[cryptography] Shared key in DPI device...

2012-07-03 Thread Ben Laurie
I thought this might interest the list: Vulnerability in Cyberoam DPI devices [30 Jun 2012] (CVE-2012-3372) === Cyberoam make a range of DPI devices (http://www.cyberoamworks.com/) which are capable of intercepting SSL connections.

Re: [cryptography] Key extraction from tokens (RSA SecurID, etc) via padding attacks on PKCS#1v1.5

2012-07-03 Thread Thierry Moreau
Noon Silk wrote: From: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/06/bad-couple-of-years-for-cryptographic.html Here's the postage stamp version: due to a perfect storm of (subtle, but not novel) cryptographic flaws, an attacker can extract sensitive keys from several popular cryptographic

Re: [cryptography] Shared key in DPI device...

2012-07-03 Thread Jeff Jarmoc
Sadly, I worry this scenario may not be all that unique. While I have no first had experience or confirmation, some tech notes on WebSense's site indicate they ship with a default root. See http://www.websense.com/content/support/library/web/v76/wcg_help/c_int_rt.aspxwhich states; Important The

[cryptography] Announcing Tahoe-LAFS v1.9.2

2012-07-03 Thread David-Sarah Hopwood
ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Least-Authority File System, v1.9.2 The Tahoe-LAFS team is pleased to announce the immediate availability of version 1.9.2 of Tahoe-LAFS, an extremely reliable distributed storage system. Get it here: https://tahoe-lafs.org/source/tahoe-lafs/trunk/docs/quickstart.rst

Re: [cryptography] Devices and protocols that require PKCS 1.5 padding

2012-07-03 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Erwann Abalea eaba...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/7/2 Thor Lancelot Simon t...@panix.com [...] Besides PGP, what other standard, widely-deployed protocols require the use of padding types other than OAEP? TLS, up to v1.2. PKCS#1v1.5 is mandatory. The TPM