On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 07:12:21AM -0400, Richard Salz wrote:
I don't think you need all that much to get good secure private email.
You need a client that can make PEM pretty seamless; reduce it to a
button that says encrypt when possible. You need the client to be
able to generate a
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On 08/27/2013 02:32 AM, Sebastian Krahmer wrote:
Now, thats an interesting point! Once all email is encrypted, how
many mail providers would be interested in offering free service at
all,
Another question might be, how many e-mail services would
I don't think you need all that much to get good secure private email.
You need a client that can make PEM pretty seamless; reduce it to a
button that says encrypt when possible. You need the client to be
able to generate a keypair, upload the public half, and pull down
(seamlessly) recipient
This is everything *but* PRISM-proof : it doesn t solve the metadata issue
and your directory server containing public keys could very well be forced
by a law enforcement agency ( in the best case scenario because it could
also be the mafia) to answer the fbi/mafia public key on any request made
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On Aug 26, 2013, at 4:12 AM, Richard Salz rich.s...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't think you need all that much to get good secure private email.
You need a client that can make PEM pretty seamless; reduce it to a
button that says encrypt when
On 08/26/2013 04:12 AM, Richard Salz wrote:
You need the client to be
able to generate a keypair, upload the public half, and pull down
(seamlessly) recipient public keys. You need a server to store and
return those keys. You need an installed base to kickstart the network
effect.
Who has
On Aug 26, 2013, at 1:16 PM, Ray Dillinger b...@sonic.net wrote:
Minor point in an otherwise interesting message:
Even a tiny one-percent-of-a-penny payment
that is negligible between established correspondents or even on most email
lists would break a spammer. Also, you can set your client to
This is everything *but* PRISM-proof
I wasn't trying to be PRISM proof, hence my subject line. The client
and keyserver could help thwart traffic analysis by returning a few
extra keys on each request. The client then sends a structure
message to some of those keys that the receiving client
On 08/26/2013 10:39 AM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
On Aug 26, 2013, at 1:16 PM, Ray Dillinger b...@sonic.net wrote:
Even a tiny one-percent-of-a-penny payment
that is negligible between established correspondents or even on most email
lists would break a spammer.
This (and variants, like a