Re: voting by m of n digital signature?

2008-11-14 Thread Florian Weimer
* James A. Donald: Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so that the signature proves that at least m possessors of secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m, or which ones signed? What about this?

Re: voting by m of n digital signature?

2008-11-10 Thread dan
James A. Donald writes: -+--- | Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so | that the signature proves that at least m possessors of | secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n | a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m, | or which

Re: voting by m of n digital signature?

2008-11-09 Thread Richard Salz
Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so that the signature proves that at least m possessors of secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m, or which ones signed? Yes there are a number of ways. Usually they

Re: Voting machine security

2008-08-19 Thread Adam Fields
On Mon, Aug 18, 2008 at 10:16:02AM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote: [...] Essentially no one would argue that is is quite expensive. I suspect that nearly everyone in the country would be happy to pay an additional $1/election for more reliable results. Without seeing all of the expense (and

Re: Voting machine security

2008-08-18 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 11:57 AM, John Ioannidis [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This just about sums it up: http://xkcd.com/463/ Only slightly better then suggested by the comic. McAfee anti-virus software was on the servers, not the DRE voting machines themselves. From

Re: Voting machine security

2008-08-18 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 9:24 AM -0700 8/18/08, Eric Rescorla wrote: (and because of the complexity of US elections, hand counting is quite expensive) This is quite disputable. Further, hand vs. machine counting is core to the way we think about the security of the voting system. On a complex ballot, there are

Re: Voting machine security

2008-08-18 Thread dan
Paul Hoffman writes: -+-- | At 9:24 AM -0700 8/18/08, Eric Rescorla wrote: | (and because of the complexity of US elections, | hand counting is quite expensive) | | This is quite disputable. Further, hand vs. machine counting is core | to the way we think about the

Re: voting

2004-04-20 Thread Matt Crawford
On Apr 15, 2004, at 8:58 PM, Ed Gerck wrote: Currently, voter privacy is absolute in the US and does not depend even on the will of the courts. For example, there is no way for a judge to assure that a voter under oath is telling the truth about how they voted, or not. For many years in the 90's

Re: voting

2004-04-19 Thread Ed Gerck
David Jablon wrote: I think Ed's criticism is off-target. Where is the privacy problem with Chaum receipts when Ed and others still have the freedom to refuse theirs or throw them away? The privacy, coercion, intimidation, vote selling and election integrity problems begin with giving

Re: voting

2004-04-19 Thread Yeoh Yiu
Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: David Jablon wrote: The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends. What I see in serious voting system research efforts are attempts to build systems that

Re: voting

2004-04-19 Thread Ed Gerck
Yeoh Yiu wrote: Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends. You get totals per nation, per state, per county, per riding, per precinct, per polling stion

RE: voting

2004-04-16 Thread Bill Frantz
One area we are not addressing in voting security is absentee ballots. The use of absentee ballots is rising in US elections, and is even being advocated as a way for individuals to get a printed ballot in jurisdictions which use electronic-only voting machines. Political parties are encouraging

RE: voting

2004-04-16 Thread Trei, Peter
Ed Gerck[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] John Kelsey wrote: At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: 1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify' that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter coercion. I think

RE: voting

2004-04-15 Thread John Kelsey
At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: ... 1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify' that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter coercion. I think the VoteHere scheme and David Chaum's scheme both claim to solve this

Re: voting

2004-04-09 Thread Ed Gerck
a counterpoint... Perry E. Metzger wrote: I'm a believer in the KISS principle. :-) that's one S too many. For true believers, KIS is enough. A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you verify it

Re: voting

2004-04-09 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 8:24 AM -0400 4/8/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens the way for serial voting fraud. The receipt should be exposed to the voter

Re: voting

2004-04-09 Thread l . crypto
Having a paper ballot printed by machine (and checked by the votor) before being dropped in a box may permit some additional cross-checks: * Put serial numbers or something like them, on each ballot, so that missing or added ballots can be detected. * Put check digits on each ballot, so that

Re: voting

2004-04-09 Thread Major Variola (ret)
At 11:16 PM 4/8/04 +0200, privacy.at Anonymous Remailer wrote: In the second place, it fails for elections with more than two parties running. The casual reference above to representatives on each side betrays this error. Poorly funded third parties cannot provide representatives as easily as

RE: voting

2004-04-09 Thread Trei, Peter
privacy wrote: [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted] It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud, error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptographic

Re: voting, KISS, etc.

2004-04-09 Thread Adam Fields
On Fri, Apr 09, 2004 at 12:46:47PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure voting security miss the point entirely. [...] I'm a technophile. I've loved technology all my life. I'm also a security professional, and I love a good

RE: voting

2004-04-09 Thread Jerrold Leichter
| privacy wrote: | [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted] | | It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded | and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud, | error and incompetence is overwhelming.

Re: voting

2004-04-09 Thread Florian Weimer
Perry E. Metzger wrote: Complicated systems are the bane of security. Systems like this are simple to understand, simple to audit, simple to guard. I fully agree, but there is a wide variety of voting schemes out there, of varying complexity. In a ballot with only very few options, your