Re: traffix analysis

2003-08-28 Thread Anonymous
John S. Denker writes: A scenario of relevance to the present discussion goes like this: -- There exists a data haven. (Reiter and Rubin called this a crowd.) -- Many subscribers have connections to the haven. -- Each subscriber maintains a strictly scheduled flow of

Re: traffix analysis

2003-08-28 Thread Steve Schear
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote: It will often be possible to also trace the communication channel back through the crowd, by inserting delays onto chosen links and observing which ones correlate with delays in the data observed at the endpoint. This way it is not necessary to monitor

Re: traffix analysis

2003-08-28 Thread Adam Back
I agree with anonymous summary of the state of the art wrt cryptographic anonymity of interactive communications. Ulf Moeller, Anton Stiglic, and I give some more details on the attacks anonymous describes in this IH 2001 [1] paper: http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/pubs/traffic.pdf which