Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-13 Thread John Levine
8Kbit/second is enough if all you need is to understand what is being
said, not recognize the speaker.  The processing power to do this is
pretty small on today's scale of things.)

With decent compression techniques, 8kbps is close to telephone
quality, and 2400bps has artifacts but is still quite clear.  There
are some nice examples at:

http://www.data-compression.com/speech.shtml

1kbps would be adequate for understandable speech, so I would expect
that a modern phone with megabytes for music storage could easily
store several days of voice-activated room bugging.

R's,
John

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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-11 Thread Bill Stewart

At 11:26 AM 12/9/2006, Daniel F. Fisher wrote:
Ian Farquhar (ifarquha) wrote The other problem for this technique is 
battery life.


Suppose this worked by recording from mic to memory and then transmitting 
later. This leads to a bunch of questions:


By what factor could transmission time/power be reduced sending such a 
recording later? How many minutes could a typical phone buffer? How much 
does a typical conversation compress? Are such algorithms within the power 
of a typical phone's processor? How much power is used in recording to 
memory and compressing?


Cell phones already compress voice, to reduce spectrum needs,
and that's done in hardware rather than wasting CPU.
If the phone's design is sufficiently general, it can easily grab
the compressed voice bits and store them in memory instead of transmitting
(assuming there's enough memory, which isn't necessarily the case.)
Voice compression rates are typically 5.6 - 6.5kbps, or 13 on some GSM flavors,
and you may gain a bit from silence suppression depending on
whether the microphone can adequately hear the other speaker.

If the phone doesn't have data networking features,
or only has the slow types (CDPD, etc.) used to handle text messages,
there's probably no big advantage to doing this.
But if you've got faster data service, say 50-60kbps or the newer
~~200-300kbps stuff, then you can transmit faster than real-time speech,
and if you can buffer enough data, say 1 MB for 20 minutes of talk time,
you might save some battery.

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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-09 Thread Daniel F. Fisher
Ian Farquhar (ifarquha) wrote The other problem for this technique is 
battery life.


Suppose this worked by recording from mic to memory and then 
transmitting later. This leads to a bunch of questions:


By what factor could transmission time/power be reduced sending such a 
recording later? How many minutes could a typical phone buffer? How much 
does a typical conversation compress? Are such algorithms within the 
power of a typical phone's processor? How much power is used in 
recording to memory and compressing? Can transmission power requirements 
be reduced by transmitting when transmission power requirements are low? 
Can they be reduced often enough to make it worthwhile optimizing in 
this way?


-Dan

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RE: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-05 Thread Ian Farquhar (ifarquha)
The other problem for this technique is battery life.

Let's assume we can shove a firmware update/hack/whatever into the phone to 
enable snooping, it's still transmitting when acting
as a bug.  Even if this feature is only enabled when the phone is geolocated 
somewhere interesting, the reduction in battery
life is going to be significant.  If your phone has a standby time of days, and 
you're used to shoving it on the charger rarely,
then suddenly you're doing it several times a day, you're going to notice.  
Even if you are the dumb, stupid criminal the
government likes to tell us that surveillance always catches.

I suppose that it could be argued that you could use silence detection etc. to 
reduce power used, but most phones are pretty
aggressive at power saving already.  I doubt there are huge savings to be made 
which haven't been implemented already.

Ian.

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Taral
Sent: Monday, 4 December 2006 2:26 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: John Ioannidis; cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: Re: cellphones as room bugs

On 12/3/06, Thor Lancelot Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 It's been a while since I built ISDN equipment but I do not think this 
 is correct: can you show me how, exactly, one uses Q.931 to instruct 
 the other endpoint to go off-hook?

That's the same question I have. I don't remember seeing anything in the GSM 
standard that would allow this either.

--
Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything.
-- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem

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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-04 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
On Sun, 3 Dec 2006 20:26:07 -0500
Thor Lancelot Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 On Sat, Dec 02, 2006 at 05:15:02PM -0500, John Ioannidis wrote:
  On Sat, Dec 02, 2006 at 10:21:57AM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
   
   Quoting:
   
  The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
  surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
  mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
  conversations.
  
  Not very novel; ISDN phones, all sorts of digital-PBX phones, and
  now VoIP phones, have this feature (in the sense that, since
  there is no physical on-hook switch (except for the phones in
  Sandia and other such places), it's the PBX that controls whether
  the mike goes on or not).
 
 It's been a while since I built ISDN equipment but I do not think this
 is correct: can you show me how, exactly, one uses Q.931 to instruct
 the other endpoint to go off-hook?
 
I don't recall if it's Q.931 per se, as much as the CO.  Or rather, I
know for certain that various government security agencies were quite
unhappy about ISDN phones with speakerphone capability being deployed
in sensitive sites.  The speaker button was not, as I understood it, a
hard button; it was a soft button that the switch responded to.


--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-04 Thread Alex Alten


At 10:21 AM 12/2/2006 -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:


Quoting:

   The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
   surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
   mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
   conversations.

   The technique is called a roving bug, and was approved by top
   U.S. Department of Justice officials for use against members of a
   New York organized crime family who were wary of conventional
   surveillance techniques such as tailing a suspect or wiretapping
   him.

http://news.com.com/2100-1029_3-6140191.html


Cellphones maintain contact with cell towers, so they can be roughly
tracked on the ground too, even when you are not talking.  With GPS
being embedded this may become much more accurate.

As an amusing aside, for a while someone was accidently calling my
land line with their cell phone.  You could hear them driving around, with
the usual car noises, and sometimes the radio on too. Occasionally I
heard them in conversation with someone else. This went on for months.

- Alex


--

Alex Alten
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-04 Thread Peter Gutmann
Thor Lancelot Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

It's been a while since I built ISDN equipment but I do not think this is
correct: can you show me how, exactly, one uses Q.931 to instruct the other
endpoint to go off-hook?

You make use of the undocumented remote management interface [0].

Peter.

[0] Buffer overflow bug in the packet header parsing code.

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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-04 Thread Taral

On 12/3/06, Thor Lancelot Simon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

It's been a while since I built ISDN equipment but I do not think this
is correct: can you show me how, exactly, one uses Q.931 to instruct the
other endpoint to go off-hook?


That's the same question I have. I don't remember seeing anything in
the GSM standard that would allow this either.

--
Taral [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can't prove anything.
   -- Gödel's Incompetence Theorem

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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-04 Thread John Ioannidis
On Sun, Dec 03, 2006 at 09:26:15PM -0600, Taral wrote:
 That's the same question I have. I don't remember seeing anything in
 the GSM standard that would allow this either.
 

I'll hazard a guess: mobile providers can send a special type of
message (not sure if it would be classed as an SMS) with various
settings for your phone.  They do that, for example, to set the GPRS
settings.  IN many phones, one of the possible settings is to
automatically answer the phone, without ringing (the feature is used
in some of the hands-free settings).  The user would probably notice
that the phone is in use, but there may be some other trick around
that.

/ji

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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-03 Thread John Ioannidis
On Sat, Dec 02, 2006 at 10:21:57AM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
 
 Quoting:
 
The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
conversations.

Not very novel; ISDN phones, all sorts of digital-PBX phones, and now
VoIP phones, have this feature (in the sense that, since there is no
physical on-hook switch (except for the phones in Sandia and other
such places), it's the PBX that controls whether the mike goes on or
not).

I've always wondered what legitimate use the ability to turn on the
microphone of a *mobile* phone remotely was.  No mobile telephony
company has ever advertised this as a feature.

/ji

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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-03 Thread Steve Schear

At 07:21 AM 12/2/2006, Perry E. Metzger wrote:


Quoting:

   The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
   surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
   mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
   conversations.

   The technique is called a roving bug, and was approved by top
   U.S. Department of Justice officials for use against members of a
   New York organized crime family who were wary of conventional
   surveillance techniques such as tailing a suspect or wiretapping
   him.


This technique was pioneered by some criminals (drug, I think) that would 
'forget' their cell phones in police cars to they could listen in on them.


Steve 


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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-03 Thread Steve Schear

At 07:21 AM 12/2/2006, Perry E. Metzger wrote:


Quoting:

   The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
   surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
   mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
   conversations.


BTW, its easy to thwart this, even without removing the battery as 
recommended: just place a shorted jack into the phone's mic/headset 
plug.  These plug's use an physical-electrical contact switching method to 
shunt the audio so the software AFAIK can route around it.


Steve 


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Re: cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-03 Thread Thor Lancelot Simon
On Sat, Dec 02, 2006 at 05:15:02PM -0500, John Ioannidis wrote:
 On Sat, Dec 02, 2006 at 10:21:57AM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
  
  Quoting:
  
 The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
 surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
 mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
 conversations.
 
 Not very novel; ISDN phones, all sorts of digital-PBX phones, and now
 VoIP phones, have this feature (in the sense that, since there is no
 physical on-hook switch (except for the phones in Sandia and other
 such places), it's the PBX that controls whether the mike goes on or
 not).

It's been a while since I built ISDN equipment but I do not think this
is correct: can you show me how, exactly, one uses Q.931 to instruct the
other endpoint to go off-hook?

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cellphones as room bugs

2006-12-02 Thread Perry E. Metzger

Quoting:

   The FBI appears to have begun using a novel form of electronic
   surveillance in criminal investigations: remotely activating a
   mobile phone's microphone and using it to eavesdrop on nearby
   conversations.

   The technique is called a roving bug, and was approved by top
   U.S. Department of Justice officials for use against members of a
   New York organized crime family who were wary of conventional
   surveillance techniques such as tailing a suspect or wiretapping
   him.

http://news.com.com/2100-1029_3-6140191.html

-- 
Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED]

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