Re: security questions

2008-08-10 Thread John Levine
> IIRC, it used personal data already available to DEC -- so they > didn't have to ask their employees for it That works great so long as the personal data is accurate. Banks these days are supposed to verify your identity when you open an account. Online banks pull your credit report anyway, so

Re: security questions

2008-08-10 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Thu, Aug 07, 2008 at 08:53:58AM -0400, John Ioannidis wrote: > > Does anyone know how this "security questions" disease started, and why > it is spreading the way it is? If your company does this, can you find > the people responsible and ask them what they were think

Re: security questions

2008-08-08 Thread Leichter, Jerry
obably involves more setup time than the average user will want to put up with.) | > constitute good security questions based on the anticipated entropy | > of the responses. This is why, for example, no good security | > question has a yes/no answer (i.e., 1-bit). Aren't security | > que

Re: security questions

2008-08-08 Thread John Ioannidis
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John Ioannidis wrote: | Does anyone know how this "security questions" disease started, and why | it is spreading the way it is? If your company does this, can you find | the people responsible and ask them what they were thinking? The answer is "

RE: security questions

2008-08-07 Thread piers . bowness
John Ioannidis wrote: | Does anyone know how this "security questions" disease started, and why | it is spreading the way it is? If your company does this, can you find | the people responsible and ask them what they were thinking? The answer is "Help Desk Call Avoidance"

Re: security questions

2008-08-07 Thread Leichter, Jerry
On Thu, 7 Aug 2008, John Ioannidis wrote: | Does anyone know how this "security questions" disease started, and | why it is spreading the way it is? If your company does this, can you | find the people responsible and ask them what they were thinking? | | My theory is that no actua

Re: security questions

2008-08-07 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
Stefan Kelm wrote: Wells Fargo is requiring their online banking customers to provide answers to security questions such as these: Does Wells Fargo really use the term "security question" here? Yes it does. I'm a Wells Fargo customer and I had to set my "security que

Re: security questions

2008-08-07 Thread John Ioannidis
Does anyone know how this "security questions" disease started, and why it is spreading the way it is? If your company does this, can you find the people responsible and ask them what they were thinking? My theory is that no actual security people have ever been involved, and that

Re: security questions

2008-08-07 Thread Stefan Kelm
> Wells Fargo is requiring their online banking customers to provide > answers to security questions such as these: Does Wells Fargo really use the term "security question" here? Just wondering, Stefan. --

RE: security questions

2008-08-07 Thread Scott Guthery
Another useful piece of research on the topic: V. Griffith and M. Jakobsson. "Messin' with Texas, Deriving Mother's Maiden Names Using Public Records." ACNS '05, 2005 and CryptoBytes Winter '07 http://www.informatics.indiana.edu/markus/papers.asp Cheers, Scott --

Re: security questions

2008-08-06 Thread Apu Kapadia
is, I enter random values that I don't even record for the security questions. Should something go wrong, I'm going to end up on the phone with a rep anyway, and they will have some other method for authenticating me (or, of course, a clever social-engineering attacker). An except from

Re: security questions

2008-08-06 Thread David Molnar
Peter Saint-Andre wrote: [list of security questions snipped] *** It strikes me that the answers to many of these questions might be public information or subject to social engineering attacks... You might enjoy reading Ari Rabkin's recent paper at SOUPS 2008 on this issue: &quo

Re: security questions

2008-08-06 Thread Matt Ball
On Wed, Aug 6, 2008 at 9:23 AM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: > > Wells Fargo is requiring their online banking customers to provide answers to > security questions such as these: > > *** > > What is name of the hospital in which your first child was born? ... > What was your

Re: security questions

2008-08-06 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
Chris Kuethe wrote: On Wed, Aug 6, 2008 at 8:23 AM, Peter Saint-Andre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Wells Fargo is requiring their online banking customers to provide answers to security questions such as these: *** ... *** It strikes me that the answers to many of these questions mi

Re: security questions

2008-08-06 Thread Chris Kuethe
On Wed, Aug 6, 2008 at 8:23 AM, Peter Saint-Andre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Wells Fargo is requiring their online banking customers to provide answers > to security questions such as these: > > *** > ... > *** > > It strikes me that the answers to many of t

Re: security questions

2008-08-06 Thread Leichter, Jerry
On Wed, 6 Aug 2008, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: | Wells Fargo is requiring their online banking customers to provide | answers to security questions such as these: | | *** | | What is name of the hospital in which your first child was born? | What is your mother's birthday? (MMDD) | What i

security questions

2008-08-06 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
Wells Fargo is requiring their online banking customers to provide answers to security questions such as these: *** What is name of the hospital in which your first child was born? What is your mother's birthday? (MMDD) What is the first name of your first roommate in college? What is the

RE: Foibles of user "security" questions

2008-01-14 Thread Dave Korn
On 07 January 2008 17:14, Leichter, Jerry wrote: > Reported on Computerworld recently: To "improve security", a system > was modified to ask one of a set of fixed-form questions after the > password was entered. Users had to provide the answers up front to > enroll. One question: Mother's maid

Re: Foibles of user "security" questions

2008-01-14 Thread Peter Gutmann
Florian Weimer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >* Jerry Leichter: >> I can just see the day when someone's fingerprint is rejected as >> "insufficiently complex". >It's been claimed that once you reach the retirement age, one person in ten >hasn't got any fingerprints which can be used for biometric pu

Re: Foibles of user "security" questions

2008-01-14 Thread ' =JeffH '
of possible relevance... Mike Just. "Designing and Evaluating Challenge-Question Systems". IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, 1540-7993/04, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2004. =JeffH - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubsc

Re: Foibles of user "security" questions

2008-01-11 Thread Florian Weimer
* Jerry Leichter: > I can just see the day when someone's fingerprint is rejected as > "insufficiently complex". It's been claimed that once you reach the retirement age, one person in ten hasn't got any fingerprints which can be used for biometric purposes. -

Re: Foibles of user "security" questions

2008-01-09 Thread mtd
stored). In fact, I see security questions as a security weakness. My typical answer is random garbage, such as output of pwgen -s -y 48 1. This can be discarded then. Or, at least, gpw 1 60 (gpw output is less secure, but can be stored, remembered, and even written in on simplified keyboards) L

Re: Foibles of user "security" questions

2008-01-08 Thread Victor Duchovni
d unmemorable (stored on a "keychain" or just discarded if the primary password is similarly safely stored). When asked to provide answers for security questions, mine are always either the output of "openssl rand -base64 N" (with N = 6, 9 or 12), or more memorable non-sequ

RE: Foibles of user "security" questions

2008-01-07 Thread Ian Farquhar (ifarquha)
om: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Leichter, Jerry Sent: Tuesday, 8 January 2008 4:14 AM To: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Foibles of user "security" questions Reported on Computerworld recently: To "improve security", a system was modified to ask on

Foibles of user "security" questions

2008-01-07 Thread Leichter, Jerry
Reported on Computerworld recently: To "improve security", a system was modified to ask one of a set of fixed-form questions after the password was entered. Users had to provide the answers up front to enroll. One question: Mother's maiden name. User provides the 4-character answer. System r