Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Peter Gutmann writes:
STARTTLS
If Alice and Cathy both implement STARTTLS, and Beatty does not, and Beatty
handles email which is ultimately sent to Cathy, then STARTTLS accomplishes
nothing. If Uma and Wendy implement DomainKeys, and Violet does not,
Peter Gutmann wrote:
The S/MIME list debated this some time ago, and decided (pretty much
unanimously) against it, for two reasosn. Firstly, because it adds huge ugly
blobs of base64 crap to each message (and before the ECC fans leap in here,
that still adds small ugly blobs of base64 crap to
Dave Howe wrote:
Peter Gutmann wrote:
It *is* happening, only it's now called STARTTLS (and if certain vendors
(Micromumblemumble) didn't make it such a pain to set up certs for
their MTAs
but simply generated self-signed certs on install and turned it on by
default,
it'd be happening even
Dave Howe wrote:
Ian Grigg wrote:
Dave Howe wrote:
TLS for SMTP is a nice, efficient way to encrypt the channel.
However, it offers little or no assurance that your mail will
*stay* encrypted all the way to the recipients.
That's correct. But, the goal is not to secure email to the extent
At 10:14 PM 5/30/2004, Peter Gutmann wrote:
The S/MIME list debated this some time ago, and decided (pretty much
unanimously) against it, for two reasosn. Firstly, because it adds huge ugly
blobs of base64 crap to each message (and before the ECC fans leap in here,
that still adds small ugly
Ian Grigg wrote:
Dave Howe wrote:
No - it means you might want to consider a system that guarantees
end-to-end encryption - not just first link, then maybe if it feels
like it
That doesn't mean TLS is worthless - on the contrary, it adds an
additional layer of both user authentication and
Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It would be better if the solution does NOT need industry
support at all, only user support. It should use what is already
available.
This is the point in the script at which I laugh at you, Ed. S/MIME and PGP
have been available for many many
On Thu, May 20, 2004 at 10:07:43AM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
yahoo draft internet standard for using DNS as a public key server
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-delany-domainkeys-base-00.txt
The main problem with this approach is revealed in a mind slip by Yahoo
themselves at
On Thu, May 20, 2004 at 10:07:43AM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
[...]
yahoo draft internet standard for using DNS as a public key server
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-delany-domainkeys-base-00.txt
This sounds quite a lot like the ideas outlined in a paper I
co-authored in 1995,
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 21:26:31 -0600
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Yahoo releases internet standard draft for using DNS as public key
server
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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