Email end-to-end: PGP, PGP/MIME, S/MIME. Not tunnel SSL or SSL
at the end points.
Lars Eilebrecht wrote:
According to Ed Gerck:
But encryption and authentication are a hassle today, with less
than 2% of all email encrypted (sorry, can't cite the source I know).
Are these 2% 'only' S/MIME and
According to Ed Gerck:
But encryption and authentication are a hassle today, with less
than 2% of all email encrypted (sorry, can't cite the source I know).
Are these 2% 'only' S/MIME and PGP-encrypted email messages or
is SSL-encrypted email communication included?
ciao...
--
Lars
Peter Gutmann wrote:
No they won't. All the ones I've seen are some variant on the build a big
wall around the Internet and only let the good guys in, which will never work
because the Internet doesn't contain any definable inside and outside, only
800 million Manchurian candidates waiting to
At 05:15 AM 6/2/2004, Ben Laurie wrote:
SPF will buy me one thing forever: I won't get email telling me I sent
people spam and viruses.
Unfortunately, that won't work for me.
My email address is at pobox.com, the mail forwarding service
where the main proponent of SPF works,
but my SMTP service
On Mon, May 31, 2004 at 08:27:49PM -0700, bear wrote:
The point of an automated web of trust is that the machine is doing the
accounting for you.
Does it? If there were meaningful reputation accounting
You got fooled by the present tense. If there was such an architecture, I
wouldn't have
On Sun, May 30, 2004 at 12:36:53PM -0700, bear wrote:
If I'm a node in a web of trust (FOAF is a human), prestige will
percolate through it completely. That way I can color a whole
domain with a nonboolean trust hue, while a domain of fakers will
have only very few connections
On Sat, 29 May 2004, Russell Nelson wrote:
Eugen Leitl writes:
If I'm a node in a web of trust (FOAF is a human), prestige will
percolate through it completely. That way I can color a whole
domain with a nonboolean trust hue, while a domain of fakers will
have only very few connections
Anton Stiglic [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I think cryptography techniques can provide a partial solution to spam.
No they won't. All the ones I've seen are some variant on the build a big
wall around the Internet and only let the good guys in, which will never work
because the Internet doesn't
At 09:27 AM 5/28/2004, Peter Gutmann wrote:
No they won't. All the ones I've seen are some variant on the build a big
wall around the Internet and only let the good guys in, which will never work
because the Internet doesn't contain any definable inside and outside, only
800 million Manchurian
On Fri, May 28, 2004 at 09:46:03AM -0700, bear wrote:
Spam won't stop until spam costs the spammers money.
If I'm a node in a web of trust (FOAF is a human), prestige will
percolate through it completely. That way I can color a whole domain with a
nonboolean trust hue, while a domain of fakers
On Fri, 28 May 2004, Anne Lynn Wheeler wrote:
connecting systems that were designed for fundamentally safe and isolated
environment to wide-open anarchy hostile operation exposes all sorts of
problems. somewhat analogous to not actually needing a helmet for riding a
motorcycle ... or seat
Ian Grigg wrote:
... fundamentally, as Steve suggests,
we expect email from anyone, and it's free.
We have to change one of those basic features
to stop spam. Either make it non-free, or
make it non-authorised. Hashcash doesn't
achieve either of those, although a similar
system such as a
At 09:36 AM 5/11/2004, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian Grigg writes:
Security architects
will continue to do most of their work with
little or no crypto.
And rightly so, since most security problems have nothing to do with
the absence of crypto.
j. a cryptographic
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Anton Stiglic writes:
- Original Message -
From: Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
j. a cryptographic solution for spam and
viruses won't be found.
This ties into the same thing: spam is *unwanted* email, but it's not
*unauthorized*. Crypto
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ben Laurie writes:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Anton Stiglic write
s:
- Original Message -
From: Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
j. a cryptographic solution for spam and
viruses won't be found.
This ties into the same
Ben Laurie wrote:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
The spammers are playing with other people's money, cycles, etc. They
don't care.
We took that into account in the paper. Perhaps you should read it?
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/weis2004/clayton.pdf
(Most of the people on this list are far too
I've moved this to the top because I feel it is the most important statement
that can be made
Hadmut said :
Security doesn't
necessarily mean cryptography.
- Original Message -
From: Hadmut Danisch [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The future of security
On Mon, Apr 26, 2004 at 08:21
At 8:21 PM +0100 4/26/04, Graeme Burnett wrote:
Hello folks,
I am doing a presentation on the future of security,
which of course includes a component on cryptography.
That will be given at this conference on payments
systems and security: http://www.enhyper.com/paysec/
Would anyone there have any
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian Grigg writes:
Security architects
will continue to do most of their work with
little or no crypto.
And rightly so, since most security problems have nothing to do with
the absence of crypto.
j. a cryptographic solution for spam and
viruses won't be found.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Would anyone there have any good predictions on how
cryptography is going to unfold in the next few years
or so? I have my own ideas, but I would love
to see what others see in the crystal ball.
I'd like to think we would see a new flowering of
.
- Maybe we'll have less crypto security in future than we have
today.
5-10 years ago I knew much more people using PGP than today.
Most modern mail user agents are capable of S/MIME, but it's hard
to find someone making use of it. I'm a consultant for many
companies
Would anyone there have any good predictions on how
cryptography is going to unfold in the next few years
or so? I have my own ideas, but I would love
to see what others see in the crystal ball.
prediction:
just as in the 1990s the commercial world caught up to
the mil world
Many thanks to the list members who have contributed ideas to the above -
I'll share the results by previewing the paper in the next few weeks if I
may.
Having been a devotee of the financial crypto community for many years, a
thought has just occurred to me about the possible use of Systemics
Graeme Burnett wrote:
Hello folks,
I am doing a presentation on the future of security,
which of course includes a component on cryptography.
That will be given at this conference on payments
systems and security: http://www.enhyper.com/paysec/
Would anyone there have any good predictions on how
Ian Grigg wrote:
Graeme Burnett wrote:
Hello folks,
I am doing a presentation on the future of security,
which of course includes a component on cryptography.
That will be given at this conference on payments
systems and security: http://www.enhyper.com/paysec/
Would anyone there have any good
signing and
signature signing ... as well as nature of naked public keys ...
recently posted to thread in sci.crypt:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004e.html#20 Soft signatures
and the future of security ... somewhat orthogonal to cryptography ...
there was recently a letter from NSF to some former
Hello folks,
I am doing a presentation on the future of security,
which of course includes a component on cryptography.
That will be given at this conference on payments
systems and security: http://www.enhyper.com/paysec/
Would anyone there have any good predictions on how
cryptography is going
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