Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder

2013-10-10 Thread John Kelsey
The problem with offensive cyberwarfare is that, given the imbalance between attackers and defenders and the expanding use of computer controls in all sorts of systems, a cyber war between two advanced countries will not decide anything militarily, but will leave both combattants much poorer

Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder

2013-10-10 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/10/9 Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com I see cyber-sabotage as being similar to use of chemical or biological weapons: It is going to be banned because the military consequences fall far short of being decisive, are unpredictable and the barriers to entry are low. I doubt that's

Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder

2013-10-10 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
2013/10/10 John Kelsey crypto@gmail.com The problem with offensive cyberwarfare is that, given the imbalance between attackers and defenders and the expanding use of computer controls in all sorts of systems, a cyber war between two advanced countries will not decide anything militarily,

Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder

2013-10-09 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 12:44 AM, Tim Newsham tim.news...@gmail.com wrote: We are more vulnerable to widespread acceptance of these bad principles than almost anyone, ultimately, But doing all these things has won larger budgets and temporary successes for specific people and agencies

Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder

2013-10-09 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-10-08 02:03, John Kelsey wrote: Alongside Phillip's comments, I'll just point out that assassination of key people is a tactic that the US and Israel probably don't have any particular advantages in. It isn't in our interests to encourage a worldwide tacit acceptance of that stuff.

Re: [Cryptography] Iran and murder

2013-10-09 Thread Tim Newsham
We are more vulnerable to widespread acceptance of these bad principles than almost anyone, ultimately, But doing all these things has won larger budgets and temporary successes for specific people and agencies today, whereas the costs of all this will land on us all in the future. The same

[Cryptography] Iran and murder

2013-10-07 Thread John Kelsey
Alongside Phillip's comments, I'll just point out that assassination of key people is a tactic that the US and Israel probably don't have any particular advantages in. It isn't in our interests to encourage a worldwide tacit acceptance of that stuff. I suspect a lot of the broad principles