Your cryptosystem should be designed with the assumption that an attacker will
record all old ciphertexts and try to break it later. The whole point of
encryption is to make that attack not scary. We can never rule out future
attacks, or secret ones now. But we can move away from marginal
On 09/07/2013 06:57 PM, james hughes wrote:
PFS may not be a panacea but does help.
There's no question in my mind that PFS helps. I have, in the past,
been very in much favor of turning on PFS support in various protocols,
when it has
been available. And I fully understand what the
On Sep 7, 2013, at 8:16 PM, Marcus D. Leech mle...@ripnet.com wrote:
But it's not entirely clear to me that it will help enough in the scenarios
under discussion. If we assume that mostly what NSA are doing is acquiring a
site
RSA key (either through donation on the part of the site,
On Sep 8, 2013, at 1:47 PM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote:
On Sep 8, 2013, at 3:51 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
In summary, it would appear that the most viable solution is to make
the end-to-end encryption endpoint a piece of hardware the user owns
(say the oft mentioned $50
note when the router hughes references was 1st introduced in in IETF gateway
committee meeting as VPN it caused lots of turmoil in the IPSEC camp as well as
with the other router vendors. The other router vendors went into standards
stall mode ... their problem was none of them had a product
On Sep 8, 2013, at 7:16 PM, james hughes wrote:
Let me suggest the following.
With RSA, a single quiet donation by the site and it's done. The situation
becomes totally passive and there is no possibility knowing what has been
read. The system administrator could even do this without the
This space is of particular interest to me. I implemented just one of
these and published the protocol (rather than pimp my blog if anyone wants
to read up on the protocol description feel free to email me and I'll send
you a link).
The system itself was built around a fairly simple PKI which
At 06:49 PM 9/6/2013, Marcus D. Leech wrote:
It seems to me that while PFS is an excellent back-stop against NSA
having/deriving a website RSA key, it does *nothing* to prevent the kind of
cooperative endpoint scenario that I've seen discussed in other
forums, prompted by the latest
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 6:49 PM, Marcus D. Leech mle...@ripnet.com wrote:
It seems to me that while PFS is an excellent back-stop against NSA
having/deriving a website RSA key
Well, it helps against passive eavesdropping. However if the NSA has a web
site's private TLS key, they can still MitM
On Sep 7, 2013, at 1:50 PM, Peter Fairbrother zenadsl6...@zen.co.uk wrote:
On 07/09/13 02:49, Marcus D. Leech wrote:
It seems to me that while PFS is an excellent back-stop against NSA
having/deriving a website RSA key, it does *nothing* to prevent the kind of
cooperative endpoint scenario
It seems to me that while PFS is an excellent back-stop against NSA
having/deriving a website RSA key, it does *nothing* to prevent the kind of
cooperative endpoint scenario that I've seen discussed in other
forums, prompted by the latest revelations about what NSA has been up to.
But if
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