Ben Laurie wrote:
I am suggesting that if
you cannot rely on the recipient (or their machine) to manage keys
properly, then you also cannot rely on them to manage decrypted emails
properly.
Yes. This thread is about the observation that, even if the recipient
manages keys perfectly well, the re
Ed Gerck wrote:
Ben Laurie wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote:
If the recipient cannot in good faith detect a key-access ware, or a
GAK-ware, or a Trojan, or a bug, why would a complete background
check of the recipient help?
Let's assume for a moment that a solution exists that satisfies your
requirements. S
Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
At 12:53 PM 9/16/2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
If the recipient cannot in good faith detect a key-access ware, or a
GAK-ware, or a Trojan, or a bug, why would a complete background
check of the recipient help?
a "complete audit and background check" ... would include an audit of
Ben Laurie wrote:
Ed Gerck wrote:
If the recipient cannot in good faith detect a key-access ware, or a
GAK-ware, or a Trojan, or a bug, why would a complete background
check of the recipient help?
Let's assume for a moment that a solution exists that satisfies your
requirements. Since the recipien
At 12:53 PM 9/16/2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
If the recipient cannot in good faith detect a key-access ware, or a
GAK-ware, or a Trojan, or a bug, why would a complete background
check of the recipient help?
a "complete audit and background check" ... would include an audit of the
recipient ... not just
Ed Gerck wrote:
Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> the issue then is what level do you trust the recipient, what is the
threat model, and what are the countermeasures.
if there is a general trust issue with the recipient (not just their
key generating capability) ... then a classified document compromi
On Fri, Sep 17, 2004 at 07:35:09PM +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
> Oh, that's really easy. Each mailer (MUA) should (on
> install) generate a self-signed cert. Stick the fingerprint
apt-get install postfix-tls
Allright, this still doesn't generate the certs, nor reference them in the
main.cf.
> in
Bill Stewart wrote:
At 10:19 PM 9/15/2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
Yes, PKC provides a workable solution for key distribution... when you
look at servers. For email, the PKC solution is not workable (hasn't
been)
and gives a false impression of security. For example, the sender has no
way of knowing if th
lrk wrote:
Perhaps it is time to define an e-mail definition of crypto to keep the
"postman" from reading the "postcards". That should be easy enough to
implement for the average user and provide some degree of privacy for
their mail. Call it "envelopes" rather than "crypto". Real security
require
On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 04:57:39PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
> At 10:19 PM 9/15/2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> >Yes, PKC provides a workable solution for key distribution... when you
> >look at servers. For email, the PKC solution is not workable (hasn't been)
> >and gives a false impression of security.
At 05:35 PM 9/16/2004, Adam Shostack wrote:
Generate a key for "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" encrypt mail to
Bob to that key. When Bob shows up, decrypt and send over ssl.
note there is still the issue of knowing it is bob ... whether before the
"transmission" or after the "transmission" and, in fact
Adam Shostack wrote:
On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 12:05:57PM -0700, Ed Gerck wrote:
| >Adam Shostack wrote:
| >
| >I think the consensus from debate back last year on
| >this group when Voltage first surfaced was that it
| >didn't do anything that couldn't be done with PGP,
| >and added more risks to bo
At 10:19 PM 9/15/2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
Yes, PKC provides a workable solution for key distribution... when you
look at servers. For email, the PKC solution is not workable (hasn't been)
and gives a false impression of security. For example, the sender has no
way of knowing if the recipient's key is
On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 06:12:48PM +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
| Adam Shostack wrote:
| >Given our failure to deploy PKC in any meaningful way*, I think that
| >systems like Voltage, and the new PGP Universal are great.
|
| I think the consensus from debate back last year on
| this group when Voltage
On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 12:05:57PM -0700, Ed Gerck wrote:
| >Adam Shostack wrote:
| >
| >I think the consensus from debate back last year on
| >this group when Voltage first surfaced was that it
| >didn't do anything that couldn't be done with PGP,
| >and added more risks to boot.
|
| Voltage actu
On Wed, Sep 15, 2004 at 11:39:25AM -0700, Ed Gerck wrote:
>
> Yes, SSL and public-key encryption are and continue to be a success for web
> servers. However, the security model for protecting email with public-key
> cryptography seems to be backwards, technically and business wise.
Exactly. It i
Adam Shostack wrote:
I think the consensus from debate back last year on
this group when Voltage first surfaced was that it
didn't do anything that couldn't be done with PGP,
and added more risks to boot.
Voltage actually does. It allows secure communication
without pre-registering the recipient.
C
Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> the issue then is what level do you trust the recipient, what is the
threat model, and what are the countermeasures.
if there is a general trust issue with the recipient (not just their key
generating capability) ... then a classified document compromise could
happen
Adam Shostack wrote:
Given our failure to deploy PKC in any meaningful way*, I think that
systems like Voltage, and the new PGP Universal are great.
I think the consensus from debate back last year on
this group when Voltage first surfaced was that it
didn't do anything that couldn't be done with P
At 11:19 PM 9/15/2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
Yes, PKC provides a workable solution for key distribution... when you
look at servers. For email, the PKC solution is not workable (hasn't been)
and gives a false impression of security. For example, the sender has no
way of knowing if the recipient's key is
Given our failure to deploy PKC in any meaningful way*, I think that
systems like Voltage, and the new PGP Universal are great.
* I don't see Verisign's web server tax as meaningful; they accept no
liability, and numerous companies foist you off to unrelted domains.
We could get roughly the same s
Benne,
With Voltage, all communications corresponding to the same public key can be
decrypted using the same private key, even if the user is offline. To me, this
sounds worse than the PKC problem of trusting the recipient's key. Voltage
also corresponds to mandatory key escrow, as you noted, with
Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
PGP allows that a relying party vet a public key with the key owner
and/or vet the key with one or more others (web-of-trust)
note that while public key alleviates the requirement that a key be
distributed with secrecy ... it doesn't eliminate the requirement that
the
nt: woensdag 15 september 2004 20:39
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: public-key: the wrong model for email?
>
> [Perry: please use this version, if possible]
>
> Public-key cryptography burdens the recipient and puts the
> recipient in charge, while the sender is at the re
At 12:39 PM 9/15/2004, Ed Gerck wrote:
> [1] Public-key cryptography gives the impression that email message
security can
> be achieved quite simply. The public-key can be distributed at will, no
need for
> secrecy, and anyone can receive private and secure messages. The same
procedure
> being a
[Perry: please use this version, if possible]
Public-key cryptography burdens the recipient and puts the recipient in
charge, while the sender is at the recipient's mercy. Is this the right
model for email security? After all, the sender is the party at risk.
To clarify, my comment is not that PKC
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