Re: Software Helps Rights Groups Protect Sensitive Information
Ian Brown wrote: This reminds me of a question I've been meaning to ask for a while. Has there been any research done on encryption systems which encrypt two (or n) plaintexts with n keys, producing a joint ciphertext with the property that decrypting it with key k[n] only produces the nth plaintext? See the Steganographic File System: http://www.mcdonald.org.uk/StegFS/ Also Rubberhose: http://www.rubberhose.org/ -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Software Helps Rights Groups Protect Sensitive Information
At 16:08 2004-05-31 -0400, Ivan Krstic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >This reminds me of a question I've been meaning to ask for a while. Has >there been any research done on encryption systems which encrypt two (or >n) plaintexts with n keys, producing a joint ciphertext with the >property that decrypting it with key k[n] only produces the nth plaintext? > >In the particular scenario that the article describes, activists need to >protect their information from people that probably have little respect >for the Geneva convention and would possibly find any evidence of >encrypted information as proof enough that there is illegal activity >going on. This, in turn, might lead to the police beating the key out of >them. > >Now, if a solution such as Apple's FileVault or PGP's PGPDrive offered >an "interleaved drive" system where one file stored multiple encrypted >disks, and which one is accessed depended on which key you provided, >perhaps things can be changed a bit. Password A unlocks a drive with >mild dissidence information to appear credible. Password B unlocks a >drive with the truly secret data. If captured, after some hours of a >(probably highly unpleasant) interrogation, the dissident gives password >A, interrogators try it, it works, they find nothing of tremendous use >and dissident walks. BestCrypt (http://www.jetico.com/) claims to do this for N = 2: "BestCrypt v.7 also allows the creation of hidden containers - containers not evident to an intruder. You can simply create another (hidden) container inside already existing (shell) container. Data stored inside shell and hidden containers can be completely different, passwords for the containers are also different, and it is not possible to determine whether the shell container has a hidden container inside it, or not. Version 7 help documentation contains detailed information on the creation and management of hidden containers." --Mark - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Software Helps Rights Groups Protect Sensitive Information
>This reminds me of a question I've been meaning to ask for a while. Has >there been any research done on encryption systems which encrypt two (or >n) plaintexts with n keys, producing a joint ciphertext with the >property that decrypting it with key k[n] only produces the >nth plaintext? See the Steganographic File System: http://www.mcdonald.org.uk/StegFS/ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Software Helps Rights Groups Protect Sensitive Information
This reminds me of a question I've been meaning to ask for a while. Has there been any research done on encryption systems which encrypt two (or n) plaintexts with n keys, producing a joint ciphertext with the property that decrypting it with key k[n] only produces the nth plaintext? In the particular scenario that the article describes, activists need to protect their information from people that probably have little respect for the Geneva convention and would possibly find any evidence of encrypted information as proof enough that there is illegal activity going on. This, in turn, might lead to the police beating the key out of them. Now, if a solution such as Apple's FileVault or PGP's PGPDrive offered an "interleaved drive" system where one file stored multiple encrypted disks, and which one is accessed depended on which key you provided, perhaps things can be changed a bit. Password A unlocks a drive with mild dissidence information to appear credible. Password B unlocks a drive with the truly secret data. If captured, after some hours of a (probably highly unpleasant) interrogation, the dissident gives password A, interrogators try it, it works, they find nothing of tremendous use and dissident walks. If people have written on this before, I'd appreciate a few references. As for Zimmerman's comment about keyloggers - I'd hope the software offered a point-and-click method of entering the password. This can still be defeated with a custom-tailored piece of spyware, but it can be made much more difficult for the attackers to do so (depending on how well it's coded, it might actually require TEMPEST or the breaking of kneecaps to extract the password). Cheers, Ivan. R. A. Hettinga wrote: SOFTWARE HELPS RIGHTS GROUPS PROTECT SENSITIVE INFORMATION [snip] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Software Helps Rights Groups Protect Sensitive Information
R. A. Hettinga wrote: To prevent loss or theft, the data is backed up automatically and redundantly on dedicated Martus servers in Manila, Toronto, Seattle and Budapest. Nobody can read the files without access to the original user's cryptography key and password -- with the exception of sophisticated code-cracking organizations such as the U.S. National Security Agency or China's Public Security Bureau. I might be missing something here but - exactly how does a system insecure enough that interested governments can crack it help protect people who are releasing information concealed by those governments? - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
