On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 7:59 PM, Kevin W. Wall wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 5:56 PM, Peter Gutmann
> wrote:
>>
>> travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org writes:
>>
>> >If we assume that the lifetime of the cert is there to limit its window
>> > of
>> >vulnerability to factoring, brute force
On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 5:56 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org writes:
>
> >If we assume that the lifetime of the cert is there to limit its window of
> >vulnerability to factoring, brute force, and other attacks against
> >computational security properties,
>
>
travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org writes:
>If we assume that the lifetime of the cert is there to limit its window of
>vulnerability to factoring, brute force, and other attacks against
>computational security properties,
Which only occurs in textbooks. It's probably not necessary to me
On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 10:46:30AM -0800,
travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
> libnss, at least on Linux, checks that the signing cert (chain) is valid
> at the time of signature - as opposed to present time. (It may check
> present time as well - not sure on that).
>
> This makes
On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 10:46:30AM -0800,
travis+ml-rbcryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
> libnss, at least on Linux, checks that the signing cert (chain) is valid
> at the time of signature - as opposed to present time. (It may check
> present time as well - not sure on that).
>
> This makes
