design it correctly. Disk encryption systems like CGD work
on the block level, and do not propagate CBC operations across blocks,
So is it vulnerable to any of the attacks here?
http://clemens.endorphin.org/LinuxHDEncSettings
I
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A similar issue occurs in a civilian context, sometimes with fake
employees, other times with fake bills. Often, these get found
because they rely on the person committing the fraud being there
every time a check arrives: It's the check sitting around with no
one speaki
| > issues did start showing up in the mid-90s in the corporate world ...
| > there were a large number of former gov. employees starting to show up
| > in different corporate security-related positions (apparently after
| > being turfed from the gov). their interests appeared to possibly reflec
I use the following approach to encrypting my disks.
I use an encrypted loopback device. The version of losetup I use
permits me to store the disk key in a PGP encrypted file and decrypt
it (with gpg) when needed. I made many backups of the both my personal
keyring and the file with the encrypted
"Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Does anyone have any experience with disk or filesystem encryption,
> especially with regard to unclean shutdowns and power failures? Normal
> file systems are designed to fail in ways that are easy to
> clean up with fsck, but when you start to throw encr
On 29 Apr 2006 02:00:18 -, StealthMonger
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Interesting epilog: theregister has apparently now edited out all
mention of master keys.
They probably had their misunderstanding pointed out to them by
countless people by now.
But... did anyone else note the phrasing of
Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
issues did start showing up in the mid-90s in the corporate world ...
there were a large number of former gov. employees starting to show up
in different corporate security-related positions (apparently after
being turfed from the gov). their interests appeared to pos
"Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> In an article on disk encryption
> (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/26/pgp_infosec/), the following
> paragraph appears:
> BitLocker has landed Redmond in some hot water over its insistence
> that there are no back doors for law
and real-time reference from today ... on backup tapes ... at off-site
location that weren't encrypted (and should have been):
Data storage firm apologizes for loss of railroad data tapes
Information on as many as 17,000 workers at risk
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2006/04/28/da
note from the corporate side ... is was specifically the escrow of
encryption keys for data at rest ... as part of prudent corporate asset
protection; it was not escrow of authentication keys nor escrow of
encryption keys used for communication.
the internal network was larger than the arpanet
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
Ah -- corporate key escrow. An overt back door for Little Brother, rather
than a covert one for Big Brother
the key escrow meetings attempted to differentiate between keys used for
authentication and keys used for securing corporate data (I only went to
a couple
On Wed, Apr 26, 2006 at 10:41:12PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>
> Ah -- corporate key escrow. An overt back door for Little Brother, rather
> than a covert one for Big Brother
You should check the list of recipient keys in PGP messages from time
to time anyway. I recently found a bug
Quoting "Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> What is a "master key" in this context?
ADK, the Additional Decryption Key. An enterprise with a Managed
PGP Desktop installed base can set up an ADK and all messages get
encrypted to the ADK in addition to the recipient's key.
Ah -- corpo
On Wed, 26 Apr 2006 22:24:22 -0400, Derek Atkins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Quoting "Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > In an article on disk encryption
> > (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/26/pgp_infosec/), the following
> > paragraph appears:
> >
> > BitLocker has landed
On Wed, Apr 26, 2006 at 09:53:27PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> In an article on disk encryption
> (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/26/pgp_infosec/), the following
> paragraph appears:
>
> BitLocker has landed Redmond in some hot water over its insistence
> that there are no
Quoting "Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
In an article on disk encryption
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/26/pgp_infosec/), the following
paragraph appears:
BitLocker has landed Redmond in some hot water over its insistence
that there are no back doors for law enf
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