Re: [cryptography] Snowden Induced Mea Culpas

2013-08-25 Thread ianG
It's Sunday, it's time for some amusement. I agree with everything John writes, and although I prefer an alternate style, it may be time for straight talking. On 24/08/13 00:33 AM, John Young wrote: Comsec experts should not be surprised at the Snowden revelations about NSA so far, most of

Re: [cryptography] no-keyring public

2013-08-25 Thread Alexander Klimov
On Sat, 24 Aug 2013, Krisztián Pintér wrote: has anybody done something like that already? does it have a name? There was a ECC program from the previous century that worked as you described: the private key was derived solely from the user password. Unfortunately, I cannot recall its name

Re: [cryptography] no-keyring public

2013-08-25 Thread Matthew Orgass
On 2013-08-25 alser...@inbox.ru wrote: On Sat, 24 Aug 2013, Krisztián Pintér wrote: has anybody done something like that already? does it have a name? There was a ECC program from the previous century that worked as you described: the private key was derived solely from the user password.

Re: [cryptography] no-keyring public

2013-08-25 Thread Natanael
Bitcoin Brainwallet software creates ECDSA keys that you can use for multiple purposes, not only for Bitcoin. A link to Phidelius, which was previously mentioned: http://dankaminsky.com/2012/01/03/phidelius/ --- I would like to see some standardized hierarchial deterministic scheme to generate

[cryptography] Android SecureRandom poor entropy

2013-08-25 Thread Marco Pozzato
Hi all, I'm CTO at PrivateWave, developing solutions for secure telephony. Recently, android SecureRandom PRNG proved to be seriously flawed ( http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/08/some-securerandom-thoughts.html) because, by default, it is not properly initialized with good entropy.

Re: [cryptography] Android SecureRandom poor entropy

2013-08-25 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Marco Pozzato mpodr...@gmail.com wrote: ... Recently, android SecureRandom PRNG proved to be seriously flawed (http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/08/some-securerandom-thoughts.html) because, by default, it is not properly initialized with good entropy.

Re: [cryptography] What is the state of patents on elliptic curve cryptography?

2013-08-25 Thread D. J. Bernstein
Zooko Wilcox-OHearn writes (on the old cryptogra...@metzdowd.com list): I'd be keen to see a list of potentially-relevant patents which have expired or are due to expire within the next 5 years. http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html includes a chart and pointers. Pretty much the entirety of the

Re: [cryptography] Snowden Induced Mea Culpas

2013-08-25 Thread Lodewijk andré de la porte
Assume all mayor cryptotools are exploited. Sad but true. Any other reason people complain OpenSSL is written in tongues (so to speak)? Hiding exploits is easier in a mess. That said the people in the IETS might be ignorant to the fact that TLS is likely backdoor'ed. The thing with this problem

Re: [cryptography] Snowden Induced Mea Culpas

2013-08-25 Thread Kyle Maxwell
I find it likely that the Google engineer quoted had things like the NSA taps on routers and in telecom facilities in mind, rather than whether users of various services can expect that their providers will hand over to the government. In other words, encrypting data in motion rather than at rest.

Re: [cryptography] Preventing Time Correlation Attacks on Leaks: Help! :-)

2013-08-25 Thread Mansour Moufid
On 2013-08-20, at 3:31 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote: Hi all, at GlobaLeaks we are going to implement a feature that want to mitigate time correlation attacks between a Whistleblower submitting something and a Receiver, receiving a notification that there's a new leak outstanding to