Re: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project

2003-09-11 Thread Rich Salz
You propose to put a key into a physical device and give it to the public, and expect that they will never recover the key from it? Seems unwise. You think the public can crack FIPS devices? This is mass-market, not govt-level attackers. Second, if the key's in hardware you *know* it's been

Re: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project

2003-09-11 Thread Peter Gutmann
Rich Salz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Second, if the key's in hardware you *know* it's been stolen. You don't know that for software. Only for some definitions of stolen. A key held in a smart card that does absolutely everything the untrusted PC it's connected to tells it to is only marginally

RE: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project

2003-09-11 Thread Scott Guthery
/enforcer open-source TCPA project On Wed, 10 Sep 2003, Sean Smith wrote: So this doesn't work unless you put a speed limit on CPU's, and that's ridiculous. Go read about the 4758. CPU speed won't help unless you can crack 2048-bit RSA, or figure out a way around the physical security, or find

Re: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project

2003-09-11 Thread Damian Gerow
Thus spake Rich Salz ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) [11/09/03 08:51]: You propose to put a key into a physical device and give it to the public, and expect that they will never recover the key from it? Seems unwise. You think the public can crack FIPS devices? This is mass-market, not govt-level

is secure hardware worth it? (Was: Re: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project)

2003-09-11 Thread Sean Smith
Just to clarify... I'm NOT saying that any particular piece of secure hardware can never be broken. Steve Weingart (the hw security guy for the 4758) used to insist that there was no such thing as tamper-proof. On the HW level, all you can do is talk about what defenses you tried, what

Re: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project

2003-09-11 Thread Rich Salz
And 'the public' doesn't include people like government level attackers? People like cryptography experts? People who like to play with things like this? No it doesn't. *It's not in the threat model.* /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology

Re: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project

2003-09-09 Thread Sean Smith
How can you verify that a remote computer is the real thing, doing the right thing? You cannot. Using a high-end secure coprocessor (such as the 4758, but not with a flawed application) will raise the threshold for the adversary significantly. No, there are no absolutes. But there are

fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project

2003-09-08 Thread Sean Smith
The Bear/Enforcer Project Dartmouth College http://enforcer.sourceforge.net http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sws/abstracts/msmw03.shtml How can you verify that a remote computer is the real thing, doing the right thing? High-end secure coprocessors are expensive and computationally limited;