Re: [cryptography] question about heartbleed on Linux

2014-04-10 Thread Sven Moritz Hallberg
On Thu, 10 Apr 2014 10:09:10 -0700 (PDT), "Scott G. Kelly" wrote: > My friend thinks "modern" operating systems clear memory to > prevent inter-process data leakage. Of course, I agree that this is > security goodness, but I wonder if, in the name of performance, this > is "optional". I think ev

[cryptography] GnuPG Crowdfunding

2013-12-20 Thread Moritz Bartl
Main features - Brand new GnuPG website - Release of GnuPG 2.1 - Anonymous Tor network access to gnupg.org - New server for web infrastructure - New user friendly design optimised for desktop and mobile - Fresh download page catering to all devices - Updated collection of external videos, guides, a

Re: [cryptography] A new approach to steganography

2013-12-03 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 03.12.2013 19:27, Bram Cohen wrote: > I came up with a new approach to steganography. There's an > implementation and writeup of it here - > > https://github.com/bramcohen/DissidentX I had a GSoC student working on a browser extension this year that encapsulates steganography algorithms. The i

Re: [cryptography] Deleting data on a flash?

2013-09-23 Thread Moritz
On 09/23/2013 10:02 AM, ianG wrote: >> The issue is that it's pretty much impossible to delete data securely >> from a flash device. > Why is that? The flash memory controller hides the real storage cells from you and spreads writes across all cells equally for wear-leveling. You cannot directly a

Re: [cryptography] [Bitcoin-development] REWARD offered for hash collisions for SHA1, SHA256, RIPEMD160 and others

2013-09-14 Thread Moritz
On 09/15/2013 03:12 AM, Peter Todd wrote: > It's amusing that the Bitcoin scripting language lets you pull off > stunts like this; annoying that the scripting language is too limited to > pull off much more than this. You have seen the "CoinWitness" proposal? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?to

[cryptography] RFC6973: Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols

2013-08-28 Thread Moritz Bartl
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6973 This document offers guidance for developing privacy considerations for inclusion in protocol specifications. It aims to make designers, implementers, and users of Internet protocols aware of privacy- related design choices. It suggests that whether any individu

Re: [cryptography] Recommendations for glossary of cryptographic terms

2013-07-04 Thread Moritz
rminology: http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/Anon_Terminology.shtml Moritz ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

2013-07-01 Thread Moritz
On 01.07.2013 15:33, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: > I think if Tor had an arbitrary queue with store and forward as a high > latency module of sorts, we'd really be onto something. Isn't that what Roger proposed as "Alpha Mixing"? http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#alpha-mixing:pet2006 It could be valuable

[cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

2013-06-13 Thread Moritz
Hi, A foundation offered me money for improving, auditing, or implementing crypto-related software and hardware. We could probably also fund/perform usability studies. Any suggestions? --Mo signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ cr

Re: [cryptography] Certificate expiry reminder tool?

2013-05-23 Thread Moritz
A generic solution is any kind of scheduler/calendar/reminder, right? Or what kind of tool to you imagine, and how is that specific to "crypto"? On 23.05.2013 16:05, Hans-Joachim Knobloch wrote: > Dear all, > > is anyone of you aware of a (preferably open source) tool that keeps a > database of c

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-23 Thread Moritz
On 23.05.2013 11:22, Eugen Leitl wrote: > Considering that Google is dropping XMPP support, I'm investigating > other options, e.g. Jitsi. Has there been a security review for > Jitsi? Not that I know. https://jitsi.org/Main/Features "Call encryption with SRTP and ZRTP for XMPP and SIP" "Call en

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Moritz
On 22.05.2013 10:45, James A. Donald wrote: > This tells me that not that the police are super terrific hackers who > produced customized malware for each person's computer, but that they > are your mother. ... your mother, with a bit of monetary power to simply purchase the knowledge and the tool

Re: [cryptography] New mailing list for crypto politics/non-tech (Was: Cypherpunks mailing list)

2013-03-25 Thread Moritz
Can we slowly move back to crypto on this list, and discuss politics and cypherpunk or whatever definitions on the new one? On 26.03.2013 06:19, James A. Donald wrote: > Politics is collective decision making. Cypherpunk is opposed to > collective decision making. Definition of POLITICS [Merriam

Re: [cryptography] Cypherpunks mailing list

2013-03-25 Thread Moritz
On 25.03.2013 09:25, Adam Back wrote: > because > its a silly domain that people who dislike inviting their addition to a > watch-list will avoid. Isn't exactly that a nice property of a "cypherpunks" list? > Maybe someone with a more neutral domain could try it - or a cypherpunks.* > domain if t

[cryptography] [OT] Hackerbus First Tour Dates: Switzerland, France, Spain, Portugal

2012-03-11 Thread Moritz Bartl
f the first part of the tour: http://www.hackerbus.eu/blog/2012/03/11/first-tour-dates-switzerland-france-spain-portugal.html RSS http://www.hackerbus.eu/feed Thank you! -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ http://www.hackerbus.eu/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital sign

Re: [cryptography] [OT] Bitcoin exchangers broken into: Plesk exploit

2012-03-02 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 02.03.2012 10:56, Moritz Bartl wrote: > Losses of more than $50,000 worth of coins. Together with the statement from Bitcoinica, an exchanger also using Linode VPS services, the losses allegedly amount to roughly $200,000. -- Moritz Bartl http://www.torservers.net/ signature.

[cryptography] [OT] Bitcoin exchangers broken into: Plesk exploit

2012-03-02 Thread Moritz Bartl
ion: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=66916.0 Remote vulnerability in Plesk Panel http://kb.parallels.com/en/113321 -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ cryptography mailing list cr

Re: [cryptography] Bitcoin in endgame

2012-02-23 Thread Moritz Bartl
minality, and (c) at some stage the Feds get involved. Finally, (d) the system collapses." -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] Well, that's depressing. Now what?

2012-01-27 Thread Sven Moritz Hallberg
On Fri, 27 Jan 2012 13:39:44 -0500, Warren Kumari wrote: > If your security widget vendor is malicious, they may include some > sort of storage in devices you purchase, record secret bits and > someone might pull them out in the future > > Surely I am missing something here? Or is that really