In the past there have been a few proposals to use asymmetric cryptosystems,
typically RSA, like symmetric ones by keeping the public key secret, the idea
behind this being that if the public key isn't known then there isn't anything
for an attacker to factor or otherwise attack. Turns out that
Hi,
In the past there have been a few proposals to use asymmetric cryptosystems,
typically RSA, like symmetric ones by keeping the public key secret, the idea
behind this being that if the public key isn't known then there isn't anything
for an attacker to factor or otherwise attack. Turns
In the past there have been a few proposals to use asymmetric cryptosystems,
typically RSA, like symmetric ones by keeping the public key secret, the idea
behind this being that if the public key isn't known then there isn't anything
for an attacker to factor or otherwise attack. Turns out
On 1/11/12 10:55 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com writes:
Is anyone aware of of application layer encryption protocols with session
management tuned for use on cellular networks?
[...]
From that description your problem isn't at the encryption-protocol level at
On Sat, Nov 3, 2012 at 6:25 PM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote:
On 1/11/12 10:55 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Jeffrey Walton noloa...@gmail.com writes:
Is anyone aware of of application layer encryption protocols with session
management tuned for use on cellular networks?
[...]
From that
Jon Callas j...@callas.org writes:
Which immediately prompts the question of what if it's long or secret? [1]
This attack doesn't work on that.
The asymmetric-as-symmetric was proposed about a decade ago as a means of
protecting against new factorisation attacks, and was deployed as a commercial
