Re: [cryptography] motivation, research ethics organizational criminality (Re: Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP: Is this still a good proposal?)

2013-09-14 Thread John Kemp
On Sep 13, 2013, at 8:10 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote: “In the 1960s students at MIT protested strongly against having a classified research laboratory on the campus and MIT said we will divest it, so it won’t be part of MIT anymore,” said Leslie. “It still exists in Cambridge,

Re: [cryptography] motivation, research ethics organizational criminality (Re: Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP: Is this still a good proposal?)

2013-09-14 Thread David D
Quote, Personally, I don't feel that the threat justifies what has been donesnip Your feeling is supported by data. http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html The above link is a formatted list of total deaths by terrorism (in the USA) dating back to 1865. You are 17,600

Re: [cryptography] motivation, research ethics organizational criminality (Re: Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP: Is this still a good proposal?)

2013-09-14 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Sat, Sep 14, 2013 at 7:08 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg jeff...@goldmark.org wrote: On 2013-09-13, at 9:28 AM, David D da...@7tele.com wrote: ... Obviously, we should insist on due process for the NSA stooges. If they confess their activities and name their co-conspirators, we may allow them some

Re: [cryptography] motivation, research ethics organizational criminality (Re: Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP: Is this still a good proposal?)

2013-09-14 Thread David D
Great points all around. Your suggestions for identification and punishment are delightful. Does it do enough? That is up to the person holding the flaming torch leading the angry mob. I commend your vivid imagination and magical abilities to reduce an entire email down to one point and run

Re: [cryptography] motivation, research ethics organizational criminality (Re: Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP: Is this still a good proposal?)

2013-09-14 Thread coderman
On Sat, Sep 14, 2013 at 4:49 PM, David D da...@7tele.com wrote: Great points all around. Your suggestions for identification and punishment are delightful. someone mentioned a bitcoin assassination pool: names to addresses, addresses to kill bid, according to harm perpetuated. if your

[cryptography] [Bitcoin-development] REWARD offered for hash collisions for SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160 and others

2013-09-14 Thread Peter Todd
2.17BTC ($267USD) pledged to the SHA1 reward to date. It's amusing that the Bitcoin scripting language lets you pull off stunts like this; annoying that the scripting language is too limited to pull off much more than this. In any case I'd love to see proof of a SHA1 or RIPEMD160 collision

Re: [cryptography] [Bitcoin-development] REWARD offered for hash collisions for SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160 and others

2013-09-14 Thread Moritz
On 09/15/2013 03:12 AM, Peter Todd wrote: It's amusing that the Bitcoin scripting language lets you pull off stunts like this; annoying that the scripting language is too limited to pull off much more than this. You have seen the CoinWitness proposal?