Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

2007-02-05 Thread Allen
Vlad SATtva Miller wrote: Allen wrote on 31.01.2007 01:02: I'll skip the rest of your excellent, and thought provoking post as it is future and I'm looking at now. From what you've written and other material I've read, it is clear that even if the horizon isn't as short as five years, it is

Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

2007-02-05 Thread Leichter, Jerry
| Currently I'm dealing | with very large - though not as large as 4 gig - x-ray, MRI, and | similar files that have to be protected for the lifespan of the | person, which could be 70+ years after the medical record is | created. Think of the MRI of a kid to scan for some condition |

OTP, was Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

2007-02-05 Thread Travis H.
On Sun, Feb 04, 2007 at 11:27:00PM -0500, Leichter, Jerry wrote: | 1) use a random key as large as the plaintext (one-time-pad) ...thus illustrating once again both the allure and the uselessness (in almost all situations) of one-time pads. For long-term storage, you are correct, OTP at best

Re: data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

2007-02-04 Thread Vlad \SATtva\ Miller
Allen wrote on 31.01.2007 01:02: I'll skip the rest of your excellent, and thought provoking post as it is future and I'm looking at now. From what you've written and other material I've read, it is clear that even if the horizon isn't as short as five years, it is certainly shorter than 70.

data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW

2007-01-30 Thread Travis H.
On Wed, Jan 24, 2007 at 03:28:50PM -0800, Allen wrote: If 4 gigs is right, would it then be records to look for to break the code via birthday attacks would be things like seismic data, In case anyone else couldn't parse this, he means the amount of encrypted material necessary to break the