You propose to put a key into a physical device and give it
to the public, and expect that they will never recover
the key from it? Seems unwise.
You think the public can crack FIPS devices? This is mass-market, not
govt-level attackers.
Second, if the key's in hardware you *know* it's been
Rich Salz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Second, if the key's in hardware you *know* it's been stolen. You don't know
that for software.
Only for some definitions of stolen. A key held in a smart card that does
absolutely everything the untrusted PC it's connected to tells it to is only
marginally
/enforcer open-source TCPA project
On Wed, 10 Sep 2003, Sean Smith wrote:
So this doesn't
work unless you put a speed limit on CPU's, and that's ridiculous.
Go read about the 4758. CPU speed won't help unless
you can crack 2048-bit RSA, or figure out a way around
the physical security, or find
Thus spake Rich Salz ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) [11/09/03 08:51]:
You propose to put a key into a physical device and give it
to the public, and expect that they will never recover
the key from it? Seems unwise.
You think the public can crack FIPS devices? This is mass-market, not
govt-level
Just to clarify...
I'm NOT saying that any particular piece of secure hardware can never be
broken. Steve Weingart (the hw security guy for the 4758) used to insist that
there was no such thing as tamper-proof. On the HW level, all you can do is
talk about what defenses you tried, what
How can you verify that a remote computer is the real thing, doing
the right thing?
You cannot.
Using a high-end secure coprocessor (such as the 4758, but not
with a flawed application) will raise the threshold for the adversary
significantly.
No, there are no absolutes. But there are
