Re: [cryptography] preventing protocol failings

2011-07-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes: On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 12:06 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: (The ASN.1 filter I mentioned earlier is a stripped-down version of dumpasn1. Remember that dataset of 400K broken certs that NISCC generated a few years ago and that

Re: [cryptography] preventing protocol failings

2011-07-06 Thread Peter Gutmann
I wrote: BER and DER are actually the safest encodings of the major security protocols I work with. Based on the following, which just appeared on another list: In contrast to RFC 5280, X.509 does not require DER encoding. It only requires that the signature is generated across a DER

Re: [cryptography] preventing protocol failings

2011-07-06 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 7:07 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: I wrote: BER and DER are actually the safest encodings of the major security protocols I work with. Based on the following, which just appeared on another list:  In contrast to RFC 5280,  X.509 does not require

Re: [cryptography] preventing protocol failings

2011-07-06 Thread Sampo Syreeni
On 2011-07-04, Jon Callas wrote: Let me be blunt here. The state of software security is so immature that worrying about crypto security or protocol security is like debating the options between hardened steel and titanium, when the thing holding the chain of links to the actual user

Re: [cryptography] Bitcoin observation

2011-07-06 Thread Taral
2011/7/6 lodewijk andré de la porte lodewijka...@gmail.com: I find the phrasing very strange. You cannot destroy a bitcoin, only render it practically beyond recovery. You could still recover it by figuring out which account's full of money and brute forcing their private key from their public