RE: Firewire threat to FDE

2008-03-21 Thread Dave Korn
Hagai Bar-El wrote on 18 March 2008 10:17: All they need to do is make sure (through a user-controlled but default-on feature) that when the workstation is locked, new Firewire or PCMCIA devices cannot be introduced. That hard? Yes it is, without redesigning the PCI bus. A bus-mastering

Re: Firewire threat to FDE

2008-03-21 Thread David Malone
On Wed, Mar 19, 2008 at 02:25:36PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote: [This has been thrashed out on other lists.] Just how would that help? As I understand it, Firewire and PCMCIA provide a way for a device to access memory directly. The OS doesn't have to do anything - in fact, it *can't* do

Firewire threat to FDE

2008-03-19 Thread Hagai Bar-El
Hello, As if the latest research (which showed that RAM contents can be recovered after power-down) was not enough, it seems as Firewire ports can form yet an easier attack vector into FDE-locked laptops. Windows hacked in seconds via Firewire

Re: Firewire threat to FDE

2008-03-19 Thread Leichter, Jerry
| As if the latest research (which showed that RAM contents can be | recovered after power-down) was not enough, it seems as Firewire ports | can form yet an easier attack vector into FDE-locked laptops. | | Windows hacked in seconds via Firewire |