Hadmut Danisch wrote:
On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 12:41:41AM +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
It occurs to me that a number of these ideas could
be written up over time ... a wiki, anyone? I think
it is high past time to start documenting crypto
patterns.
Wikis are not that good for discussions, and I do
On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 12:41:41AM +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
It occurs to me that a number of these ideas could
be written up over time ... a wiki, anyone? I think
it is high past time to start documenting crypto
patterns.
Wikis are not that good for discussions, and I do believe
that this
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Peter Gutmann writes:
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Maybe it's worth doing some sort of generic RFC for this security model to
avoid scattering the same thing over a pile of IETF WGs, things like the
general operational principles (store a hash of the
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Maybe it's worth doing some sort of generic RFC for this security model to
avoid scattering the same thing over a pile of IETF WGs,
Sounds good. Who wants to write it...?
Since there seems to be at least some interest in this, I'll make a start on
At 11:43 AM 9/11/2004, Peter Gutmann wrote:
So in other words it's the same baby-duck security model that's been quite
successfully used by SSH for about a decade, is also used in some SSL
implementations that don't just blindly trust anything with a certificate
(particularly popular with
On Fri, 10 Sep 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote:
From: Joe Touch [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To clarify, this is not really anonymous in the usual sense.
It does not authenticate the endpoint's identification, other than same
place I had been talking to.
That's pseudonymity, not anonymity.
There's no
