Re: [cryptography] Bonding or Insuring of CAs?

2013-01-26 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-01-26 8:31 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote: Since there isn't a strong list moderator here, I gotta ask: is this (and similar PKIX-is-broken threads) on-topic for this mailing list? Regardless of how much I agree with the sentiment, it seems to have nothing to do with cryptography. Maybe

[cryptography] Burning of driftwood considered harmful

2013-01-26 Thread Harald Hanche-Olsen
… because it produces polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (aka dioxins). [Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz (2013-01-26 04:32:48 UTC)] John Levine jo...@iecc.com writes: I'd like a list where people ensured that the subject lines of their messages described what the message was about, so I

Re: [cryptography] OAEP for RSA signatures?

2013-01-26 Thread James Muir
PSS is similar to OAEP, but is for signatures. If you have OAEP implemented, then it wouldn't take you long to do PSS, which is described in the PKCS-1v2.1 document. Hacking OAEP into a signature scheme sounds a little dangerous. However, I guess the idea would idea would just be to hash your

Re: [cryptography] OAEP for RSA signatures?

2013-01-26 Thread Peter Gutmann
ianG i...@iang.org writes: Could OAEP be considered reasonable for signatures? You need to define appropriate. For example if you mean interoperable then OAEP isn't even appropriate for encryption, let alone signatures. If you're worried about timing channels then OAEP is also pretty

Re: [cryptography] OAEP for RSA signatures?

2013-01-26 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Sat, January 26, 2013 5:53 pm, Peter Gutmann wrote: ianG i...@iang.org writes: Could OAEP be considered reasonable for signatures? You need to define appropriate. For example if you mean interoperable then OAEP isn't even appropriate for encryption, let alone signatures. If you're