There are high assurance systems that exist that do eactly this. There
are two different implementations of the security unit processing the
same data. The outputs are compared by a seperate high assurance and
validated module that enters into an alarm mode should the outputs
differ.
However,
On Sat, 26 Apr 2008, Karsten Nohl wrote:
| Assuming that hardware backdoors can be build, the interesting
| question becomes how to defeat against them. Even after a particular
| triggering string is identified, it is not clear whether software can
| be used to detect malicious programs. It almost
Leichter, Jerry wrote:
I suspect the only heavy-weight defense is the same one we use against
the Trusting Trust hook-in-the-compiler attack: Cross-compile on
as many compilers from as many sources as you can, on the assumption
that not all compilers contain the same hook.
...
Of course,
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Each chip does not have to be 100% independent, and does not have to
be used 100% of the time.
Assuming a random selection of both outputs and chips for testing, and
a finite set of possible outputs, it is possible to calculate what
sampling ratio would
On Mon, 28 Apr 2008, Ed Gerck wrote:
| Leichter, Jerry wrote:
| I suspect the only heavy-weight defense is the same one we use against
| the Trusting Trust hook-in-the-compiler attack: Cross-compile on
| as many compilers from as many sources as you can, on the assumption
| that not all
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Each chip does not have to be 100% independent, and does not have to
be used 100% of the time.
Assuming a random selection of both outputs and chips for testing, and
a finite set of possible outputs, it is possible to calculate what
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Each chip does not have to be 100% independent, and does not have to
be used 100% of the time.
Assuming a random selection of both outputs and chips for testing, and
a finite set of possible
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
No. It really does not. Shannon's tenth theorem is about correcting
lossy channels with statistically random noise. This is about making
sure something bad doesn't happen to your computer like having someone
transmit blocks of your hard drive out on the network. I assure
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
No. It really does not. Shannon's tenth theorem is about correcting
lossy channels with statistically random noise. This is about making
sure something bad doesn't happen to your computer like having someone
transmit blocks of your
On Apr 25, 2008, at 11:09 AM, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
I remember seeing another, similar contest in which
the goal was to produce a vote-counting program that
looked completely correct, but biased the results.
The winner was amazingly good - I
On Thu, 24 Apr 2008, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
| Perry E. Metzger wrote:
| A pretty scary paper from the Usenix LEET conference:
|
| http://www.usenix.org/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king_html/
|
| The paper describes how, by adding a very small number of gates to a
| microprocessor
I suppose Ken Thompson's, Reflections on Trusting Trust is appropriate
here. This kind of vulnerability has been known about for quite some
time, but did not have much relevance until the advent of ubiquitous
networking.
-
The
Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
A pretty scary paper from the Usenix LEET conference:
http://www.usenix.org/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king_html/
The paper describes how, by adding a very small number of gates to a
microprocessor design (small enough that it would be
Leichter, Jerry wrote:
While analysis of the actual silicon will clearly have to be part of
any solution, it's going to be much harder than that:
1. Critical circuitry will likely be tamper-resistant.
Tamper-resistance techniques make it hard to see what's
On Sat, Apr 26, 2008 at 02:33:11AM -0400, Karsten Nohl wrote:
[...]
Assuming that hardware backdoors can be build, the interesting question
becomes how to defeat against them. Even after a particular triggering
string is identified, it is not clear whether software can be used to
detect
A pretty scary paper from the Usenix LEET conference:
http://www.usenix.org/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king_html/
The paper describes how, by adding a very small number of gates to a
microprocessor design (small enough that it would be hard to notice
them), you can create a machine that
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
A pretty scary paper from the Usenix LEET conference:
http://www.usenix.org/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king_html/
The paper describes how, by adding a very small number of gates to a
microprocessor design (small enough that it would be hard to notice
them),
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