Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-03-15 Thread Ben Laurie
Philipp Gühring wrote: I had the feeling that Microsoft wants to abandon the usage of client certificates completely, and move the people to CardSpace instead. But how do you sign your emails with CardSpace? CardSpace only does the realtime authentication part of the market ... It's not

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-22 Thread Peter Gutmann
Thierry Moreau [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: At first, it seems neat. But then, looking at how it works in practice: the client receives an e-mail notification soliciting him to click on a HTML link and then enroll for a security certificate, the client is solicited exactly like a phishing criminal

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-21 Thread Thierry Moreau
Leichter, Jerry wrote: While trying to find something else, I came across the following reference: Title: Sender driven certification enrollment system Document Type and Number: United States Patent 6651166 Link to this page:

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-14 Thread Bill Squier
On Feb 11, 2008, at 8:28 AM, Philipp Gühring wrote: I had the feeling that Microsoft wants to abandon the usage of client certificates completely, and move the people to CardSpace instead. But how do you sign your emails with CardSpace? CardSpace only does the realtime authentication part of

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-14 Thread Peter Gutmann
Philipp =?iso-8859-1?q?G=FChring?= [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I had the feeling that Microsoft wants to abandon the usage of client certificates completely, and move the people to CardSpace instead. While there's an obvious interpretation of that (Microsoft want to lock everyone into CardSpace),

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-14 Thread RL 'Bob' Morgan
Imagine if a website could instruct your browser to transparently generate a public/private keypair for use with that website only and send the public key to that website. Then, any time that the user returns to that website, the browser would automatically use that private key to

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-14 Thread RL 'Bob' Morgan
Is anyone aware of any third-party usability studies on CardSpace, OpenID, ...?). I'm not. It would be a good opportunity for security usability researchers to contribute though. [0] I'm not sure whether putting CardSpace and Liberty in such close proximity in the above line was a

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-13 Thread Philipp Gühring
Hi, Microsoft broke this in IE7... It is no longer possible to generate and enroll a client cert from a CA not on the trusted root list. So private label CAs can no longer enroll client certs. We have requested a fix, so this may come in the future, but the damage is already done... Also

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-10 Thread Leichter, Jerry
| By the way, it seems like one thing that might help with client certs | is if they were treated a bit like cookies. Today, a website can set | a cookie in your browser, and that cookie will be returned every time | you later visit that website. This all happens automatically. Imagine | if a

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-10 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
re: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm28.htm#30 Fixing SSL so lots of the AADS http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#aads scenarios are that every place a password might appear, have a public key instead. for various of the cookie authentication operations ... also think kerberos tickets.

Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-09 Thread David Wagner
Tim Dierks writes: (there are totally different reasons that client certs aren't being widely adopted, but that's beside the point). I'd be interested in hearing your take on why SSL client certs aren't widely adopted. It seems like they could potentially help with the phishing problem (at

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-09 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Transport Card Broken) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm28.htm#24 Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken) http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm28.htm#26 Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken) - The Cryptography

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-09 Thread Taral
On 2/9/08, David Wagner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: By the way, it seems like one thing that might help with client certs is if they were treated a bit like cookies. I don't see how this helps with phishing. Phishers will just go after the password or other secrets used to authenticate a new

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-09 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Sat, Feb 09, 2008 at 05:04:28PM -0800, David Wagner wrote: By the way, it seems like one thing that might help with client certs is if they were treated a bit like cookies. Today, a website can set a cookie in your browser, and that cookie will be returned every time you later visit that

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-06 Thread John Levine
They can't be as anonymous as cash if the party being dealt with can be identified. And the party can be identified if the transaction is online, real-time. Even if other clues are erased, there's still traffic analysis in this case. If I show up at a store and pay cash for something every

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-06 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
a recent reference Research unmasks anonymity networks http://www.techworld.com/security/news/index.cfm?newsID=11295 Research unmasks anonymity networks http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/020108-research-unmasks-anonymity.html Research unmasks anonymity networks

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-03 Thread StealthMonger
Anne Lynn Wheeler [EMAIL PROTECTED] write: one of my favorite exchanges from the mid-90s was somebody claiming that adding digital certificates to the electronic payment transaction infrastructure would bring it into the modern age. my response was that it actually would regress the

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-03 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
StealthMonger wrote: They can't be as anonymous as cash if the party being dealt with can be identified. And the party can be identified if the transaction is online, real-time. Even if other clues are erased, there's still traffic analysis in this case. What the offline paradigm has going

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-01 Thread Dan Kaminsky
(as if anyone uses client certificates anyway)? Guess why so few people are using it ... If it were secure, more people would be able to use it. People don't use it because the workload of getting signed up is vastly beyond their skillset, and the user experience using the things

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-01 Thread Ian G
Eric Rescorla wrote: (as if anyone uses client certificates anyway)? Guess why so few people are using it ... If it were secure, more people would be able to use it. No, if it were *convenient* people would use it. I know of absolutely zero evidence (nor have you presented any) that people

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-02-01 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Ian G wrote: The PII equation is particularly daunting, echoing Lynn's early '90s experiences. I am told (but haven't really verified) that the certificate serial number is PII and therefore falls under the full weight of privacy law regs ... this may sound ludicrous, but privacy and

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-31 Thread Dave Howe
Philipp Gühring wrote: I once implemented SSL over GSM data channel (without PPP and without TCP), and discovered that SSL needs better integrity protection than raw GSM delivers. (I am quite sure that´s why people normally run PPP over GSM channels ...) SSH has the same problems. It also

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-31 Thread James A. Donald
Eric Rescorla wrote: Huh? What are you claiming the problem with sending client certificates in plaintext is (as if anyone uses client certificates anyway)? Well that is one problem - no one uses them, and no one should use them, while PKI was designed under the assumption that everyone would

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-31 Thread Philipp Gühring
Hi, Huh? What are you claiming the problem with sending client certificates in plaintext is * It´s a privacy problem * It´s a security problem for people with a security policy that requires the their identities to be kept secret, and only to be used to authenticate to the particular server

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-31 Thread Thierry Moreau
Philipp Gühring wrote: Hi, SSL key distribution and management is horribly broken, with the result that everyone winds up using plaintext when they should not. Yes, sending client certificates in plaintext while claiming that SSL/TLS is secure doesn´t work in a world of phishing and

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-31 Thread Eric Rescorla
At Thu, 31 Jan 2008 03:04:00 +0100, Philipp Gühring wrote: Hi, Huh? What are you claiming the problem with sending client certificates in plaintext is * It´s a privacy problem * It´s a security problem for people with a security policy that requires the their identities to be kept

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-31 Thread Tim Dierks
On Jan 30, 2008 9:04 PM, Philipp Gühring [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi, Huh? What are you claiming the problem with sending client certificates in plaintext is * It´s a privacy problem * It´s a security problem for people with a security policy that requires the their identities to be

RE: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-31 Thread Jim Cheesman
de 2008 3:04 Para: Eric Rescorla CC: Cryptography; Rasika Dayarathna Asunto: Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken) Hi, Huh? What are you claiming the problem with sending client certificates in plaintext is * It´s a privacy problem * It´s a security problem for people

Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-30 Thread Philipp Gühring
Hi, SSL key distribution and management is horribly broken, with the result that everyone winds up using plaintext when they should not. Yes, sending client certificates in plaintext while claiming that SSL/TLS is secure doesn´t work in a world of phishing and identity theft anymore. We

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-30 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Philipp Gühring wrote: Yes, sending client certificates in plaintext while claiming that SSL/TLS is secure doesn´t work in a world of phishing and identity theft anymore. We have the paradox situation that I have to tell people that they should use HTTPS with server-certificates and

Re: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-30 Thread Eric Rescorla
At Wed, 30 Jan 2008 17:59:51 -, Dave Korn wrote: On 30 January 2008 17:03, Eric Rescorla wrote: We really do need to reinvent and replace SSL/TCP, though doing it right is a hard problem that takes more than morning coffee. TCP could need some stronger integrity protection. 8

RE: Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

2008-01-30 Thread Dave Korn
On 30 January 2008 17:03, Eric Rescorla wrote: We really do need to reinvent and replace SSL/TCP, though doing it right is a hard problem that takes more than morning coffee. TCP could need some stronger integrity protection. 8 Bits of checksum isn´t enough in reality. (1 out of 256