Re: [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption

2013-09-19 Thread Trevor Perrin
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 1:20 PM, Michael Rogers wrote: > > We're not using time-based updates because of the storage reliability > issue. We're using them because of two issues with message-based updates. > > First, if messages are lost, the sender and recipient can lose > synchronisation: if the

Re: [cryptography] Introducing TDMX - Trusted Domain Messaging eXchange (Specification)

2013-09-19 Thread shawn wilson
Per the purpose - this is to encrypt messages that generally traverse TCP/53 (zone transfer and the like), correct? On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:37 PM, wrote: > Dear cryptographers, > > I've been working privately on the design and proof-of-concept of an > enterprise messaging oriented middleware,

[cryptography] Introducing TDMX - Trusted Domain Messaging eXchange (Specification)

2013-09-19 Thread pjklauser
Dear cryptographers, I've been working privately on the design and proof-of-concept of an enterprise messaging oriented middleware, named "Trusted Domain Messaging eXchange". Think of it as an amalgamation of secure email and file transfer with end2end encryption and mutual authorization. The spec

Re: [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption

2013-09-19 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 19/09/13 08:04, Trevor Perrin wrote: > I'd have to see a writeup to have real comments. But to address > the issue of "fragility": > > It seems you're worried about per-message key updates because in > the (infrequent?) case that a sender's write

Re: [cryptography] [liberationtech] "Ibis: An Overlay Mix Network for Microblogging" by Ian Goldberg

2013-09-19 Thread Eugen Leitl
- Forwarded message from Steve Weis - Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 21:50:45 -0700 From: Steve Weis To: liberationtech Subject: Re: [liberationtech] "Ibis: An Overlay Mix Network for Microblogging" by Ian Goldberg Reply-To: liberationtech It was an interesting talk. The gist is that they've

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength

2013-09-19 Thread ianG
On 19/09/13 00:23 AM, Lucky Green wrote: I get that 1024 bits is about on the edge, about equivalent to 80 bits or a little less, and may be crackable either now or sometime soon. Moti Young and others wrote a book back in the 90's (or perhaps) 80's, that detailed the strength of various RSA ke

Re: [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption

2013-09-19 Thread Trevor Perrin
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 1:36 PM, Michael Rogers wrote: > > Yup, that's the fragile current design I mentioned. :-) The new design > still depends on persistent storage, but it avoids the risk of key > reuse if the persistent storage is unreliable. I'd have to see a writeup to have real comments.