John S. Denker writes:
A scenario of relevance to the present discussion
goes like this:
-- There exists a data haven. (Reiter and Rubin
called this a crowd.)
-- Many subscribers have connections to the haven.
-- Each subscriber maintains a strictly scheduled
flow of
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
It will often be possible to also trace the communication channel back
through the crowd, by inserting delays onto chosen links and observing
which ones correlate with delays in the data observed at the endpoint.
This way it is not necessary to monitor
I agree with anonymous summary of the state of the art wrt
cryptographic anonymity of interactive communications.
Ulf Moeller, Anton Stiglic, and I give some more details on the
attacks anonymous describes in this IH 2001 [1] paper:
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/pubs/traffic.pdf
which
