On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 10:25:34AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
Well, there's an idea: use different physical media formats for entertainment
and non-
entertainment content (meaning, content created by MPAA members vs. not) and
don't sell
writable media nor devices capable of writing it for
Well, there's an idea: use different physical media formats for
entertainment and non-entertainment content (meaning, content created by
MPAA members vs. not) and don't sell writable media nor devices capable
of writing it for the former, not to the public, keeping very tight
controls on the
At 07:50 AM 5/4/2007, Nicolas Williams wrote:
On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 10:25:34AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
This seems to assume that when a crack is announced, all revenue
stops. This would appear to be false. When cracks are announced in such
systems,
Allen [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I know I'm in over my head on this so my apologies, but if the
key is used in one machine in a product line - Sony DVD players
say - then if they find the one machine that it came from and
disable it, wouldn't figuring out the key for the next machine in
Hal Finney wrote:
[snip]
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=
By this point in our series on AACS (the encryption scheme used in
HD-DVD and Blu-ray) it should be clear that AACS creates a nontrivial
strategic game between the AACS central authority (representing the
movie studios) and
Ian G wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue during the release
At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue
On Thu, May 03, 2007 at 10:25:34AM -0700, Steve Schear wrote:
At 03:52 PM 5/2/2007, Ian G wrote:
This seems to assume that when a crack is announced, all revenue
stops. This would appear to be false. When cracks are announced in such
systems, normally revenues aren't strongly effected.
* Perry E. Metzger:
This seems to me to be, yet again, an instance where failure to
consider threat models is a major cause of security failure.
Sorry, but where's the security failure? Where can you buy hardware
devices that can copy HD disks? Or download software that does, with
a readily
Florian Weimer [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
* Perry E. Metzger:
This seems to me to be, yet again, an instance where failure to
consider threat models is a major cause of security failure.
Sorry, but where's the security failure? Where can you buy hardware
devices that can copy HD disks? Or
Perry Metzger writes:
I will again solicit suggestions about optimal strategies both for
the attacker and defender for the AACS system -- I think we can learn
a lot by thinking about it. It would be especially interesting if
there were modifications of the AACS system that would be more hardy
Hal Finney wrote:
Perry Metzger writes:
Once the release window has passed,
the attacker will use the compromise aggressively and the authority
will then blacklist the compromised player, which essentially starts
the game over. The studio collects revenue during the release window,
and sometimes
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