Re: [cryptography] Client TLS Certificates - why not?

2013-03-06 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-03-06 4:41 AM, StealthMonger wrote: What's wrong with the following simple idea: 1. p2p: The parties opportunistically verify out-of-band after exchanging keys via public key servers or (insecure) email. 2. Prospective customer verification of merchant: Merchant includes the ID of its

Re: [cryptography] Client TLS Certificates - why not?

2013-03-06 Thread Martin Paljak
On Wed, Mar 6, 2013 at 10:40 AM, James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com wrote: Can you implement your above design while hiding the keys in urls, rather than inflicting them on the suffering user? There's a saying in Estonian, literally translated: who wants to eat sausages is better off not

Re: [cryptography] Client TLS Certificates - why not?

2013-03-06 Thread StealthMonger
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes: On 2013-03-06 4:41 AM, StealthMonger wrote: 2. Prospective customer verification of merchant: Merchant includes the ID of its signing key in every advertisement and repeatedly admonishes prospects to

Re: [cryptography] Client TLS Certificates - why not?

2013-03-06 Thread ianG
On 6/03/13 14:33 PM, StealthMonger wrote: Your only argument is that the key ID is longer or more random. This of course is the ZT challenge. The issue isn't that Zooko's Triangle can or can't be squared, but that we the developer have to square it [0]. A solution is redesign of the

Re: [cryptography] Client TLS Certificates - why not?

2013-03-06 Thread Michael Rogers
I don't think most non-programmers would differentiate between a string of hex digits and an arbitrary alphanumeric string, so you might as well use base 32. But do you really need to encode more bits? With a ZRTPish hash commitment / key exchange / confirmation code structure you can detect a

Re: [cryptography] Client TLS Certificates - why not?

2013-03-06 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Wed, Mar 6, 2013 at 6:33 AM, StealthMonger stealthmon...@nym.mixmin.net wrote: ... The key, and the hash of the key, is a long string of random gibberish. It should not be visible to end users. Experience demonstrates that showing it repels 99% of end users. Merchant includes its

[cryptography] Sodium: NaCl repackaged for portability/ease-of-use

2013-03-06 Thread Tony Arcieri
Hello crypto-people, Frank Denis just announced Sodium, a fork of NaCl containing only the reference C code, packaged using a standard autotools build system: http://labs.umbrella.com/2013/03/06/announcing-sodium-a-new-cryptographic-library/ NaCl has traditionally been hard to use because it

Re: [cryptography] Client TLS Certificates - why not?

2013-03-06 Thread James A. Donald
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes: The key, and the hash of the key, is a long string of random gibberish. It should not be visible to end users. Experience demonstrates that showing it repels 99% of end users. On 2013-03-06 9:33 PM, StealthMonger wrote: Merchant includes its