Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
cyphrpunk wrote: 1. The issue is still moot at present. We are a long way from where open, public, remote attestion will be possible. See this diagram from the Trousers open-source TPM software stack project which shows which pieces are still missing:

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread Ivan Krstić
Travis H. wrote: I can validate everything else, but as long as the BIOS is motherboard-specific and closed source, I don't see why I should trust it. We need to get rid of this legacy crud. LinuxBIOS is a good step but unfortunately it is only supported on a few motherboards. We're

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread Ivan Krstić
Alexander Klimov wrote: Since a regular installation should not change ``reported OS hash,'' TPM will not be able to detect the difference. Am I missing something? You're missing the marketing value of saying this piece of hardware, that you probably wouldn't otherwise want in your machine

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread Ivan Krstić
Kuehn, Ulrich wrote: Who is we? In the case of my own system I payed for (so speaking for myself) I would like to have such a mechanism to have the system prove to me before login that it is not tampered with. The TCG approach does not provide this. What does prove mean here? Does having a

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread cyphrpunk
On 10/10/06, Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think the current CPUs / memory managers do not have the ring -1 / curtained memory features, but already a year ago or more Intel and AMD were talking about these features. So its possible the for example hypervisor extra virtualization

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread James A. Donald
James A. Donald: Well obviously I trust myself, and do not trust anyone else all that much, so if I am the user, what good is trusted computing? One use is that I can know that my operating system has not changed behind the scenes, perhaps by a rootkit, know that not only have I not

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread cyphrpunk
Here is a posting from the cypherpunks mailing list describing the capabilities of Intel's new virtualization/TPM technology. Gets a bit ranty but still good information. CP -- Forwarded message -- From: Anonymous Remailer (austria) [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2006

RE: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread Kuehn, Ulrich
From: Ivan Krstić [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Kuehn, Ulrich wrote: Who is we? In the case of my own system I payed for (so speaking for myself) I would like to have such a mechanism to have the system prove to me before login that it is not tampered with. The TCG approach does

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-13 Thread cyphrpunk
On 10/13/06, Kuehn, Ulrich [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: With reliably stopping the boot process I mean the following: Given that stage i of the process is running, it takes the hash of the next stage, compares that to an expected value. If they match, the current stage extends the TPM register (when

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-12 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Mon, 9 Oct 2006 kkursawe at esat.kuleuven.ac.be wrote: IIUC, TPM is pointless for disk crypto: if your laptop is stolen the attacker can reflash BIOS and bypass TPM. According to TCG Specification, the first part of the BIOS (called Core Root of Trust for Measurement) should be

RE: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-12 Thread Kuehn, Ulrich
From: James A. Donald [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Dienstag, 10. Oktober 2006 06:40 What we want is that a bank client can prove to the bank it is the real client, and not trojaned. What the evil guys at RIAA want is that their music player can prove it is their real music player,

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-12 Thread Adam Back
I was suspecting that as DRM at least appears to one of the main motivators (along side trojan/malware protection) for trustworthy computing that probably you will not be able to put the TPM into debug mode (ie manipulate code without affecting the hash attested in debug mode). Ability to do so

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-12 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Mon, 9 Oct 2006, James A. Donald wrote: Well obviously I trust myself, and do not trust anyone else all that much, so if I am the user, what good is trusted computing? One use is that I can know that my operating system has not changed behind the scenes, perhaps by a rootkit, know that

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-12 Thread John Gilmore
What we want is that a bank client can prove to the bank it is the real client, and not trojaned. What the evil guys at RIAA want is that their music player can prove it is their real music player, and not hacked by the end user. Having a system that will only boot up in a known state is

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-12 Thread Travis H.
On 10/9/06, Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The bad part is that the user is not given control to modify the hash and attest as if it were the original so that he can insert his own code, debug, modify etc. (All that is needed is a debug option in the BIOS to do this that only the user can

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-12 Thread cyphrpunk
On 10/10/06, Brian Gladman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I haven't been keeping up to date with this trusted computing stuff over the last two years but when I was last involved it was accepted that it was vital that the owner of a machine (not necessarily the user) should be able to do the sort of

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-10 Thread James A. Donald
-- Kuehn, Ulrich wrote: However, this is the big problem with the TPM according to the TCG spec. While you can remotely verify that the system came up according to what you installed there, you have no means to force it to either come up the way you want, or to be in a clear error

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-10 Thread Brian Gladman
Adam Back wrote: So the part about being able to detect viruses, trojans and attest them between client-server apps that the client and server have a mutual interest to secure is fine and good. The bad part is that the user is not given control to modify the hash and attest as if it were

RE: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Kuehn, Ulrich
From: Erik Tews [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Donnerstag, 5. Oktober 2006 23:52 [...] Later, you can remotely query your system and get a report what has been bootet on your system. You can do this query using a java application and tpm4java. However, this is the big problem

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Fri, 6 Oct 2006, Erik Tews wrote: And the TPM knows that your BIOS has not lied about the checksum of grub how? The TPM does not know that the BIOS did not lie about the checksum of grub or any other bios component. What you do is, you trust your TPM and your BIOS that they never lie

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread James A. Donald
Erik Tews wrote: What you do is, you trust your TPM and your BIOS that they never lie to you, because they are certified by the manufature of the system and the tpm. (This is why it is called trusted computing) So if you don't trust your hardware and your manufactor, trusted computing is

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Adam Back
So the part about being able to detect viruses, trojans and attest them between client-server apps that the client and server have a mutual interest to secure is fine and good. The bad part is that the user is not given control to modify the hash and attest as if it were the original so that he

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-09 Thread Martin Hermanowski
Alexander Klimov schrieb: On Fri, 6 Oct 2006, Erik Tews wrote: And the TPM knows that your BIOS has not lied about the checksum of grub how? The TPM does not know that the BIOS did not lie about the checksum of grub or any other bios component. What you do

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-08 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Thu, Oct 05, 2006 at 11:51:49PM +0200, Erik Tews wrote: Am Donnerstag, den 05.10.2006, 16:25 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: On 10/2/06, Erik Tews [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Am Sonntag, den 01.10.2006, 23:42 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: Anyone have any information on how to develop TPM software?

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-08 Thread Erik Tews
Am Freitag, den 06.10.2006, 17:29 -0400 schrieb Thor Lancelot Simon: On Thu, Oct 05, 2006 at 11:51:49PM +0200, Erik Tews wrote: Am Donnerstag, den 05.10.2006, 16:25 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: On 10/2/06, Erik Tews [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Am Sonntag, den 01.10.2006, 23:42 -0500 schrieb

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-06 Thread Travis H.
On 10/2/06, Erik Tews [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Am Sonntag, den 01.10.2006, 23:42 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: Anyone have any information on how to develop TPM software? http://tpm4java.datenzone.de/ Using this lib, you need less than 10 lines of java-code for doing some simple

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-06 Thread Erik Tews
Am Donnerstag, den 05.10.2006, 16:25 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: On 10/2/06, Erik Tews [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Am Sonntag, den 01.10.2006, 23:42 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: Anyone have any information on how to develop TPM software? http://tpm4java.datenzone.de/ Using

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-06 Thread Travis H.
On 10/5/06, Erik Tews [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: First, you need a system with tpm. I assume you are running linux. Then you boot your linux-kernel and an initrd using the trusted grub bootloader. Your bios will report the checksum of trusted grub to the tpm before giving control to your grub

TPM disk crypto

2006-10-02 Thread Travis H.
Quoting: Disk drives gear up for a lockdown Rick Merritt, EE Times (09/25/2006 9:00 AM EDT) Built-in security is the next big thing for hard-disk drives. By 2008, drive makers should be shipping in volume a broad array of drives based on a maturing standard. ... The first version of the

Re: TPM disk crypto

2006-10-02 Thread Erik Tews
Am Sonntag, den 01.10.2006, 23:42 -0500 schrieb Travis H.: Anyone have any information on how to develop TPM software? Yes, thats easy. We created a java library for the tpm chip. You can get it at http://tpm4java.datenzone.de/ Using this lib, you need less than 10 lines