### Re: voting by m of n digital signature?

* James A. Donald: Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so that the signature proves that at least m possessors of secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m, or which ones signed? What about this?

### Re: voting by m of n digital signature?

James A. Donald writes: -+--- | Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so | that the signature proves that at least m possessors of | secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n | a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m, | or which

### voting by m of n digital signature?

Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so that the signature proves that at least m possessors of secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m, or which ones signed?

### Re: voting by m of n digital signature?

Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so that the signature proves that at least m possessors of secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m, or which ones signed? Yes there are a number of ways. Usually they

### Re: Voting machine security

, that's true. But of course, no one who doesn't work for a voting machine company is just talking about summing a few lists. The idea that after you factor in everything, it might actually be cheaper to have people do it after all, is a very difficult one for many people to even conceptualize. Progress

### Re: Voting machine security

On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 11:57 AM, John Ioannidis [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This just about sums it up: http://xkcd.com/463/ Only slightly better then suggested by the comic. McAfee anti-virus software was on the servers, not the DRE voting machines themselves. From http

### Re: Voting machine security

At 9:24 AM -0700 8/18/08, Eric Rescorla wrote: (and because of the complexity of US elections, hand counting is quite expensive) This is quite disputable. Further, hand vs. machine counting is core to the way we think about the security of the voting system. On a complex ballot

### Re: Voting machine security

the security of the voting system. | The keynote talk for the USENIX Security Symposium was Dr. Strangevote or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Paper Ballot Debra Bowen, California Secretary of State and her talk had one slide only. I do not have the slide, but I can

### Voting machine security

This just about sums it up: http://xkcd.com/463/ /ji - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

### Voting machines make mistake in Arkansas

Excerpt: Bruce Haggard, an election commissioner in Faulkner County, Arkansas, is baffled by a problem that occurred with two voting machines in this month's state primary elections. The machines allocated votes cast in one race to an entirely different race that wasn't even

### Call for presentations: Cryptographic e-voting systems for the IACR

The International Association for Cryptologic Research (http://www.iacr.org/ ) is seeking presentations and demos of e-voting systems. For its next meeting in August-17, 2008 (in Santa-Barbara, CA, USA), the IACR board would like to invite presentations and demos of cryptographic e-voting

### Electronic Voting: Danger and Opportunity

University of Illinois will hold a talk on Electronic Voting: Danger and Opportunity. Professor Edward W. Felten of Princeton University will be speaking.See: http://webtools.uiuc.edu/calendar/Calendar?calId=504eventId=78090ACTION=VIEW_EVENT saqib http://www.quantumcrypto.de/dante

### Fwd: Fwd: Fwd: PunchScan voting protocol

I've attached below Rick's reply to this thread. Rick Carback is a member of the PunchScan team. - Taral -- Forwarded message -- From: Rick Carback Date: Dec 16, 2007 12:01 PM Subject: Re: Fwd: Fwd: PunchScan voting protocol I think there are some misconceptions/assumptions

### Re: PunchScan voting protocol

On 12/13/2007 08:23 PM, Taral wrote: On 12/12/07, John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Several important steps in the process must be carried out in secret, and if there is any leakage, there is unbounded potential for vote-buying and voter coercion. I've done quite a bit of work with this

### Re: PunchScan voting protocol

On 12/12/07, John Denker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Several important steps in the process must be carried out in secret, and if there is any leakage, there is unbounded potential for vote-buying and voter coercion. I've done quite a bit of work with this protocol. The protocol assumes the

### PunchScan voting protocol

Hi Folks -- I was wondering to what extent the folks on this list have taken a look the PunchScan voting scheme: http://punchscan.org/ The site makes the following claims: End-to-end cryptographic independent verification, or E2E, is a mechanism built into an election that allows voters

### Phd thesis on voting

I haven't seen this mentioned here: Ben Adida did a Phd thesis on voting at MIT (ended this August) http://ben.adida.net/research/phd-thesis.pdf At his blog there is more material available such as conference slides, paper etc. http://benlog.com/ (end of page) -- Mads Rasmussen LEA

### Re: free e-voting software available?!

I am working on the implementation of a system which should fit your requirements based on some work of mine and on A Protocol for Anonymous and Accurate E-Polling, Danilo Bruschi, Igor Nai Fovino, Andrea Lanzi, E-Government: Towards Electronic Democracy, International Conference, TCGOV

### free e-voting software available?!

My department would like to conduct departmental votes in some automated way. We're looking for free software, (or modestly-priced software) to do this. Anyone know of such a thing? I've done some searching without any luck. We don't have the usual requirements of a full-blown voting package

### Surprise! Another serious hole in Diebold voting machines...

...okay, not so much surprise. [...] Scientists said Diebold appeared to have opened the hole by making it as easy as possible to upgrade the software inside its machines. The result, said Iowa's Jones, is a violation of federal voting system rules. All of us who have heard

### Diebold completes e-voting printer prototype

Wherein Dieblod remembers, hey, presto, they're a cash-register company after all... Cheers, RAH --- http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/evoting/2005-01-28-diebold-printout_x.htm USA Today Diebold completes e-voting printer prototype NORTH CANTON, Ohio (AP) - Diebold said

### No mandate for e-voting, computer scientist says

http://gcn.com/cgi-bin/udt/im.display.printable?client.id=gcndaily2story.id=27861 No mandate for e-voting, computer scientist says 11/09/04 By William Jackson, GCN Staff Despite wide use in last week's presidential election, direct-recording electronic voting still is a faulty method of casting

### Calif. settles electronic voting suit against Diebold for \$2.6M

http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2004/11/10/financial1831EST0118.DTL Ths San Francisco Chronicle Calif. settles electronic voting suit against Diebold for \$2.6M RACHEL KONRAD, AP Technology Writer Wednesday, November 10, 2004 (11-10) 15:31 PST SAN FRANCISCO (AP

### Electonic Voting

November 2004 This is an interesting time for electronic voting. India, the largest democracy in the world, went completely paper- free for its general elections earlier this year. For the first time, some 387 million people expressed their electoral right electronically. Despite

### On the Voting Machine Makers' Tab

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/12/opinion/12sun2.html?th=pagewanted=printposition= The New York Times September 12, 2004 On the Voting Machine Makers' Tab As doubts have grown about the reliability of electronic voting, some of its loudest defenders have been state and local election officials

### He Pushed the Hot Button of Touch-Screen Voting

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/politics/15vote.html?pagewanted=printposition= The New York Times June 15, 2004 He Pushed the Hot Button of Touch-Screen Voting By KATHARINE Q. SEELYE Kevin Shelley is a big and voluble Irish politician, the son of a former San Francisco mayor

### Who Tests Voting Machines?

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/30/opinion/30SUN1.html?th=pagewanted=printposition= The New York Times May 30, 2004 MAKING VOTES COUNT Who Tests Voting Machines? henever questions are raised about the reliability of electronic voting machines, election officials have a ready response

### [Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice

* DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice May 26 - 27, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ari Juels

### Calif. Official Bans Some Voting Machines

http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=storycid=519u=/ap/20040501/ap_on_re_us/electronic_votingprinter=1 Yahoo! Yahoo! News Sat, May 01, 2004 Calif. Official Bans Some Voting Machines Fri Apr 30, 8:56 PM ET Add U.S. National - AP to My Yahoo! By JIM WASSERMAN, Associated Press Writer SACRAMENTO

### Tiny new agency ill-equipped for e-voting oversight

http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/8580743.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp The San Jose Mercury News Posted on Mon, May. 03, 2004 Tiny new agency ill-equipped for e-voting oversight SAN JOSE, Calif. (AP) - As alarm mounts over the integrity of the ATM-like voting

### E-Voting Commission Gets Earful

http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,63349,00.html Wired News E-Voting Commission Gets Earful By Michael Grebb? Story location: http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,63349,00.html 02:00 AM May. 06, 2004 PT WASHINGTON -- Passions ran high Wednesday at the first public hearing

### Re: voting

On Apr 15, 2004, at 8:58 PM, Ed Gerck wrote: Currently, voter privacy is absolute in the US and does not depend even on the will of the courts. For example, there is no way for a judge to assure that a voter under oath is telling the truth about how they voted, or not. For many years in the 90's

### Re: voting

a promotion... etc. Also relevant is that voters may WANT to keep their receipts, for the same reasons. It seems a legitimate priority for a voting system to be designed to assure voters that the system is working. As long as this does not go against the 'first law' for public voting systems

### Re: voting

Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: David Jablon wrote: The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends. What I see in serious voting system research efforts are attempts to build systems

### Re: voting

a pre-defined, unlikely voting pattern in each race of a ballot. This exemplifies one reason why we need the 'second law' -- to preserve unlinkability between ballots and voters. So there's a need to design the system to have more voters than ballot boxes to conform to your second law

### RE: voting

One area we are not addressing in voting security is absentee ballots. The use of absentee ballots is rising in US elections, and is even being advocated as a way for individuals to get a printed ballot in jurisdictions which use electronic-only voting machines. Political parties are encouraging

### RE: voting

Ed Gerck[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] John Kelsey wrote: At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: 1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify' that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter coercion. I think

### DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice

* DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice May 26 - 27, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ari Juels

### RE: voting

At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: ... 1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify' that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter coercion. I think the VoteHere scheme and David Chaum's scheme both claim to solve this problem

### See-Through Voting Software

http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62983,00.html Wired News See-Through Voting Software By Kim Zetter 02:00 AM Apr. 08, 2004 PT VoteHere, an electronic voting systems company, released its source code this week in a bid to let others examine how the machines work and help people gain

### Re: voting

a counterpoint... Perry E. Metzger wrote: I'm a believer in the KISS principle. :-) that's one S too many. For true believers, KIS is enough. A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you verify it

### Re: voting

At 8:24 AM -0400 4/8/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens the way for serial voting fraud. The receipt should be exposed to the voter

### Re: voting

Having a paper ballot printed by machine (and checked by the votor) before being dropped in a box may permit some additional cross-checks: * Put serial numbers or something like them, on each ballot, so that missing or added ballots can be detected. * Put check digits on each ballot, so that

### Re: voting

, Perry and other KISS advocates have a very strong (albeit social) point. Joe Sixpack can understand *and test* levers or Hollerith cards or their optical counterparts. Good luck getting him to understand number theory. It would be better in many estimations to have even coercible voting than

### RE: voting

privacy wrote: [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted] It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud, error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptographic

### voting, KISS, etc.

I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure voting security miss the point entirely. They start with the assumption that something is broken about the current voting system. I contend it is just fine. For example, it takes a long time to count pieces of papers compared

### Re: voting, KISS, etc.

On Fri, Apr 09, 2004 at 12:46:47PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure voting security miss the point entirely. [...] I'm a technophile. I've loved technology all my life. I'm also a security professional, and I love a good

### RE: voting

| privacy wrote: | [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted] | | It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded | and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud, | error and incompetence is overwhelming

### Re: voting

Perry E. Metzger wrote: Complicated systems are the bane of security. Systems like this are simple to understand, simple to audit, simple to guard. I fully agree, but there is a wide variety of voting schemes out there, of varying complexity. In a ballot with only very few options, your

### voting

I'm a believer in the KISS principle. A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you verify it and drop it in a slot. Ideally, the cards would be marked with something like OCR-B so that the correspondence

### All Internet voting is insecure: report

http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/35078.html http://www.eetimes.com/at/news/OEG20040123S0036 = All Internet voting is insecure: report By electricnews.net Posted: 23/01/2004 at 11:37 GMT Get The Reg wherever you are, with The Mobile Register

### DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice

* DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice May 26 - 27, 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ari Juels

### Electronic-voting firm reveals hacker break-in

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/PrintStory.pl?document_id=2001825724zsection_id=268448455slug=votehere300date=20031230 Tuesday, December 30, 2003, 12:00 A.M. Pacific The Seattle Times: Electronic-voting firm reveals hacker break-in By Monica Soto Ouchi Seattle Times technology reporter

### ANDOS-based secure voting system

Hello, This is my first post on this mailing-list since i'm new with cryptographic problems. I also apologize in advance for any language mistake I'll make. I am currently interrested in programming a secured voting system using ANDOS (All-or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets) protocol. I've

### Re: VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting

Schu stressed that several layers of security will prevent hackers from accessing the system. VeriSign will house the security servers in its own hosting centers. The company will ask military personnel to use their Common Access Cards--the latest form of ID for the military--to access the

### VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting

http://msnbc-cnet.com.com/2102-1029_3-5083772.html?tag=3Dni_print VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting=20 By Robert Lemos=20 Staff Writer, CNET News.com=20 http://news.com.com/2100-1029-5083772.html=20 VeriSign announced Monday that it will provide key components of a system d= esigned

### Re: VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting

On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded: VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting The solution we are building will enable absentee voters to exercise their right to vote, said George Schu, a vice president at VeriSign. The sanctity of the vote can't be compromised nor

### Re: VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting

Roy M. Silvernail wrote: On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded: VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting The solution we are building will enable absentee voters to exercise their right to vote, said George Schu, a vice president at VeriSign. The sanctity

### Re: VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting

On Wednesday 01 October 2003 19:53, Ian Grigg wrote: Roy M. Silvernail wrote: On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded: VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting The solution we are building will enable absentee voters to exercise their right to vote, said George

### Re: DC Security Geeks Talk: Analysis of an Electronic Voting System

At 02:48 PM 9/24/03 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=Newsfile=printsid=463 Cryptonomicon.Net - Talk: Analysis of an Electronic Voting System Someone needs to inject a story about e-voting fraud into the popular imagination. Is Tom Clancy available