Anne & Lynn Wheeler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>the purpose of a certificate is analogous to the old letters of credit in the
>sailing ship days it supposedly establishes the bonifides of the
>individual in an offline, non-connected world where the relying party has no
>other recourse regard
On 3/5/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Anne & Lynn Wheeler) wrote:
>The implication is that if i can substitute a public key in some
>certificate that attests to represent some other party then it may
>be some form of identity theft (fraudulent messages can be created that
>otherwise appear to have
On Sat, Mar 05, 2005 at 09:23:11AM -0700, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> Victor Duchovni wrote:
> >What is the significance of this? It seems I can get a certificate for
> >two public keys (chosen, not given) while only proving posession of the
> >first. Is there anything else? In what sense is the
Victor Duchovni wrote:
What is the significance of this? It seems I can get a certificate for
two public keys (chosen, not given) while only proving posession of the
first. Is there anything else? In what sense is the second public key
useful to the attacker?
so three kinds of attacks on certificat
Victor Duchovni wrote:
What is the significance of this? It seems I can get a certificate for
two public keys (chosen, not given) while only proving posession of the
first. Is there anything else? In what sense is the second public key
useful to the attacker?
the purpose of a certificate is analogo
On Wed, Mar 02, 2005 at 12:35:50PM +, Ben Laurie wrote:
> Cute. I expect we'll see more of this kind of thing.
>
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/067
>
> Executive summary: calculate chaining values (called IV in the paper) of
> first part of the CERT, find a colliding block for those chaining
Ben Laurie wrote:
> Dan Kaminsky wrote:
>
>> The x.509 cert collision is a necessary consequence of the earlier
>> discussed prime/not-prime collision. Take the previous concept, make
>> both prime, and surround with the frame of an x.509 cert, and you get
>> the new paper.
>
>
> Actually, no
Dan Kaminsky wrote:
The x.509 cert collision is a necessary consequence of the earlier
discussed prime/not-prime collision. Take the previous concept, make
both prime, and surround with the frame of an x.509 cert, and you get
the new paper.
Actually, not - an RSA public key is not prime. Gener
Ben,
Semantic gap, and I do apologize if I didn't make this clear. Wang
adapts to any initial state, so you can create arbitrary content to
prepend your collision set with, adapt to its output, and then append
whatever you like. The temporal ordering is indeed important though;
you can't cre
Cute. I expect we'll see more of this kind of thing.
http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/067
Executive summary: calculate chaining values (called IV in the paper) of
first part of the CERT, find a colliding block for those chaining
values, generate an RSA key that has the collision as the first part of
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