Re: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-07 Thread Harald Hanche-Olsen
+ Fearghas McKay fm-li...@st-kilda.org:

 http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper.htm
 
 Has been around since ~1995 and just works whenever I have used it,
 albeit some time ago. It publishes time stamp info on Usenet,
 comp.security.pgp.announce which shows the last activity was in
 2002...
 
 http://groups.google.com/group/comp.security.pgp.announce/browse_thread/thread/d25667d87c1740f6#
 
 Which seems to support your viewpoint.

As explained at http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper/stampnew.htm they
moved to alt.security.pgp in 2002. But ... the latest timestamp
summary I can see there is from May 2009, so I guess the point stands,
unless it's just google groups that won't cooperate. (Hmmm, my news
server doesn't even carry alt.security.gpg, so I can't check further.
Not a good sign.)

- Harald

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RE: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-07 Thread Alex Pankratov
 

 -Original Message-
 From: pgut001 [mailto:pgut...@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz] 
 On Behalf Of Peter Gutmann
 Sent: October 5, 2009 10:07 PM
 To: a...@poneyhot.org; cryptography@metzdowd.com
 Subject: Re: Trusted timestamping
 
 Alex Pankratov a...@poneyhot.org writes:
 
 I have spent a couple of days looking around the Internet, 
 and things 
 appear to be .. erm .. hectic and disorganized.
 
 [...]
 
 Your summary pretty much answers the question, lots of bit 
 players sitting around waiting for the market to emerge, and 
 they've been waiting, in some cases, for at least the last 
 decade or so.  In Europe the vendors are pinning their hopes 
 on legislation forcing people to use TSPs, although even 
 there it's been severely crippled by the fact that having to 
 point a legislative gun at the customers head to get them to 
 use it doesn't engender much enthusiasm for it.

These players are sitting in the wrong place then. I have run 
into a fairly well defined need for a timestamping service in 
a graphic design community. 

Interestingly enough they do not need the timestamps for the 
courts, they need them more as a deterrent to a blatant theft 
of their creative ideas. 

If someone copies their work, verbosely or at a concept level, 
then the clone is wortheless unless it can be sold or used as 
a promotion vehicle. The copycat's goal is to get the copy 
published in as many online galleries and auction/specwork 
sites as possible, and the goal of the original author is to 
prevent that from happening. At the moment the challenge 
frequently boils down to searching through archive.org contents, 
and using that as a proof of who was first. 

In this context archive.org, clearly, serves as a coarse time
stamping service, implicitly trustworthy. There is obviously
a room for improvement, and that's why I asked what I asked.

Alex





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Re: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-07 Thread Fearghas McKay


On 6 Oct 2009, at 14:48, Harald Hanche-Olsen wrote:


As explained at http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper/stampnew.htm they
moved to alt.security.pgp in 2002. But ... the latest timestamp
summary I can see there is from May 2009, so I guess the point stands,
unless it's just google groups that won't cooperate. (Hmmm, my news
server doesn't even carry alt.security.gpg, so I can't check further.
Not a good sign.)


http://stamper.itconsult.co.uk/stamper-files/sig2009.txt

Shows a small stream of sigs up to 7th Oct so there is some life in  
parrot yet.


f


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Re: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-05 Thread PaweĊ‚ Krawczyk
On Sun, 04 Oct 2009 23:42:22 +0200 Alex Pankratov a...@poneyhot.org 
wrote:

There is for example timestamp.verisign.com, but there is 
no documentation or description of it whatsoever. 

From European world plagued with qualified electronic signature 
disease - timestamp servers usually are compatible with RFC 3161 
Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP) that works over HTTP, but since they 
don't want to provide free timestamping for anyone they're using 
various techniques to limit usage of this service.

I've seen two techniques to do this. One was allowing only TSP 
request encapsulated in *signed* CMS (RFC 3369). So if you're 
signing a document using qualified signature AND timestamp you've 
got to enter PIN twice - one for document signature, one for TSP 
transport signature. 

The other server was not requiring signed CMS, but instead silently 
discarded signature requests from clients other that their own 
software. It had something to do with TSP options probably, but I 
didn't investigate any deeper.

-- 
Pawe  Krawczyk
http://ipsec.pl

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Re: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-05 Thread Ian G

On 04/10/2009 23:42, Alex Pankratov wrote:


I guess my main confusion at the moment is why large CAs of
Verisign's size not offering any standalone timestamping
services.



My view is that there is no demand for this as a service.  The apparent 
need for it is more a paper requirement that came out of PKI world's 
search for a perfect product than any business need.


E.g., if you think you want it, you might be better rewarded by 
re-examining your assumptions as to why it is needed, than building it...



iang

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RE: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-05 Thread piers.bowness
 -Original Message-
 On Sunday, October 04, 2009 5:42 PM
 Alex Pankratov a...@poneyhot.org wrote:
 
 Does anyone know what's the state of affairs in this area ? 

I think there are two factors. 1) This is complex problem and 2) Where
it might have really been required (i.e. the courts) it has not; the
courts accept unsigned, text log files as reasonable evidence.

From a local (as in US) perspective I would look into some of the
services provided by NIST (http://tf.nist.gov/service/its.htm). Even
their authenticated offerings appear to be very limited, and use
static, symmetric keys (which can only be obtained by snail-mail!)

I've always liked the saying: A man with two watches never knows what
time it is.  As long as there is more than one accepted internet time
source and the courts accept uncertified timestamps in log files, I
don't see any clear solution to (or reason to pursue) obtaining signed
time.


-Piers
--
Piers Bowness
RSA - The Security Division of EMC

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Re: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-05 Thread Thierry Moreau

Alex Pankratov wrote:
Does anyone know what's the state of affairs in this area ? 


This is probably slightly off-topic, but I can't think of
a better place to ask about this sort of thing.

I have spent a couple of days looking around the Internet,
and things appear to be .. erm .. hectic and disorganized.

There is for example timestamp.verisign.com, but there is 
no documentation or description of it whatsoever. Even the
website itself is broken. However it is used by Microsoft's 
code signing tool that embeds Verisign's timestamp into 
Authenticode signature of signed executable files.


There is also a way to timestamp signed PDFs, but the there 
appears to be nothing _trusted_ about available Trusted 
Timestamping Authorities. Just a bunch of random companies

that call themselves that way and provide no indication why
they should actually be *trusted*. No audit practicies, not 
even a simple description of their backend setup. The same
goes for the companies providing timestamping services for 
arbitrary documents, either using online interfaces or a

downloadable software.

There are also Digital Poststamps, which is a very strange
version of a timestamping service, because their providers
insist on NOT releasing the actual timestamp to the customer 
and then charging for each timestamp verification request.


I guess my main confusion at the moment is why large CAs of 
Verisign's size not offering any standalone timestamping 
services.


Any thoughts or comments ?
  


I answer your question by two questions:

Trusted timestamping service is like a specialized form of 
non-repudiation service. You may wonder if there is any fielded usage of 
genuine non-repudiation service, i.e. extending to an arbitration 
function that would support evidence management in some litigation 
forum. Fraud prevention in payment systems is not based on a genuine 
non-repudiation scheme. Are you aware of the current state of genuine 
non-repudiation service?


Another approach to your question is that timestamping service has to be 
sold before being fielded and used. Who is(are) the real 
beneficiary(ies) in a trusted timestamping service, and how do you sell 
the service to them so that it makes economic sense?


Regards,

- Thierry Moreau
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Re: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-05 Thread silky
On Mon, Oct 5, 2009 at 8:42 AM, Alex Pankratov a...@poneyhot.org wrote:
 Does anyone know what's the state of affairs in this area ?

 This is probably slightly off-topic, but I can't think of
 a better place to ask about this sort of thing.

 I have spent a couple of days looking around the Internet,
 and things appear to be .. erm .. hectic and disorganized.

 There is for example timestamp.verisign.com, but there is
 no documentation or description of it whatsoever. Even the
 website itself is broken. However it is used by Microsoft's
 code signing tool that embeds Verisign's timestamp into
 Authenticode signature of signed executable files.

 There is also a way to timestamp signed PDFs, but the there
 appears to be nothing _trusted_ about available Trusted
 Timestamping Authorities. Just a bunch of random companies
 that call themselves that way and provide no indication why
 they should actually be *trusted*. No audit practicies, not
 even a simple description of their backend setup. The same
 goes for the companies providing timestamping services for
 arbitrary documents, either using online interfaces or a
 downloadable software.

 There are also Digital Poststamps, which is a very strange
 version of a timestamping service, because their providers
 insist on NOT releasing the actual timestamp to the customer
 and then charging for each timestamp verification request.

 I guess my main confusion at the moment is why large CAs of
 Verisign's size not offering any standalone timestamping
 services.

 Any thoughts or comments ?

I have no useful comments other than to point you to a timestamping
service you may or may not have seen (I didn't see you mention it:
http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper/stampinf.htm), form what I've
noticed (just in passing) this seems to be the most popular stamping
service.


 Thanks,
 Alex

-- 
noon silky
  http://www.mirios.com.au/
  http://skillsforvilla.tumblr.com/

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Re: Trusted timestamping

2009-10-05 Thread Fearghas McKay


On 5 Oct 2009, at 16:04, Ian G wrote:

My view is that there is no demand for this as a service.  The  
apparent need for it is more a paper requirement that came out of  
PKI world's search for a perfect product than any business need.


E.g., if you think you want it, you might be better rewarded by re- 
examining your assumptions as to why it is needed, than building it...


http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper.htm

Has been around since ~1995 and just works whenever I have used it,  
albeit some time ago. It publishes time stamp info on Usenet,  
comp.security.pgp.announce which shows the last activity was in 2002...


http://groups.google.com/group/comp.security.pgp.announce/browse_thread/thread/d25667d87c1740f6#

Which seems to support your viewpoint.

f

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