On Jun 10, 2009, at 4:19 PM, travis+ml-cryptogra...@subspacefield.org
wrote:
Reading really old email, but have new information to add.
On Wed, Oct 03, 2007 at 02:15:38PM +1000, Daniel Carosone wrote:
Speculation: the drive always encrypts the platters with a (fixed)
AES
key, obviating t
Reading really old email, but have new information to add.
On Wed, Oct 03, 2007 at 02:15:38PM +1000, Daniel Carosone wrote:
> Speculation: the drive always encrypts the platters with a (fixed) AES
> key, obviating the need to track which sectors are encrypted or
> not. Setting the drive password s
> I think the really interesting question is what happens when you lose
> a FDE-ed hard drive. Do you still need to publish the incident and
> contact potentially affected individuals? If the answer is "no", I'm
> sure this technology will be quickly adopted, independently of its
> actual impleme
* Ivan Krstić:
> On Oct 3, 2007, at 4:39 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> But this exhibits an issue with disk-based encryption: you can't
>> really know what they are doing, and if they are doing it right.
>> (Given countless examples of badly-deployed cryptography, this isn't
>> just paranoia, but a
On Oct 3, 2007, at 4:39 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
But this exhibits an issue with disk-based encryption: you can't
really know what they are doing, and if they are doing it right.
(Given countless examples of badly-deployed cryptography, this isn't
just paranoia, but a real concern.)
Precisely.
* Simon Josefsson:
> One would assume that if you disable the password, the data would NOT be
> accessible. Making it accessible should require a read+decrypt+write of
> the entire disk, which would be quite time consuming. It may be that
> this is happening in the background, although it isn't
On Tue, Oct 02, 2007 at 03:50:27PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> Without access to the device (I've contacted Hitachi EMEA to find out if
> it is possible to purchase the special disks) it is difficult to infer
> how it works, but the final page of the howto seems strange:
>
> ...
>
>NOTE:
On Tue, 02 Oct 2007 15:50:27 +0200
Simon Josefsson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> It sounds to me as if they are storing the AES key used for bulk
> encryption somewhere on the disk, and that it can be unlocked via the
> password.
I'd say "decrypted by the password", rather than unlocked, but th
Following up on an old thread with some new information:
> Hitachi's white paper is available from:
>
> http://www.hitachigst.com/tech/techlib.nsf/techdocs/74D8260832F2F75E862572D7004AE077/$file/bulk_encryption_white_paper.pdf
...
> The interesting part is the final sentence of the white paper:
>
Leichter, Jerry wrote:
First off, it depends on how the thing is implemented. Since the entire
drive is apparently encrypted, and you have to enter a password just to
boot from it, some of the support is in an extended BIOS or some very
early boot code, which is "below" any OS you might actually
Dave Korn wrote:
On 07 September 2007 21:28, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
Grow up. *If* the drive vendor keeps the mechanism secret, you have
cause for complaint. But can you name a drive vendor who's done
anything like that in years?
All DVD drive manufacturers. That's why nobody could writ
On 07 September 2007 21:28, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
> Grow up. *If* the drive vendor keeps the mechanism secret, you have
> cause for complaint. But can you name a drive vendor who's done
> anything like that in years?
All DVD drive manufacturers. That's why nobody could write a driver for
Ivan Krsti? wrote:
On Sep 6, 2007, at 6:14 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
other known good implementations of AES128 (CBC? I'm not
sure...).
Plain AES-CBC is not a great choice for FDE. You can do whatever you'd
like to the bits of a given block at the cost of garbling the previous
block, which
| Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2007 16:00:03 -0600
| From: Chris Kuethe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
| To: Jacob Appelbaum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
| Cc: Cryptography
| Subject: Re: Seagate announces hardware FDE for laptop and desktop machines
|
| On 9/6/07, Jacob Appelbaum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
On Sep 6, 2007, at 6:14 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
other known good implementations of AES128 (CBC? I'm not
sure...).
Plain AES-CBC is not a great choice for FDE. You can do whatever
you'd like to the bits of a given block at the cost of garbling the
previous block, which makes binaries a
Jacob Appelbaum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Seagate recently announced a 1TB drive for desktop systems and a 250GB
> laptop drive. What's of interest is that it appears to use a system
> called DriveTrust for Full Disk Encryption. It's apparently AES-128.
>
> The detail lacking press release is
Chris Kuethe wrote:
> On 9/6/07, Jacob Appelbaum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Seagate recently announced a 1TB drive for desktop systems and a 250GB
>> laptop drive. What's of interest is that it appears to use a system
>> called DriveTrust for Full Disk Encryption. It's apparently AES-128.
>
> Y
On 9/6/07, Jacob Appelbaum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Seagate recently announced a 1TB drive for desktop systems and a 250GB
> laptop drive. What's of interest is that it appears to use a system
> called DriveTrust for Full Disk Encryption. It's apparently AES-128.
Yes, but will it work on my Ul
Seagate recently announced a 1TB drive for desktop systems and a 250GB
laptop drive. What's of interest is that it appears to use a system
called DriveTrust for Full Disk Encryption. It's apparently AES-128.
The detail lacking press release is here:
http://www.seagate.com/ww/v/index.jsp?locale=en-
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