### Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

William Allen Simpson wrote: There are already other worthy comments in the thread(s). This is a great post. One can't stress enough that programmers need programming guidance, not arcane information theoretic concepts. We are using computational devices, and therefore computational

### Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

On Sat, Jan 08, 2005 at 10:46:17AM +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: But that was precisely my initial position: that the insight on the internal state (which I saw, by definition, as the loss of entropy by the generator) that we gain from one bit of output is much smaller than one full bit. I

### Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

- Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: cryptography@metzdowd.com Sent: Friday, January 07, 2005 9:30 AM Subject: Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Enzo Michelangeli Sent: Tuesday, January

### Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Enzo Michelangeli Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 7:50 PM This entropy depletion issue keeps coming up every now and then, but I still don't understand how it is supposed to happen. If the PRNG uses a really non-invertible

### Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

On Thu, Jan 06, 2005 at 04:35:05PM +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: By how much exactly? I'd say, _under the hypothesis that the one-way function can't be broken and other attacks fail_, exactly zero; in the real world, maybe a little more. Unfortunately for your analysis, *entropy* assumes

### Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

| You're letting your intuition about usable randomness run roughshod | over the formal definition of entropy. Taking bits out of the PRNG | *does* reduce its entropy. | | By how much exactly? I'd say, _under the hypothesis that the one-way | function can't be broken and other attacks fail_,

### Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

From: John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Jan 5, 2005 2:06 PM To: Enzo Michelangeli [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing) ... You're letting your intuition about usable randomness run roughshod over the formal definition

### Re: entropy depletion (was: SSL/TLS passive sniffing)

- Original Message - From: John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2005 3:06 AM Enzo Michelangeli wrote: [...] If the PRNG uses a really non-invertible algorithm (or one invertible only with intractable complexity), its output gives no insight whatsoever on